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This thesis examines Bulgarian migration to the UK since the lifting of work restrictions 
in 2014. Contesting the economic reductionism of mainstream migration literature, my 
aim is to provide an in-depth understanding of the diverse motivations, experiences, 
and meanings that migration holds for those who engage in it. By following the journeys 
of two groups of Bulgarians who share two different perceptions of class identity, I 
juxtapose their pre-migratory imaginations of life in the UK with the lived realities of 
migration. The phenomenon of migration is approached through the native concept of 
the ‘West’ (Zapadat), which simultaneously denotes the geographical region of western 
Europe and a place offering possibilities for a more meaningful life and a better future. 
By deconstructing this notion through the conceptual prism of the ‘imaginary West’ I 
grasp the connection between individual imaginations and globally circulating 
discourses and ideologies of Western modernity and civilisation and corresponding 
ideas about social hierarchy and class. I show how this idealised and in fact utopian 
version of the West foregrounds individual decisions to migrate and to sustain 
migration projects despite unforeseen hardships and unrealised expectations. I thus 
conclude that the ‘imaginary West’ is a major force structuring and sustaining migration 
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Note on transliteration and translation 
In transliterating Bulgarian names, words, and expressions, I have used the 
Streamlined system which has been made official in Bulgaria since 1995. This system 
avoids diacritical marks and does not distinguish between a and ъ rendering both as 
a. I follow the ‘-ia’ exception introduced by Bulgarian authorities in 2006 which 
postulates the transliteration of end of word -ия as -ia instead of -iya (for example: 
Sofia and not Sofiya). I have used anglicised forms for names of geographical places 
and people. All translations of my informants’ words, or quotes from literature in 
Bulgarian are mine.  
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It was the end of June 2014 and London had been taken by a spell of unusually hot 
weather. That Monday morning, I was on my way to Kingston upon Thames where I 
was going to meet Assen (forty one) for the first time since his arrival to the UK two 
months earlier. I had known him from the time we both worked in the same real estate 
agency in Plovdiv – he as an agent, I as an office assistant. Back then he had returned 
from several years of work in Greece. In those days migration was a much-discussed 
topic in our lunchtime conversations. Unhappy with the lack of opportunities in 
Bulgaria, Assen would often contemplate better life prospects elsewhere. Having lost 
touch for years, I was surprised to hear from him at the beginning of my fieldwork in 
Bulgaria. When I informed him of my project he immediately offered himself as the 
‘perfect’ informant. He and his wife had decided to start a new life in the UK – they 
considered this the best they could do for themselves and their one-year-old daughter. 
They planned for him to find a secure job and accommodation and for the rest of the 
family to join later. This was Assen’s second attempt to ‘conquer’ London – few months 
before our first meeting he had already been to the city working at a carwash for a 
month. Back then he had his wife and daughter with him but they had difficulty getting 
used to their new life there so the whole family decided to go back home. Katya (his 
wife) told me that she felt she was ‘in a prison’:  
I was in shock. Living in a shared house was tough, plus the neighbourhood 
was full of black people. All this noise and bustle were too much for me. Assen 
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wanted to distract me with restaurants and shopping malls. I love shopping but 
at this moment I was so stressed out I didn’t even feel like it. 
Greatly disappointed, they planned to never again return to the UK, but with several of 
Assen’s work projects in Bulgaria failing, they once again changed their minds. ‘This 
time, it will be different’, Assen told me before departing. Firstly, because it was 
summer and there were plenty of jobs; secondly, because he had already secured a 
carpet cleaning position in a friend’s company. He believed that if he learned the 
language he could easily get a ‘decent’ job because he was smart and well-cultured. 
London, he said, was full of success stories of not so bright and educated Bulgarians 
who had ‘made it’ despite their ‘Balkan mentality’. In contrast to Bulgaria, where people 
simply ‘vegetated’, Britain, according to Assen and Katya, was a place where ‘dreams 
come true’. Their main explanation for this perceived discrepancy in the quality of life 
were the two distinct ways of thinking of British and Bulgarian people. Because of their 
subaltern historical fate and their unfortunate geographical location Bulgarians had 
adopted ‘flawed’ values and mentality, Assen told me, while the glorious imperial past 
of the British and their position in western Europe bestowed self-confidence and 
‘civilisational’ virtues.  
While Katya’s dreams were primarily related to achieving a calm and materially secure 
life, Assen desired professional realisation as a life coach and motivational speaker – 
something he expected would bring him ‘inner’ satisfaction and fulfilment. Both stated 
that this was their last chance for bringing a much-needed change into their lives: ‘We 
are sick of waiting and waiting for something to happen. The romantic years are over. 
Now we need to be sober-minded and determined – we need to take our life in our own 
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hands and do what is best for us.’ Before departing Assen vowed to do whatever it 
took to establish himself and his family in the UK and to never return to Bulgaria.  
During our first meeting on British soil, I sensed that this determination and eagerness 
had vanished. As we found a shady spot in the park, adjacent to Assen’s flat, he began 
to tell me about all the adversities he faced during his short stay in London: his job 
arrangement fell through, sorting his documents took longer than expected, there was 
no decent-paying employment, and he quickly ran out of cash. Not speaking English 
had made him feel like a ‘complete outsider’ but finding time for learning it was almost 
impossible. Assen complained about having grown ‘mentally tired’ of spending every 
single day thinking and worrying about his next steps: how to find his place in the UK, 
how to make a living and bring over his family? ‘It is nice here, life is orderly, there are 
rules, and one can make money. If you work then all is good, you can earn some 
qualifications, there are prospects’, he told me as we observed the passers-by. He 
pointed to a couple of dog walkers and exclaimed: ‘Here they are, the British! What a 
fortune it is to be born British in this life, what a thing! Their life is good, their social life 
is proper, they just have it all!’ Bulgarians, on the other hand, Assen believed, were 
born to suffer; they were wanted neither in their homeland nor in the West. ‘You know 
what keeps me awake at night, Polina? That we, Bulgarians, have an unfortunate fate 
– in your own homeland you don’t feel like a person, you come here, and you still don’t 
feel like a person, what a lousy situation [...] what a life!’ 
Like some of my other informants, Assen had always considered himself to be more 
than the ‘average’ Bulgarian: he was well-educated, an intellectual by devotion, and 
believed to have a Western mind-set. His self-attributed middle-class status and many 
talents never brought him financial benefits or any other kind of recognition in Bulgaria. 
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On the contrary, the promises of the past twenty-something years of free market and 
democracy had convinced him that only corrupt and unscrupulous personalities could 
be successful. As many other Bulgarians, Assen decided that the only way to reach 
his aspirations for a better future was migration to the West. He and his wife imagined 
the UK as offering greater opportunities for personal and professional advancement 
and as a place where the ‘normal’ life they so wanted for their family was attainable.  
The multiple blows Assen encountered upon arrival condemned him to suffering and 
disillusionment. Without a National Insurance number (NINo)1, recognised 
qualifications, relevant work experience, and a satisfactory level of English, there was 
not much on offer for him. He spent the year after his arrival moving back and forth 
between Bulgaria and the UK in an effort to avoid long and costly periods of 
unemployment and generate income that would help him establish a permanent life in 
London. Eventually, he grew tired of the anxiety and emotional suffering that such 
circular movement entailed and decided to try and make a living in Bulgaria ‘at least 
for the time being’.   
*** 
Contemporary international migration revolves around a paradox. In the past few years 
the number of people reported to have died or gone missing during attempts to reach 
the West (western Europe and north America) has increased to more than twenty 
                                            
1 The National Insurance Number (NINo) is related to one’s national insurance contributions and taxes. 
While British citizens (above sixteen years of age) are automatically granted one, non-British wishing to 
work in the UK need to apply for it. A NINo is one of the requirements for legal employment and benefits 
claiming. The applicant is required to attend a one-to-one evaluation interview in a local job centre which 
aims at identifying one’s identity and intentions. An evidence of identity can be one or more of the 
following: a passport or an identity card, a residence permit, a birth certificate, a driving licence and a 




thousand.2 Although on an international level the volume of migration has remained 
relatively stable, the number of people moving westwards has been rising since 1970s 
(Sassen 1988) with further upsurges in the 1990s (Castles, de Haas and Miller 2014) 
and in 2015.3 This global trend has been well-reflected in the Bulgarian case especially 
in the post-1990 large-scale migration to western Europe and the US.4 Throughout the 
first two decades of postsocialist transition5 one in every four Bulgarians declared a 
desire to migrate if they could.6 At the same time, exploitation, dismal living 
arrangements, and negative stereotyping have been all well-documented elements of 
migrant existence that often affect people regardless of the qualifications, education, 
and status they held at the beginning of their journeys.7 The anti-immigrant politics and 
discourse that according to some have today peaked in a ‘new wave of global 
resentment’ (Rensmann and Miller 2010: n.p.) are rooted in sentiments that the 
western world has harboured for a long time.  
It is unlikely that already prior to undertaking their journeys migrants are aware of all 
the different hindrances and privations that they are to meet. Still, the general risks, 
difficulties, and social decline that migration entails are no secret to anyone. Why is it 
                                            
2 https://data.humdata.org/organization/iom-missing-migrants-project [Accessed 5 June 2017]. This 
data reflects only the documented death cases, there is of course no precise way of determining the 
exact migrant death toll. 
3 http://gmdac.iom.int/gmdac-migfacts-international-migration [Accessed 5 June 2017]. The United 
States and Germany have been declared the top two migration destinations. The UK comes fourth at 
this ranking.  
4 The lack of reliable and long-term data on Bulgarian migration makes the exact number of migrants 
hard to estimate (see Kabakchieva 2009).  
5 The term refers to the years after 1989 and the end of state socialism when the country was said to 
enter a period of ‘transition’ to free market and democracy.  
6 Rangelova and Vladimirova (2004). 
7 See Pajo (2007), Maeva (2017), Fox, Morosanu and Szilassy (2012) for the case of east and central 
European migrants to western Europe. 
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then that millions of people each year continue to see migration as an attractive option? 
Why do they direct their desires to certain places – western Europe and the US, where, 
as it is widely known they would not be welcomed with open arms?  
The disentanglement of this paradox of popularity despite hostility is the starting point 
of this inquiry into Bulgarian migration to the UK. The interest guiding this qualitative 
investigation was sparked by the expectations and disillusionment that I had 
experienced myself as a migrant on my own journey from Bulgaria to the UK. My casual 
observations and conversations with fellow Bulgarians throughout the years showed 
me that many, just like myself, had left with inflated hopes and coloured imaginations 
that were shattered in the face of migration realities.  
Assen’s story is an illustration of the most recent migrations from Bulgaria to the UK. 
Like him, many of those who came in increased numbers after January 2014 were 
convinced that the lifting of EU restrictions on their right to work would enable them to 
enjoy the status and rights of a fully-fledged European citizenship. Since Bulgaria’s EU 
accession in 2007 which brought about visa-free travel between the two countries the 
number of Bulgarian immigrants has been steadily increasing (Maeva 2017). Still, it is 
not the rising migration number that is most important here. It is rather the hopes, 
aspirations and meaning that people attach to their migration journeys. Many of those 
leaving after 1989 and even more so after 2014 did not see their migration as a 
temporary money-making exercise. They were, instead, motivated by plans of long-
term settlement and dreams of constructing new lives for themselves and their loved 
ones (ibid).  Another phenomenon that requires explanation are the perceptions that 
draw people to particular destinations. Since 1989, Bulgarians with long-term 
settlement intentions have preferred to travel westwards to countries such as Germany 
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and the US, whereas Greece, Italy and Spain have been the main destinations for 
short-term labour mobility (Krasteva 2009). The UK, previously a largely unknown 
migration destination, has been gaining increasing popularity since 2007 and has 
recently been pronounced as one of the two most desired migration destinations for 
Bulgarians.8 
When scrutinised against wider socio-economic and political conditions in Europe and 
the UK in particular, such aspirational journeys appear paradoxical. Firstly, due to the 
‘managed migration’9 approach adopted by British immigration authorities in 2002, 
Bulgarians’ labour market access has been limited to low-skilled and highly exploitative 
occupations in the formal and ‘shadow’ economy (the so-called ‘3D’ jobs – dirty, 
difficult, and dangerous)10. The differentiated treatment of Bulgarians (and Romanians) 
and the much harsher immigration controls directed towards them have assigned them 
the status of ‘incomplete’ Europeans; especially in comparison to citizens from the 
other eight east European countries (‘A8’) that joined the EU in 2004.11 Secondly, such 
exclusionary policies implicitly legitimised the anti-immigration rhetorics taken up by 
British political parties and tabloid media who singled out Bulgarians and Romanians 
as the ultimate threat to the British economy, welfare, and national security. 
Stigmatising representations of Bulgarians and Romanians as ‘benefit tourists’, 
‘criminals’, and ‘uncivilised barbarians’ have fuelled negative public perceptions and 
                                            
8 See Maeva (2017), Pamporov (2011). 
9 Home Office report (2002:12). 
10 See Anderson (2010) for the power of immigration controls in molding a migrant labour force. 
11 See Fox, Morosanu and Szilassy (2012). 
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created a hostile climate towards newcomers from the two countries.12 The intensity of 
such demonising and discriminatory public and political attitudes peaked on the eve of 
the lifting of labour market restrictions on Bulgarian and Romanian workers in January 
2014. The negative reception of Bulgarian immigrants was prominently reported in 
Bulgarian media which for years has drawn attention to numerous cases of 
discrimination, exploitation, and other hardships faced by Bulgarians in the UK.13 
Finally, in popular discourses and perceptions, the issue of downward social mobility 
and de-skilling of Bulgarian migrants who despite their qualifications often do the jobs 
that locals shy away from (for a fraction of the wages at the formal labour market) 
gained increasing prominence in the past few years. In light of all these well-known 
obstacles and resentments, why is migration to the UK still an attractive undertaking 
for Bulgarians? 
The disentanglement of this paradox of popularity despite hostility and desirability 
despite exploitation is the starting point of this inquiry into Bulgarian migration to the 
UK. The main questions guiding this thesis are: 
1. Why do Bulgarians choose to migrate, and why do they migrate to the UK when 
they are aware of the hostile public discourse and the potential hardships they 
could encounter? 
2. How do Bulgarians’ post-migration experiences correspond to their 
expectations of life in the UK?  
3. How do migrants’ lived realities affect the status of the UK as an attractive 
migration destination? 
                                            
12 The British Social Attitudes Survey (2013) demonstrates that a staggering majority of 77% of 
respondents want immigration reduced by ‘little’ or ‘a lot’ (see Ford and Heath 2014:2); See also Fox, 
Morosanu and Szilassy (2012) and Vicol and Allen (2014). 
13 For the proliferation of TV shows and programmes (after 2007) depicting the life of Bulgarian 
immigrants in the EU see Balabanova and Balch (2010) and Elchinova (n.d.). 
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In both popular and academic accounts, the reasons of international migration are 
most often attributed to economic advantage which is said to justify the suffering and 
the decline in status that migrants often undergo in destination countries. In scholarship 
dealing with post-1989 east European migration to the West, the motivations for 
migration have rarely been explored in a way that moves beyond such simplistic 
observations. Such studies often conform to the ‘economic reductionism’ accounts of 
the causes behind contemporary international migration. Wage differentials between 
east and west European countries are presented as the most prominent reasons for 
post-1989 movements.14 A more macro-oriented approach sees east to west migration 
as part of a global trend in which people from developing regions are ‘pushed’ by low 
incomes, high unemployment, and general political and economic instability and 
‘pulled’ by economic opportunities on offer in ‘rich’ countries where they can easily 
improve their situation.15  
These orthodox views have dominated academic and public thinking about migration 
and have largely foregrounded social policy and decision making. Such positions, 
however, fail to engage with let alone answer important questions related to the lived 
experiences of international migration and its significance for those who engage in it. 
Firstly, reducing migration to rational cost-benefit calculation or global economic 
inequalities ignores the fact that people are also affective beings who entertain dreams 
and imaginations and that logic and rationality do not always and exclusively lead their 
migratory projects. Additionally, orthodox approaches do not tackle the complex 
interplay between individual motivations and structural forces that underlie the difficult 
                                            
14 See Morawska (1995) and Black et al. (2010).  
15 See Krasteva, Kassabova and Karabinova (2010), Mintchev and Boshnakov (2006). 
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choice between ‘leaving’ and ‘staying’ and thus tell us very little about the complexity 
of being a migrant. Secondly, even when economic privation is a significant push-
factor, it is important to notice that usually it is not the most destitute members of 
society who are migrating. Nor are people from the poorest countries at the top of 
migration statistics.16 With considerable investment and effort required, migration is not 
a strategy available to everyone and thus not simply a matter of choice, as mainstream 
migration research portrays it.17 Thirdly, the assumptions on which dominant 
theoretical approaches rest often overlook the realities awaiting migrants in receiving 
societies – in many cases instead of reaping financial benefits migrants suffer 
economic decline. For instance, in most cases they earn significantly less than the 
average wage and existential minimum in receiving economies.18 Finally, such theories 
do not account for the non-economic factors of migration, for example the cultural and 
historical links between countries or the social and political dynamics which can explain 
why individuals choose one of several destinations that all offer similar living standards.  
This thesis tries to fill these gaps by engaging with migrants’ own perspectives on and 
experiences of migration. As an in-depth study of Bulgarian migration to the UK, it tries 
to understand migration through individuals’ own concepts and practices, the values 
they attach to the process of migration, and the stories they share to make sense of 
the ‘new world’ they find themselves in and the multiple changes that they undergo. By 
drawing on qualitative data collected during twelve months of fieldwork in Bulgaria and 
the UK, this thesis intends to provide a holistic and longitudinal engagement with 
                                            
16 Stalker (2001). 
17 Ibid. 
18 See Anderson et al. (2006), Borjas (1995). 
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individuals’ migratory projects. By following people at every stage of the migration 
process, I examine the way in which they interpret their situation at different steps of 
their journeys and trace changes in their opinions, perspectives, and experiences 
throughout time. This multi-sited approach (Marcus 1995) allows for a comparison 
between the expectations and imaginations of life in the UK that motivate aspiring 
migrants in Bulgaria and the realities that they encounter in the weeks, months, and 
years after their arrival.  
This thesis investigates the migration experiences and motivations of Bulgarians with 
plans for long-term settling in the UK. It engages with people coming from a wide range 
of backgrounds, ages, and various Bulgarian localities. Migrants’ narratives 
demonstrate that what motivates their migrations is a complex combination of different 
factors and circumstances. On one hand, it is their dissatisfaction with their present 
situation in Bulgaria and the multiple constraints that engender a widely-shared feeling 
of ‘existential stagnation’. They are unable to imagine a viable future, feel a lack of 
movement forward in life and have a sense of diminished control and agency. On the 
other hand, they imagine their migration destination as a place offering a radically 
different life – one providing plentiful opportunities for fulfilment not only in an economic 
sense but in relation to overall existential satisfaction and achievement.  
In my effort to account for the key function that imagination assumes in the formation 
of desires and expectations driving migration I utilise Alexey Yurchak’s concept of the 
‘imaginary West’ (Yurchak 2006). I stress the intersection between subjective 
imaginations and wider imaginary constructs to reveal how the emic notion of the West 
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(Zapadat)19 that my informants evoked in their pre-migration imaginings of life in the 
UK reflects the supremacy of Western modernity and its developmental promise. The 
ethnographic cases in this thesis illustrate that the reasons for my informants’ 
migrations are rooted in their perceptions of physical mobility as the only accessible 
strategy for achieving a much longed-for sense of existential advancement. Such 
understandings are embedded in pervasive visions of a hierarchically structured world 
in which different nation-states are ordered according to their ability to approximate an 
idealised Western telos. Would-be migrants’ narratives reveal their desire to 
experience a Western kind of life upon migrating, one that they eagerly awaited but 
could never enjoy in Bulgaria. In distinction to Yurchak’s (2006) analysis of how the 
‘imaginary West’ always remains a fictitious ‘elsewhere’ in late Soviet socialism, I 
demonstrate how despite clashing with the realities of migrant life in the UK, the West 
in my informants’ imaginaries is continuously renegotiated, re-projected and sustained 
as a benchmark guiding future aspirations.   
As this research shows, Bulgarian migrants’ early experiences in the UK expose them 
to jolts and challenges that they find hard to navigate. These are mostly related to 
structural limitations such as formal and informal bureaucratic barriers, a highly flexible 
and exploitative labour market, and different forms of everyday exclusion and 
discrimination. Thus, instead of reaping the benefits of their European Union 
citizenship they find themselves caught up in a situation of de facto illegality – 
                                            
19 Throughout the thesis I do not use inverted commas when mentioning the ‘West’ or the adjective 
‘Western’, however, I understand them as referring to social and ideological constructs and not as solely 





employed as undocumented workers and dependent on the services provided by the 
informal economy of the Bulgarian migrant community. Insufficient language skills, lack 
of recognition of former qualifications and employment experience, little cultural and 
social capital, and their own insecurities and doubts increase Bulgarian migrants’ 
feelings of existence in a reality parallel to that of society at large. As a way of coping 
with the disappointment of their pre-migration expectations and their marginal and 
precarious existence, migrants devise practices that help them sustain their pursuit of 
a Western kind of life. My long-term engagement with the lives of my informants in the 
UK demonstrates that the Western dream largely eludes them. I show that in many 
cases migration results not only in despair and disillusionment but in fact in an 
existence worse off than the one experienced in Bulgaria. However, the social 
pressures and expectations that often accompany migration make it impossible for 
many to admit defeat or abandon their projects and return home. Instead they construct 
different strategies which help them to come to terms with their present and to sustain 
a positive outlook. Thus, instead of being debunked as illusory, the West continues to 
be pursued as a powerful dream guiding future life expectations. Their unwillingness 
to present a truthful depiction of their realities in the UK and the incapacity of their 
social circle to accept them feed into a ‘cycle of deception’ (Mahler 1995) in which the 
West continues to be reproduced as an idealised place constantly luring new cohorts 
of migrants.  
 
Overview of Bulgarian migration to western Europe and the UK  
Migration has been an important feature of Balkan and Bulgarian history since the mid-
nineteenth century (Brunnbauer 2012, Hristov 2015). Seasonal labour mobility of 
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Bulgarian craftsman (gurbet) and agricultural workers within the boundaries of the 
Ottoman empire emerged as a common economic strategy driven by limited livelihood 
opportunities in the mountainous regions of the country. This large-scale cross-
regional mobility was predominantly undertaken by men whilst women were mostly 
engaged in travel in search for work as maidservants (Hristov 2015). The first 
significant overseas migration wave from the Balkans to the US, Australia, Canada, 
and South America20 took place in the beginning of the twentieth century. Within a 
short period of time Bulgaria had participated in three different wars – the First Balkan 
war (1912-1913), the Second Balkan War (1913), and the First World War (1915-1918) 
which resulted in loss of national territory, high reparation payments, and the 
devastating collapse of the national economy (Jakimova 2009). Because of these wars 
and the redrawing of territorial borders, seasonal economic mobility within the former 
Ottoman Empire subsided (Hristov 2015). The transatlantic labour mobility that 
replaced it retained some of the main characteristics of the earlier gurbet movements 
– temporary, male-dominated, driven by economic incentives, and always maintaining 
close transnational links with the home society.21 With time, many of the migrants 
became permanent settlers and initiated the establishment of Bulgarian diaspora 
organisations in major migration destinations (Hristov 2015, Elchinova n. d.). Most 
Bulgarian workers, like other migrants coming from the Balkan region, satisfied the 
need for cheap and unskilled labour in the rapidly industrialising western economies. 
In the US, Bulgarians laboured in factories, mills, mines, and railways, whereas most 
                                            
20 During the same period Bulgarians also headed towards destinations in central and western Europe-
especially towards the former Austro-Hungarian empire (Elchinova n.d.).  
21 Overseas migration in the beginning of the twentieth century was also a strategy of avoiding military 
service (Hristov 2015). 
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of those departing for Australia sought work as gardeners (Tzaneva 2015, Markov 
2015). The imagination of this first wave of Bulgarian migrants was sparked by widely 
circulating tales about the riches of distant places and the many opportunities they 
offered for young, able-bodied males. The image of the ‘American El Dorado’ was 
spread throughout the remote village regions of the Balkans in the stories of return 
migrants, travelling merchants, and recruitment agents (Markov 2015, Kolev and Kuluri 
2012).22 The period between the two world wars was marked by a drastic decrease in 
transnational migration flows – a result of the restrictive immigration policies put in 
place by the US, Canada, western Europe and other popular migration destinations 
(Markov 2015).  
Traditionally, Britain served as a ‘distributional centre’ (Maeva 2017: 26) for Bulgarians 
on the route to the US, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia, rather than as a migration 
destination. In the beginning of the twentieth century, however, many Bulgarians 
sought employment as labourers, factory, agricultural and ship workers, miners, and 
servants23. Again, these were predominantly young single males, although with time 
female single-travellers arrived and started working as nurses and maids. Britain 
remained unattractive as an educational centre for Bulgarians, mainly because of the 
unpopularity of the English language24, the high tuition fees, and the negative attitudes 
towards the country given its support of the Ottoman Empire’s policies (Maeva 2017). 
                                            
22 Other factors that played role in migrants’ motivations according to Jakimova were the emergence of 
nuclear families and the population growth which reached its peak in 1930s (2009).  
23 Far less were those engaged in high-skilled employment as traders, clerics, insurance agents, lawyers 
and medical doctors (Maeva 2017). 
24 French and German were the two most popular foreign languages in Bulgaria at the time. 
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After World War Two the pattern and character of Bulgarian migration changed. Labour 
mobilities gave way to a wave of displaced people and political asylum-seekers who 
opposed Bulgaria’s involvement in the German alliance (1941) and the establishment 
of the Communist rule in 1944. The size of the Bulgarian community in the UK 
significantly increased. The majority of new arrivals were white collar workers and 
intellectuals who established organisations and activities in support of the Bulgarian 
political exiles and refugees throughout Europe.25  
During state socialism (1944-1989) opportunities for transnational mobility to the West 
significantly declined.26 Still, the period was marked by numerous migrations: except 
for the ethnic and politically motivated mobilities another significant flow was the labour 
mobility of contracted workers and specialists to other socialist countries and the Arab 
world. Highly-skilled Bulgarian workers took part in the building of power plants, 
factories, and hospitals in Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, and elsewhere (Krasteva 2014). 
Study exchange trips, educational migration, and tourist mobilities to different socialist 
countries were also widespread. Labour migration was entirely regulated by bilateral 
agreements with countries from the Warsaw Pact or with the Arab world and others 
sympathising with Communist principles.27 
Between 1944 and 1989 the Bulgarian community in the UK comprised different 
migrant groups: most numerous were political and economic migrants, followed by 
                                            
25 The founding of the Bulgarian section of the BBC in 1940 by political emigres is an extremely important 
factor for the consolidation of the Bulgarian diaspora, its visibility, and in sustaining links with the 
homeland. The number of the officially residing Bulgarians in the UK rose from 29 to 93 between 1944-
1989 which is still significantly less than the Bulgarian communities in other European countries (Maeva 
2017: 44-45). 
26 Intense border controls and a system of exit visas significantly complicated travel outside of the 
country (see Elchinova n.d., Kovacheva 2014). 
27 See Elchinova (n.d.), Krasteva (2014). 
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those who had arrived before 1940s (Maeva 2017). Most Bulgarian workers remained 
concentrated in the industrial, service and agricultural sectors. Few developed 
business enterprises and engaged in intellectual and artistic occupations (Maeva 
2017).28  
The fall of state socialism in 1989 and the liberalisation of border controls to western 
Europe brought a new period in Bulgarian migration that was marked by a drastic 
increase in the number and diversity of cross-border mobilities. Despite the lack of 
widely-accepted periodisation of this most recent migration, three main time periods 
can be discerned that reflect different patterns, characteristics, and strategies: (i) 1989 
– 2001; (ii) 2001-2009; (iii) 2009 to the present.29 The first wave of migrations took 
place in the early 1990s when many Bulgarians headed westwards, mainly to 
Germany, Austria, and the US as asylum seekers, undocumented workers, and 
students. This sudden and intense increase in migration was attributed to the drastic 
economic decline, dismantling of state-run industries and farms, growing 
unemployment rate, decreased purchasing power, and the collapse of the banking 
system (Giordano and Kostova 2000; Baichinska 1997).30 The neoliberal ‘shock 
therapy’31 reforms also led to social welfare reductions and the transformation of family 
and local community structures which in turn gave rise to pessimistic evaluations of 
                                            
28 Still, the number of Bulgarians in the UK at the time remained relatively small compared to the 
Bulgarian communities in Germany, Austria, and Italy (Markova 2009). 
29 I chose to follow Elchinova’s periodisation which takes account not only of the size of migration flows 
but the changing socio-economic and political context in Bulgaria and the changing migration regimes 
of different EU countries concerning Bulgarian citizens (n.d.).  
30 The period was also characterised by mass privatisation of industries, rigid financial discipline, and 
imposition of a currency board in 1997 (see Medarov and Tsoneva 2014). 
31 A metaphor describing a western-devised doctrine postulating the rapid implementation of market 
reforms in ‘new democracies’ across the world (Mandel and Humphrey 2002: 2). 
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the situation amongst large number of Bulgarians (Elchinova n.d.). As a temporary 
project, labour mobility often served as a survival strategy, although many Bulgarians 
shared intentions for permanent settlement in the West (Kabakchieva 2009). The 
desire to exercise the newly found freedom of movement and curiosity about western 
societies have been pointed to as important factors in motivating migration in these 
first ‘transitional’ years.32 Visa requirements for most west European countries and the 
double structure of the host labour markets meant that both unskilled and qualified 
Bulgarians often became undocumented workers in agriculture, construction, domestic 
care, textile industries, hotels, and restaurants (Dimitrova and Kahl 2014, Kabakchieva 
2009).  
The second period in contemporary Bulgarian migration was marked by a public 
discourse of EU accession and the granting of visa-free access33 to Schengen member 
countries in 2001 (Elchinova n.d.). Albeit with declining rates, the migration of 
Bulgarians continued, this time re-orientated towards south European destinations 
such as Greece, Spain, and Italy.34 Scholars have explained this shift in direction with 
the establishment of different work schemes, the higher tolerance of local authorities 
towards undocumented workers, and the close geographical proximity of the countries 
in question (Markova 2009). This second period was also characterised by a clear shift 
from permanent to temporal and circular mobility made possible by the greater 
openness and accessibility of EU labour markets and the affordability of travel (Bobeva 
2017). Whereas the high migration rates throughout the 1990s were explained with 
                                            
32 See Krasteva (2014), Ditchev (2008), Mancheva and Troeva (2011). 
33 Bulgarians were given the right of a legal three-month stay in Schengen member states but many 
used this as an entry point and stayed as ‘illegal’ migrants for longer periods of time.  
34 Rangelova and Vladimirova (2004). 
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people’s growing disillusionment with the devastating effects of the market reforms, 
the decline of migration in this second period was attributed to the hopes and 
expectations that came with Bulgaria’s 2007 EU accession (Elchinova 2009). More 
employment opportunities, increased income per capita, and relative political and 
economic stability (Markova 2009)35 were other reasons for the decrease in migration 
numbers.  
The global economic crisis of 2008 began to affect Bulgaria in the beginning of 2009 
when the so-called ‘economic boom’ of the previous few years came to a halt. 
Increased inflation, sharp rise in unemployment, consistent decline in GDP and 
reduced consumption ensued (Tomev 2013). Austerity policies, first introduced in the 
beginning of the 1990s with the start of the ‘free-market transformation’ of the country, 
were enforced with even greater intensity after 2009 as a way of stabilising the 
economy and decreasing deficits (Medarov and Tsoneva 2014). However, they failed 
to bring any improvement and resulted in a social crisis characterised by ‘alarming 
poverty levels and increasing social unrest’.36 The crisis and austerity deepened social 
inequalities and drastically escalated income stratification – in 2013 half of the 
country’s population faced high risk of poverty and social exclusion (Tomev 2013, 
Medarov and Tsoneva 2014). Bulgarians’ average salaries have been the lowest in the 
EU (396 EUR)37 and 67% of the workforce at the time received a monthly salary below 
                                            
35 The explanation behind the decreased migration rates in the period was corroborated by my 
informants who remembered the 2007 and 2008 as a period of relative improvement in their living 
standard.  
36 Statement in the European Commission report of 2013 on EU Employment and Social Situation, cited 
in Medarov and Tsoneva (2014). 




the national average (Tomev 2013). In the beginning of 2013 the accumulated social 
discontent erupted into massive protests against austerity, which resulted in the 
dissolution of the incumbent centre-right government. The newly elected coalition 
lasted only one year, did not revise austerity policies and even initiated further 
privatisation of public goods and services (Ivancheva 2013).  
The most significant trend in this most recent period of increased migration has been 
the shift of Bulgarians’ movements from ‘traditional’ destinations such as Spain, 
Greece and Italy to the United Kingdom and Germany38. Bulgarian scholars have 
attributed this change of pattern to the harsher impact of the economic recession on 
south-European economies and their decreased demand for migrant labour (Bobeva 
2017).  
The first major influx of Bulgarians to the UK occurred in the years after Bulgaria’s EU 
accession and consisted of both first-time migrants and Bulgarians resettling from 
European countries severely hit by the global recession in 2008. Maeva explains this 
change in migration flows and the steady growth of the Bulgarian diaspora with the 
changing migrants’ perceptions of the UK. The country came to be seen as offering 
high living standard, strong economy and numerous employment opportunities (2017). 
For only a short period of time the UK has managed to turn from a country unknown, 
remote and relatively unattractive to one of the two most preferred migration 
                                            
38 See International migration outlook OECD (2012), Kovacheva (2014), Maeva (2017); Although 
reliable data on return migration from the period is not available in Bulgarian public discourse the return 
of migrants mostly from southern Europe was widely debated. It has been established that in 2009 
(2010) when the negative effects of the global recession came to affect Bulgarian economy migration 
numbers decreased (Deneva 2017). The reasons for this could be attributed to the people’s perceptions 
of the worsening economic situation in different European countries and their own lack of economic 
capital required for migration. This observation is corroborated by my informants who claimed that during 
this time they considered migration a too risky endeavour and preferred to wait out for the effects of the 
crisis to abate before taking the decision to leave.  
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destinations (along with Germany) for labour and educational migrants alike.39 This 
abrupt change in migrants’ attitudes and perceptions was attributed to the relative 
economic stability that the country managed to sustain in the aftermath of 2008 
economic crisis and the increasing popularity of the English language (Maeva 2017, 
Genova 2016a).  
Until 2014 the opportunities for legal employment for Bulgarians in the UK were 
restricted.40 After the EU accession of Bulgaria, the British authorities limited Bulgarian 
citizens’ access to the UK labour market. Bulgarians were granted a three-month visa-
free stay in the country, after which they were required to obtain a work permit. The 
only way to enter the labour market legally was by either acquiring a self-employed 
status or by working in the processing and agricultural sectors as part of established 
work schemes for low-skilled workers.41 Studies have demonstrated that many of the 
Bulgarians who made use of these legal entry channels overstayed their temporary 
permits and became undocumented labourers in the construction, cleaning, and 
agricultural sectors where in many cases they received less than the national minimum 
wage (Markova 2009, Ivancheva 2007). Because of the undocumented status of many, 
and given the lack of official statistical data of the exact number of entries, the precise 
                                            
39 See Maeva (2017). Data from Bulgarian National Statistical Institute from 2014/2015 has 
demonstrated that the UK was the most favoured educational destination for Bulgarian students (cited 
in Bobeva 2017). 
40 Prior to 2014 Bulgarians wishing to legally work in the UK had to obtain a valid work permit (for the 
different forms of work permits see Maeva 2017: 67-69) Bulgarians’ access to social welfare provisions 
was also restricted. For comparison, Greece, Denmark, Hungary, and Portugal lifted labour market 
restrictions for Bulgarian workers in 2009. Germany, Austria, France and others allowed full access for 
Bulgarians in 2014. 
41 The Seasonal agricultural work scheme (SAWS) established in 2004 permitted quota entry of students 
outside EEA in unqualified seasonal jobs. Despite the exploitation involved the scheme became a 
popular summer work option for Bulgarian students who could not afford similar travel-and-work 
programmes to the US (see Ivancheva 2007). It should be noted that the UK also allowed legal 
employment for highly qualified workers.   
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figure of Bulgarian migration to the UK in the period in question remains difficult to 
establish. According to the Office of National Statistics in the UK, the total number of 
Bulgarians residing in the UK in this period was approximately 60,000 people.42  
The lifting of the transitory labour market restrictions for Bulgarian and Romanian 
citizens in the beginning of 2014 led to the second and most recent upsurge in the 
number of Bulgarian newcomers in the UK. In its intensity this increase in migration 
numbers falls drastically short of the hysterical predictions circulating in populist media 
and political discourses. There is no precise estimation of the number of newcomers, 
but data gathered from several official sources attests to a certain rise in Bulgarian 
arrivals post 2014. The Office of National Statistics in the UK reports a threefold 
increase in the number of NINo applications made by Bulgarians in the first year since 
the granting of full access to the UK labour market43. It should be noted that this figure 
comprises applications from short-term and circular migrants, as well as, those arrived 
before January 2014. Estimates of the Bulgarian born population in the UK made by 
the Annual Population Survey demonstrate a 30% increase in the number of Bulgarian 
residents from 2014 to 2016.44  
Since the start of my initial fieldwork in 2013, I myself have noticed an increase in the 
presence and visibility of Bulgarians in London and Birmingham. Despite this, the 
Bulgarian migrant group in the country remains relatively small compared to the size 
                                            
42 Population by Country of Birth and Nationality tables January 2013 to December 2013. Available at: 
www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/...2014/rft-table-2---population-by-cob.Xls [Accessed 5 July 2017]. 
43http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20160105160709/http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/migration
1/migration-statistics-quarterly-report/february-2015/sty-bulgarian-and-romanian-migration-to-the-
uk.html. [Accessed 25 June 2017]. 
44https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigrati
on/datasets/populationoftheunitedkingdombycountryofbirthandnationality [Accessed 25 June 2017].  
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of other migrant populations and especially, to the number of migrants from other 
postsocialist countries (i.e., Polish, Romanians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Slovaks, and 
Hungarians).45  
Traditionally, Bulgarians have settled in larger cities such as London, Birmingham, 
Manchester, Edinburgh and Glasgow which offer more employment opportunities and 
where East European and Bugarian migrant communities exist.46 London is where 
most Bulgarians in the UK live.47 Although Bulgarians are scattered throughout the city 
the highest concentration of Bulgarian businesses and homes ever since the early 90s 
is to be observed in the North and East parts of the city (zones 4, 5 and 6). In recent 
years larger number of Bulgarians settle in different localities outside London – the 
highest growing diasporas could be found in Southeast, East and West Midlands 
regions – drawn by the growing availability of jobs, the lower livings costs, and not least 
the greater ethnic homogeneity that life outside London offers.48 
Bulgarian migration to the UK has been characterised by institutional discrimination, a 
result of the ‘managed migration’ policy agenda set by the British government in 2002. 
Under this approach, in 2004 ‘A8’ citizens were granted full access to the British labour 
market in an effort to satisfy labour demands in specific sectors. The much stricter 
immigration controls adopted towards Bulgarian and Romanian workers in 2006 (a 
reply to the panic produced by the unexpectedly high numbers of ‘A8’ migrants) in 
                                            
45https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigrati
on/datasets/populationoftheunitedkingdombycountryofbirthandnationality. [Accessed 25 June 2017].  
46 A trend that exists ever since the 1944-1989 period of Bulgarian migration to the UK (Maeva 2017).  
47 According to the date provided by the last UK Census of 2011 27, 207 Bulgarians live in London which 
is more than half of all Bulgarians living in the UK. 
48 According to Nygaard, Psierbek, Francis-Brophy’s (2013) report the South East region contains the 
largest concentration of Bulgarian and Romanian migrants after London – 16%. 
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effect stripped them off the rights and freedoms related to their EU citizenship. Their 
de facto status of ‘second hand’ Europeans was further promoted by a political 
campaign which in turn provoked hostile public attitudes towards newcomers from the 
two countries. The circulation of hostile and discriminatory popular understandings and 
perceptions of Bulgarian and Romanian migrants in British society has been achieved 
mainly through the anti-immigration campaign taken up by British tabloids since 2006. 
In the media, they have been commonly stereotyped – often in a racialised manner – 
as criminal, poor, uneducated and culturally-inferior invaders posing a threat to the 
British moral and social order.49 The cumulative effects of discriminatory immigration 
policies and public discourses on Bulgarian and Romanian migrant experiences have 
not yet been a subject of rigorous investigation.50 Some of the findings of the scarce 
literature on the topic point to a process of identity questioning, feelings of being out of 
place and a rise in intra-community hostility as effects of the encounter with everyday 
discriminatory narratives and practices. Mila Maeva’s (2017) study on Bulgarian 
migrants in the UK, for example, talks about the feelings of discontent and rejection 
that such policies and discourses provoke but also the role they play in relegating 
newcomers to the confines of precarious and undesirable segments of the British 
labour market. Exploring the motivations, experiences and hopes of this most recent 
group of Bulgarian migrants is the key focus of this study.  
 
                                            
49 Fox, Morosanu and Szilassy (2012) study on tabloid representation of Romanian and Hungarian 
migrants demonstrates how in the framing of these recent migration flows media borrows racialised 
culturalist discourses used in the framing of past migrations to the UK. See also COMPAS’s study on 
the representations of Bulgarians and Romanians in the British press (2012-2013) by Vicol and Allen 
(2014). 
50 For exceptions see Bulat (2017), Yuval-Davis et al. (2017), Vicol (2017). 
25 
 
Postsocialist East to West migration 
In order to better understand the post-1989 migrations of Bulgarians to the UK and the 
role of the ‘imaginary West’ as a powerful driving force behind them it is important to 
consider the wider structural factors related to the collapse of state socialism and the 
socio-economic and ideological change that took place in eastern European societies. 
The adoption of the western developmental model in postsocialist societies led to the 
reordering of public policy and social organisation according to the principles of free 
market, private property and democratic and transparent governance. This 
refashioning came to pervade all spheres of life, as people embraced the ideology of 
western modernity under the promise that a collective effort to transform their country 
would eventually lead to economic development, prosperity and living standards equal 
to those in western Europe. Transnational migrations and short-term labour mobilities 
from the region to the West have been recognised as a widespread response to the 
effects of structural adjustment policies and neoliberal reforms introduced throughout 
postsocialist states after 1989.51 
With variations across different states, the implementation of ‘shock-therapy’ reforms 
including privatisation, deregulation of financial and commodity markets, de-
collectivisation of the agricultural sector, and withdrawal of state welfare did not bring 
the expected results.52 On the contrary, the introduction of neoliberal policies resulted 
in the closure of industries and entire sectors of production which led to mass 
unemployment, impoverishment of large parts of the population, and gaping 
                                            
51 See Kaneff and Pine (2011). 
52 See Berdahl, Bunzi and Lampland (2000), Hann (2002), Mandel and Humphrey (2002). 
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inequalities between a minority that was positioned well enough to navigate or profit 
from the restructuring and society at large.53 Ethnographically-informed research has 
shown the effects of economic and political transformations on different aspects of 
individual existence, such as increasingly strained family relations and social networks 
(Benovska-Sabkova 2014, Creed 2002), deteriorating psychological and physical 
wellbeing (Kideckel 2002, Watson 1995) and the difficulties and moral dilemmas of 
adaptation to the new postsocialist realities (Mandel and Humphrey 2002, Kaneff 
2002). Furthermore, scholars analysed the different individual and household 
responses devised in an effort to escape economic hardship and deprivation, for 
instance, household and subsistence production, informal economic activity, and 
small-scale entrepreneurship.54 
Against the backdrop of such coping strategies and the fear and uncertainty produced 
by the economic reforms, different forms of labour migration to the West have emerged 
as a more fundamental and long-term solution to the problems faced by large parts of 
east European populations.55 Thus, migration to western Europe has been theorised 
as an individual reaction to relative poverty and economic underdevelopment and 
therefore as a reflection of the global inequalities between capital-rich western 
economies and the cheap labour pool in eastern Europe.56  
However, these explanations are only part of the story and often differ from people’s 
own understandings of migration. In this thesis, I argue that east European migration 
                                            
53 Kideckel (2002), Pine (2002), Schroder and Vonderau (2008). 
54 See Bridger and Pine (1998), Kaneff and Pine (2011), Medarov et al. (2015).  
55 See Kaneff and Pine (2011), Kideckel (2011), Pine (2014). 
56 See Burrell (2010), Goerlich and Luecke (2011), Kaneff and Pine (2011). 
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needs to be understood in the context of the ideological shift from state socialism to 
liberal democratic capitalism and the expectations and hopes for a better life this gave 
rise to. The symbolic division of the world into communist East and capitalist West 
drawn by Cold War politics rested on an ideological confrontation between two different 
conceptions of modernity that left its mark on public perceptions and collective 
imaginations (Verdery 1996). In the official discourse and politics of socialist societies, 
the West was constructed as an ultimate ideological enemy of the socialist order. 
However, certain aspects of the West were regarded as positive depending on the 
particular historical moment and context. The contradictory late-Soviet policy towards 
western cultural influence and commodities and the corresponding image of the West 
in popular imagination has been analysed by Alexey Yurchak (2006). He explains how 
one and the same cultural forms, jazz, for instance, could be interpreted as a 
transmitters of bourgeois values and moral decay and as symbols of internationalism 
and expression of the creativity of the working classes, at one and the same time 
(Yurchak 2006). Thus, the appropriation of western cultural tastes, commodities and 
behaviours and the underlying desires and idealisations did not come into conflict with 
Soviet ideology but in a certain way even contributed to its reproduction. According to 
Shiraev and Zubok (2000) this ‘choking hunger’ for western modernity (with a specific 
focus on America) in the Soviet world throughout the 1980s was also a result of the 
ideological messages spread by American media outlets and their support for local 
dissidents’ anti-communist ideas. Pilkington et al. (2002: 7) further assert how the 
restricted and biased information available to Soviet citizens contributed to the 
elevation of the West to a symbol of a ‘normal [...] life’ and a civilisational standard.  
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With the collapse of state socialism, the West turned from a utopian and geopolitically 
remote construct to a main doctrine defining the political, economic and cultural path 
of east European societies (Sampson 1998). According to Peshkopia (2010), western 
capitalism is fetishised by postsocialist individuals in their attempts to approximate a 
utopian social order which is expected to ensure a happy and economically satisfying 
life for all. He recognises this mythologising as resulting from individuals’ desire to 
construct an ideological counterpart to the socialist order and, secondly, as rooted in 
the mystification of the West following from its demonisation and negation in official 
ideological discourse (Peshkopia 2010). He explains the mass support for capitalism 
and its political and normative order with postsocialist societies’ propensity for 
teleological thinking and way of relating to the future (ibid). In this sense, while the 
Marxist conception of modernity became replaced by the western capitalist one, the 
teleological understanding of the path towards modernity, development, and progress 
remained the same.  
Anthropological literature on postsocialist eastern Europe has shown the different ways 
in which people have attempted to appropriate the West through practices of 
consumption (Patico and Caldwell 2002, Rausing 2002), architecture and interior 
design (Fehervary 2002, Hartman 2007), lifestyle and cultural activities (Pilkington et 
al. 2002). However, the role of the Western cultural imaginary has not been explored 
beyond these few examples. This thesis attempts to demonstrate how Western 
imaginings work as a driving force behind migration from eastern Europe to the West. 
The historical significance of the West in the socialist and postsocialist collective 
imagination foregrounds the relevance and importance of analysing the effects on the 
latter on individual life-worlds, as well as spatial and social mobilities.  
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Methodological reflections and ethics  
This study has adopted an inductive, ethnographic approach to data gathering and 
analysis. It combines participant observation and informal conversations as main 
methods of data collection. Such a holistic approach elucidates individual perspectives 
and analyses them against particular historical, cultural, political and economic 
background. Most importantly, theoretical concepts emerge and develop in the process 
of data gathering and analysis.  
For Geertz, the study of human culture and social experiences involves engaging with 
the ‘symbolic forms – words, images, institutions, behaviors’ through which people 
‘represent themselves to themselves and to one another’ (1983: 58).  The ‘grasping of 
the native’s point of view’ (Malinowski 1922: 25) through physical and emotional 
immersion into the life-worlds of those in the focus of research interest has been the 
main principle of the ethnographic endeavour. The approach has been described as 
inductive – conclusions and theoretical reflections emerge from the data and not from 
previously acquired knowledge (Robben 2007).  A holistic engagement ensures that 
the links between different aspects of individuals’ lives are considered and local 
phenomena and understandings are brought into perspective through their broad 
contextualisation (Sluka and Robben 2007). Subsumed under the category of 
qualitative research methods, the ethnographic methodology, considered central to 
anthropology, has gained much popularity amongst researchers from a variety of 
disciplines including sociology, migration studies, and geography (Hammersley and 
Atkinson 1995, Sluka and Robben 2007).  
The aim of this study is to ethnographically account for the experiences of Bulgarian 
migrants to the UK and to provide understanding of their motivations for migration. 
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Long-term participant observation was used as the main technique of data collection. 
Participant observation requires the researcher to constantly negotiate between their 
insider and outsider identities – subjectively experiencing and grasping meanings 
shared by those under study and at the same time maintaining some distance in 
observing and evaluating practices and understandings (Clifford and Marcus 1986). 
One of the main benefits of the approach is that by ‘being there’ (Fernandez 1985: 19) 
the researcher is able to grasp the difference between peoples’ accounts and 
intentions and their actual practices (Bryman 2001).  
The ethnographic approach has been identified as the most suitable in the study of 
migration for several reasons (Glick Schiller 2003). Firstly, it helps elucidate the causes 
and the process of migration by prioritising individual meanings and perceptions and 
interpreting them against existing structural constrains and opportunities (Pessar 
2003). In this way, ethnography can bridge the dichotomy between person-centred and 
macro-level explanations of migration models and challenge some of the 
misconceptions still dominating migration research and public beliefs (Pessar 2003). 
Secondly, this research offers a longitudinal perspective into the lives of migrants – it 
accounts for the continuities and changes that they undergo. Intentions about moving 
or staying, desires and expectations are not constant in time; they change depending 
on different subjective and external factors. Quantitative methods (surveys, 
questionnaires, etc.) gauge a present sentiment – a snapshot of a moment in time - 
whereas ethnography gives us a perspective into processes across a variety of 
contexts (Glick Schiller 2003). Finally, the approach recognises the fact that migration 
is a cultural event for those who engage in it. It is invested with culturally specific 
meanings and understandings. Tony Fielding (1992) posits that ‘only ethnographic 
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research can reveal the subtle details of the experience of migration’ and its culturalist 
and idealist aspects. This conclusion is also related to the better elaboration of 
migrants’ motivations: the in-depth ethnographic endeavour helps transcend the focus 
on discursive articulations engagement with which presents migrants as ‘calculating’ 
subjects (McHugh 2000). It does this by revealing the role of ‘taken-for-granted’ and 
common-sense knowledge that migrants draw on when discussing their decisions 
(Halfacree and Boyle 1993). According to McHugh (2000: 74) ethnographic research 
is capable of following the ‘production and reproduction of sociocultural structures’ 
through the engagement and interpretation of everyday life and individual histories.  
In my study, I used participant observation and informal conversations to account for 
the different meanings that migration held for my informants and for the changes that 
these underwent with time. I was also interested in representing migration as a process 
that incorporates different stages and modes of being. I have done so by engaging 
with the lived experiences of migrants over a long period and in different localities– 
both in Bulgaria, where would-be migrants shared expectations, strategies, and 
imaginations as well as practically and mentally prepared for their journeys, and in the 
UK, where they came to discover firsthand the pressures and anxieties related to the 
migrant experience. My study prioritises migrants’ own perspectives on their 
experiences but in doing so adopts a critical outlook and interprets emic observations 
in relation to social structures and historical processes. When it comes to theory 
construction, ethnography uses the so-called ‘formative’ approach (see Van Velsen 
1967, Burawoy 1991) which engages with native concepts and emerging patterns and 
connects them to categories, explanations and hypotheses that are contextualised and 
constantly tested and reformulated in the process of investigation (Schensul, Schensul 
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and LeCompte 1999). I have tried to present my informants’ understandings and 
experiences in their own words and colloquial formulations – what Geertz (1983: 58) 
calls ‘experience-near’ concepts – but I have also related those to ‘experience-
distance’ concepts (Geertz 1983: 58) that help theoretically elucidate their meaning in 
relation to social and historical contexts. An example central to this study is the 
relationship between ‘the West’ (native concept) and the ‘imaginary West’ (theoretical 
concept). I use the ‘imaginary West’ to explain the way in which people understand 
notions like modernity, modernisation, and progress, but also wellbeing and good life 
under specific social, cultural, and historical circumstances.  
As a project that requires substantial resources and is often invested with hopes for a 
better future migration has implications for the immediate and extended family not only 
the person migrating. This thesis, however, has adopted a more individualist approach 
of looking at migration decisions and strategies, a decision that was necessitated by 
several factors. Firstly, I found that some of my informants were more likely to plan 
their migrations on their own, in some cases, even actively hiding away information 
from their family and friends circle and unwilling to allow interference. This can be partly 
attributed to the fact that they saw migration as a highly risky endevour with uncertain 
outcomes that was at the same time invested with great expectations. In this sense, 
by not sharing their plans with family and local community members they were more 
likely to escape embarrassment and humiliation in case their project failed or they had 
to return empty-handed. Another concern that required prospective migrants’ 
cautiousness was related to an exisiting public perception about the wealth and 
success that migrants obtain and the rumours, envy and loan requests provoked by it. 
Secondly, during my Bulgarian fieldwork my requests for being introduced to migrants’ 
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families and friends were often met with suspicion which was part of the more general 
weariness amongst prospective migrants and the process of building trust which I 
discuss in more detail later.57 Lastly, this person-centred approach is also 
preconditioned by legal, political and labour market mechanisms designed to 
encourage individual migration and discourage family reunification. 
In the following I present an overview of my fieldwork and reflect on my recruitment 
strategies and methods; on the specificities of the dual-sited ethnographic approach I 
have adopted; and on ethical concerns and my positionality.  
Fieldwork overview 
I first came to London in January 2009 as a participant in a three-day workshop on a 
comparative analysis of quality of work and life of EU citizens in my capacity as a 
researcher for a Bulgarian NGO. I stayed in a hotel in the heart of Oxford Street and I 
remember feeling enchanted with the lights, the historical buildings, and the bustle of 
people from all over the world. I took these brief impressions as evidence confirming 
my stereotypical ideas about the UK as a place of tradition, sophistication, and 
affluence. In the autumn of the same year I returned to pursue my MA studies at the 
University of York. My student status and my relative financial independence put me 
in the protective bubble of the university campus which significantly biased the 
impressions of this migrant experience. This changed towards the end of my studies 
when I decided to look for a summer job that would provide me with some extra cash. 
My job search and my one-month employment as a cleaner in a local pub opened my 
                                            
57 Later on, in my fieldwork in the UK I found meeting informants and their family members much easier. 
I further discuss the reasons for this in the ‘participant observation’ section of this chapter.  
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eyes to a different UK, one which had nothing to do with the UK of my dreams. I, 
however, did not let this dishearten me and was still determined to follow my 
aspirations for a Western life and education. I came back to the UK in 2012 – a few 
months prior to the start of my PhD studies. My plan was to stay with a British friend in 
London, get a taste of the life in this exciting metropolis and, most importantly, find a 
job that would allow me to save some much-needed cash. As my initial savings quickly 
dried up I found myself pulled into a precarious existence that had little to do with my 
previous privileged tourist and student experiences. My inability to find jobs matching 
my qualifications led me to constantly shift between different informal occupations, and 
my insufficient finances forced me to share accommodation with strangers in some of 
the most inhospitable parts of the city. With my initial plans turning into a disaster I 
began sharing my disappointment with other immigrants I met and I was surprised to 
find out that a great majority of them were also driven by rosy pictures of life in the UK. 
It was this experience that sparked my desire to explore the phenomenon of migration 
in more depth: I wanted to know why people moved, what role their imaginations played 
in their migration decisions and what the impact of their lived experiences of migration 
was on their pre-conceived images.  
The ethnographic data on which this study is based was collected over a period of 
twelve months in different localities in Bulgaria and the UK. I first left for Bulgaria in 
June 2013 for a two-month preliminary research stint conducted mostly in Plovdiv and 
its environs. I returned to Bulgaria for another five months from April 2014 to August 
2014 before spending three months in different parts of the UK – London and 
Birmingham, in particular.  
35 
 
Central to my study is the understanding of what happens to pre-migration 
expectations and aspirations of individuals once they begin their life in the UK. I 
decided that the best way to obtain such long-term insight into individual perspectives 
and experiences was to identify Bulgarians with plans for migration to the UK and 
engage with them prior to, during and after the completion of their journeys. As I 
intended to gain multiple perspectives, I adopted an ‘inclusive’ approach to participant 
sampling and recruited individuals of different backgrounds, ages, genders, and 
occupations. In the course of my fieldwork, I decided to narrow the scope of the study 
by focusing on people who held plans for long-term settling in the UK. This decision 
was in lines with my interest in providing a longitudinal depiction of migrants’ lives: on 
the one hand people needed time to experience the different aspects of migration 
(arrival, finding accommodation, finding employment, gaining knowledge of the 
bureaucratic complexities, etc.). On the other, I noticed that those planning short-term 
labour mobility were less inclined to talk about their expectations and imaginations of 
life in the UK as they continued to imagine their lives back in Bulgaria (in this sense 
migration was more of a strategy for improving their economic and social situation back 
home).  
Finding people who planned to migrate to the UK in the coming weeks and months 
proved to be more challenging than initially expected. If one could easily locate 
Bulgarians in schools, shops, pubs and even on busy streets in London and 
Birmingham, there was no specially designated space where prospective-migrants 
gathered in Bulgarian cities. I decided to ‘cast my net wide’ and simultaneously use a 
variety of recruitment techniques. Initially, I tried to find potential participants by posting 
a message on a popular online forum for Bulgarian migrants in the UK. My request 
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was met with fierce indignation and suspicion – users questioned my identity and 
intentions, some accused me of gathering personal data to obstruct their movements, 
others assumed I was a criminal trying to lure victims under a fake academic identity. 
After realising the limitations of this approach, I started mobilising family and friends’ 
networks – this strategy helped to reduce issues of distrust and suspicion. After 
building trust and rapport, each of my informants was eager to introduce me to friends, 
colleagues and relatives who wished to migrate to the UK. This is how my research 
was greatly facilitated by what Polsky (1967: 129) calls ‘snowballing’ – participants 
vouch for the researcher and provide access to other informants.  
In addition, I based two months of my fieldwork in a job recruitment agency in Plovdiv 
(Bulgaria) which allowed me to significantly broaden my selection of participants as I 
was introduced to people from different parts of the country. My decision to recruit 
participants through participant observation in a job recruitment agency was based on 
the increased significance that such institutionalised intermediaries have assumed in 
the post-2014 migrations to the UK. Whereas in 2007 there were only 15 officially 
registered recruitment agencies in Bulgaria in 2016 their number had risen to more 
than 300. Data from the local office of the European Job Mobility Portal (EURES) 
(where local and EU agencies advertise positions) demonstrates that in 2015 40 000 
Bulgarians had been consulted on finding employment abroad whereas in 2011 their 
number was 11 000.58 The opening of the British labour market to Bulgarian workers 
in January 2014 has led to the proliferation of local and transnational labour market 
                                            
58 http://focus-news.bg/opinion/0000/00/00/23463/ [Accessed 20 January 2018]; As the job offers for the 
UK are increasing so is the interest of prospective workers. The agency where I did my fieldwork in 2014 
received between 20 and 30 phone requests daily from people wishing to start employment in the UK.  
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intermediaries which fulfill the demands for low-skilled and flexible workforce in low-
paid sectors such as agriculture, food processing, hospitality and social care.59  
The use of different recruitment channels and practices facilitated my encounters with 
diverse group of participants with varying motivations60 but it ultimately entailed certain 
limitations – it introduced me to a disproportionate number of males61 and precluded 
access to so-called ‘highly-mobile’ professionals (Amit 2007).  
In the end, I was able to follow the migration journeys from Bulgaria to the UK (and 
sometimes back) of a total of thirteen individuals. Of those, eight were males and five 
females; two were under 20 years old, two were in their early 20s, three in their early 
to mid-30s, and six were in their mid- to late 40s. Five of them held university diplomas, 
two were prospective students, and six had professional or secondary education; six 
identified as ‘Western-thinking’ and ‘middle class’ and seven as ‘working class’ and 
with ‘Balkan temper’ and ‘mentality’. I supplemented this data through observing, 
accompanying, and conversing with a number of other prospective, current and return 
migrants who have lived and worked in the UK for different periods of time. I mainly 
used participant observation and informal conversations for gathering data.62  
                                            
59 Prior to 2014 the role of Bulgarian agencies was limited only to the recruitment of workers on the 
Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme (SAWS) and the Food Processing Sector Based Scheme on up 
to one-year long work permits.  
60 Educational and labour migrants.  
61 The higher share of male informants presented in this thesis reflects the gender characteristics of 
Bulgarian migration to western Europe (see Kabakchieva 2009). 
62 Additionally, the methods of virtual (online) ethnography (Hine 2000) were used in the form of 
observation of online discussion forums and Facebook groups popular amongst Bulgarian immigrants. 
A number of Skype conversations took place in times when face-to-face interaction was impossible; 
these resulted from an effort to keep in touch with main informants almost on a daily basis.  
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Participant observation – Although intended as main tool of data collection, some of 
the specificities of my research limited my ability of ‘active membership’ and 
participation in certain localities and stages of my fieldwork. It has been recognised 
that fieldwork which takes place in different sites offers less opportunities for participant 
observation (Gupta and Ferguson 1997, Hannerz 2003). Time and language have 
been identified as main practical limitations making multi-sited research more reliant 
on interviews (Hannerz 2003). In my case, it was mainly the scattered geographical 
distribution of my informants that limited the scope for participant observation, 
especially during my fieldwork in Bulgaria. The time spent in the recruitment agency 
allowed me to observe and converse with a wide range of would-be migrants on a daily 
basis.63 A serious drawback, however, was the fact that they came from different parts 
of the country and their stay in Plovdiv was of limited duration. When possible, I 
undertook short-distance travels to meet key informants in their hometowns and 
villages. Another strategy for overcoming limited opportunities for participant 
observation was to spend as much time as possible with informants residing in Plovdiv. 
I tried to initiate occasions for interaction and ‘hang out’ with participants in coffee 
places, pubs, restaurants, their work places, and when possible accompany them in 
their daily errands and meetings with friends.64 I also conducted observation whilst 
                                            
63 During my fieldwork at the agency I conducted informal conversations with different duration with a 
total of 32 informants. I managed to keep in touch with around about half of them, mostly through social 
media. Although no one of them became a key informant - one of those whose journeys I was able to 
follow I was able to meet five of them in the UK and Bulgaria and obtain more information about their 
experiences in the UK and their relationship with the agency.  
64 This was fairly easy with informants of my age or those younger than me but proved challenging with 
older ones and those engaged with family care and obligations.  
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engaging in informal conversation with participants and made sure to note my 
impressions in my fieldwork diary.65  
The initial distrust and suspicion that some participants occasionally expressed 
towards me was another challenge to my desire for full immersion into the lives of 
prospective-migrants. People I met (particularly those in the agency and the users of 
an online forum) questioned my intentions and my researcher identity and if they 
agreed to interact with me at all, were reluctant to engage any further beyond a short 
conversation over coffee. I believe this to reflect the particular context at the eve of 
January 2014, when the the EU working restrictions on Bulgarians and Romanians 
were to be lifted. Rumours of their extension made people particularly concerned and 
weary of anyone who inquired of their migration plans. Furthermore, despite my 
Bulgarian origin which made people more trustful I found that my affiliation to an 
English university raised questions about who was supporting and benefiting from my 
research.  
 
In the UK, it was much easier for me to become part of my informants’ lives, firstly 
because with time we had managed to develop a much more trustful relationship and, 
secondly, because they often needed me as a translator, an ‘expert in migration 
questions’, a friend they could spend time with and a sympathetic ear. I spent hours in 
their rooms and kitchens in rented homes where we chatted, watched TV, had lunches 
and dinners. I helped my informants with their job applications and accompanied them 
on their trips to job centres, banks and different state institutions. This gave me an 
                                            
65 See Glick Schiller (2003) for the importance of this practice in ethnographic interviewing. 
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insight into their daily hardships, experiences of discrimination and their self-doubt and 
frustrations. Throughout my fieldwork, I also visited a number of social events 
organised by different migrant groups and associations and I spent time in ‘Bulgarian’ 
shops, pubs and cafes which migrants used as spaces for interaction, networking and 
recuperation.  
Informal conversations – Throughout the whole research period, I carried out informal 
conversations with seventy-eight would-be, current, and return migrants. The length of 
these conversations ranged from half an hour to four hours. My initial strategy was to 
take notes during these interactions but this proved distracting for informants and 
interrupted the natural flow of the conversation. My experience showed that using a 
digital voice recorder was much less disturbing as informants would often note at the 
end of our meetings that they had completely forgotten about its existence. Once at 
home, I would listen to the interviews, transcribe important quotes, and summarise all 
the main points in my field diary. Towards the end of my fieldwork, however, recording 
conversations with informants who had by the time turned into friends became 
problematic. I gathered from their reactions that they felt uneasy when I mentioned the 
recording and they failed to see why would I need to record what had become a 
‘friendly banter’ or ‘sharing’. In such situations, I became extremely tense as I was 
constantly trying to memorise mentioned details and the exact words of sentences. I 
was using every opportunity to take notes without being noticed on my phone, napkins, 
small pieces of paper, and cigarette boxes. After those meetings, I would take time to 
write down a detailed overview of the conversation, my observations throughout and 




In recent years, multi-sited ethnography has become an increasingly popular approach 
for ethnographers studying migration (Hage 2005). George Marcus explains this 
process as movement ‘out from the single site and local situations of conventional 
ethnographic research designs to examine the circulation of cultural meanings, objects 
and identities in diffuse time-space’ (1995: 96). The ‘tracking’ strategy I have adopted 
in designing my multi-sited research is the one Marcus calls ‘follow the people’ - an 
initial group of individuals is identified and their movements are followed between 
different localities (Marcus 1995: 90). Following Marcus’ suggestion, I started my 
research from a strategically selected locale – Plovdiv, Bulgaria. There were strategic 
as well as practical considerations dictating this choice. First of all, while I was 
interested in having a diverse set of informants coming from different urban and rural 
areas I still needed to select a place that could serve as a ‘hub’ for my fieldwork. 
Secondly, scholars have noted that the profile and destinations of Bulgarian migrants 
are geographically determined and dependent on previously created networks.66 
Plovdiv, the second largest city in Bulgaria, attracts a number of internal migrants from 
different parts of the country and is popular for its high concentration of recruitment 
agencies. This forms a solid basis to engage with a broad range of prospective 
migrants. The practical reasons for my choice were autobiographical – I have lived in 
Plovdiv before coming to the UK and was thus provided with material resources, social 
                                            
66 See Guentcheva, Kabakchieva and Kolarski (2003). 
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networks and emotional support mechanisms – all preconditions for a successful 
fieldwork experience.67  
Still, I could not avoid some of the practical and methodological limitations that have 
preoccupied migration ethnographers conducting multi-sited ethnographic research. 
One of the main challenges of the approach is that immersion into the field, a key 
prerequisite for classic ethnography, is limited (Hage 2005; Hannerz 2003). The 
departures of the would-be migrants that I recruited in Bulgaria did not occur at the 
same time but at different moments within a period of six months. This meant that I 
could not carry out extended and uninterrupted periods of research with all of them and 
could only follow the narratives and experiences of a limited number of people, while 
interaction with others was more irregular. Reflecting on his own transnational 
migration research spanning across multiple localities, Hage (2005) notes the inability 
of the researcher to be deeply immersed in multiple sites and the analytical and 
psychological problems that such an effort creates. The challenges that I faced in terms 
of establishing a strong relationship with my informants and sustaining trusted and 
long-term rapport with them were very similar to the ones described by him. One 
advantage that helped me tackle the problem of depth and breadth of engagement 
was the fact that my two field sites were fairly familiar to me given my own personal 
experiences and background. My main goal was to sustain deep and personal 
interaction with my informants and not lose sight of everyday dynamics and changing 
perceptions. In order to sustain regular face-to-face interaction, I had to undertake 
                                            
67 For discussion of the links between field site and home see Knowles (2000). Cohen (1987) for example 
also admits that fieldwork could be seen as a disguised autobiography – the choice of field is often 
guided by our desire to negotiate the deficiencies of our everyday life.  
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short trips between Bulgaria and the UK. When I was prevented from doing so I relied 
on Skype, emails, and other forms of online contact.  
Finally, practical circumstances related to time and financial constraints prevented me 
from realising my initial plan of physically accompanying individuals on their migration 
journeys to the UK. In Bulgaria, I often accompanied people to airports and bus 
terminals gauging their immediate pre-migration sentiments and anxieties. In the UK, 
I had the chance of welcoming some in the first hours after their arrivals. Most, 
however, I met in the first weeks and months of their stay in the UK.  
Ethical considerations and positionality  
The ethnographic exploration of migration brings up ethical concerns that need to be 
carefully considered. My research entailed two months of participant observation in a 
job recruitment agency which served as an intermediary between migrants and British 
employers. The role of recruitment agencies in channeling migrants into temporary, 
precarious, low-paid, and exploitative employment has been well-documented in the 
migration literature.68 Despite licensed in the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies 
and working in close cooperation with the National Employment Agency and the 
European Jobs Networks the recruitment agency I was placed in, as many others in 
the country regularly breached existing rules and regulations without drawing the 
attention of national authorities. One of the most obvious unlawful practices that often 
remains unchallenged is the charging of ‘recruitment’ fee often amounting to two 
average Bulgarian wages which workers are required to pay in full before departure 
                                            
68 See Findlay et al. (2012), Sporton (2013). 
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with the explanation that this covers transport and ‘other administrative’ costs.69 In 
addition to this, prospective migrants are often provided with preliminary contracts in 
English language which oblige them to financially compensate the agency (usually with 
the initially paid ‘fee’) in case they decide to leave their employment before their 
contract expires.70 The negative public outcry over the fraudulent practices of Bulgarian 
recruitment agencies have not led to stricter regulations as usually owners (in most 
cases former migrants with connections to British employers) whose license has been 
revoked re-register and resume their activities a new name.71 
 
 
Still, a great number of prospective migrants who lack networks and language skills 
rely on such services while being extremely cautious and mistrustful. Many of the 
people I met considered finding employment through a recruitment agency a risk worth 
taking – it was seen as a stepping stone that would enable them to set foot in the UK, 
procure the necessary documents and start their search for a permanent and better 
                                            
69 According to the existing Bulgarian legislation intermediary agencies are not allowed to charge job 
applicants with service fees but can require payment for the arrangement of transport, accommodation 
and trainings. Most commonly agencies use this loophole and charge up to ten times the real costs of 
transport, accommodation, and training.  
70 This is particularly worrying as in most cases the agency misrepresents the job and living conditions 
- minimum working hours, work duties, accommodation arrangements and so on. During my time at the 
agency I witnessed many cases in which workers returned only a week after the start of their 
employment either because they were physically unable to meet the inhumane workload or because 
they were not provided with basic living arrangements.  
71 For example, the agency in question has existed ever since the early 2000 under more than eight 
different names. In 2009 the license of the company was revoked by the Gangamasters Licensing 
Authority (GLA) of the UK for supplying posted workers to British farms in breach of Bulgarian laws and 
for deducting large amounts of workers’ salaries. This, however, did not prevent the owner from 
resuming his activity almost immediately under a different company name.  
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paid employment.72  My decision to cooperate with the agency was accompanied by a 
desire to closely observe potential fraudulent practices, document them and possibly 
bring them into light after the end of my fieldwork. This intention to ‘bring justice’, 
however, as I came to realise later, contained its own moral contradictions.  
The agency owner and his staff were extremely accommodating to my requests, they 
allowed me to spend as much time in their office as I wished, provided me with a desk 
and computer and had nothing against me interacting with their clients.73 As expected, 
I witnessed several of the above-mentioned morally dubious and unlawful practices. 
For instance, before signing their job contracts, would-be migrants were charged a so-
called ‘service’ fee which often exceeded an average Bulgarian wage (ca. 290 GBN). 
They were presented with video clips and brochures which gave them an unrealistic 
account of the nature of the work they were expected to do and they had no information 
about related hazards. In addition, they were often forced to sign English-language 
contracts that were not translated for them.  
Anthropologists have discussed fieldwork contexts and circumstances that make it 
extremely difficult for researchers to sustain the role of neutral observers and even 
more so come to terms with the realisation that ‘neutrality is not an ethically acceptable 
position’ (Seymour-Smith 1986: 18).74 What made the situation in the agency 
particularly difficult for me was that on one hand I had the urge to protect my informants 
                                            
72 It should be mentioned that the dependence of some migrants on recruitment agencies has been also 
determined to a great extent by existing structural limitations in the UK, such as formal and informal 
bureaucratic barriers, a highly flexible and exploitative labour market, and different forms of everyday 
exclusion and discrimination that I discuss in more length in Chapter Five.  
73 At some point, they even gave me access to different employment contracts, email communication, 
and their own database. 
74 See also Nash (1979). 
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by sharing with them information about ‘hidden’ pitfalls, while on the other I did not 
want to lose access to the fieldwork site. I tried to address this issue by arranging 
private meetings with informants outside of the agency office and carefully drawing 
their attention to some of the risks entailed in their dealings with the agency. It was 
curious to hear that most people were well aware of the fact that they did not get the 
best, or even a good deal, but simply did not see an alternative given their lack of 
knowledge and contacts making it hard or impossible to migrate and find work on their 
own. They still chose to play along with the agency requirements and accept low pay 
and dismal working conditions for the lack of a better alternative. 
A second ethical issue was the fact that, although having the right to legally reside and 
work in the UK, many of my informants had difficulties obtaining certain documentation 
which pushed them into the informal sector of the labour market. Thus, a great number 
found themselves in a highly precarious position, at least in the first months of their 
stay in the UK. They had to take on highly exploitative occupations, had no employment 
rights and protections, often lacked access to social and healthcare services. This 
made me extremely cautious about disclosing sensitive information related to my 
informants’ occupations and identities both during fieldwork and in written outputs.  
When recruiting informants, I was explicit about the focus of my study and the research 
process. I never concealed my researcher identity and I was always available for 
discussing their potential concerns and the extent of their involvement in the study. 
Informed consent was obtained verbally and in some cases was also audio-taped. I 
ensured my informants that I would protect their identities and treat the information 
they shared with me confidentially. They were encouraged to choose pseudonyms of 
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their own liking and, although a few of them insisted there was no problem with using 
their real names, I still preferred to change those.  
Geertz (1988: 13) notes the role of ethnographers as ‘lenses, selecting and interpreting 
“scenes” and “scripts’’, these acts are not neutral or value-free – the research process, 
the collection and interpretation of data is undoubtedly influenced by the position of the 
researcher, her subjective experiences, and beliefs. Being a native ethnographer – 
doing research amongst people of the same culture and nationality – incurs both risks 
and advantages. Before starting my fieldwork in Bulgaria, I often worried about getting 
caught up in the so-called ‘home blindness’ characteristic for ethnographers studying 
their own societies and not being able to see beyond the familiar and the obvious. 
Throughout my research, however, I realised that because of the years spent outside 
Bulgaria and my strategy of engaging with social settings and with social groups with 
which I had had little contact while living in Bulgaria (for example visiting popular bars, 
cafes, and shopping malls with informants) provided me with a degree of distance and 
detachment and enabled me to get into the role of an outsider (at least at times). It was 
common for me to experience a sense of ‘cultural shock’ and feeling of being out of 
place while in an unfamiliar setting or when observing unfamiliar behavior. Overall, I 
found that my position of a ‘native researcher’ had brought many advantages – it has 
allowed a deep immersion into the field and an opportunity to gain informants’ trust 
more quickly and easily. I was careful to sustain a reflexive stance and not slip into the 
position of an authoritative insider. Even though I managed to develop close and 
trusted relationships with some of my informants I did not let those limit my critical 
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reflection on their accounts of migrant life and the possible contradictions they were 
in.75 
My position of PhD student and teaching assistant resulted in the emergence of power 
inequalities in the field. I was often perceived as an intellectual, expert in migration 
issues, fluent in the English language, and a much-experienced participant in a social 
and cultural setting of which my informants had very little knowledge. I was also said 
to have cultivated a Western mind-set because of my travels throughout western 
Europe and, most of all, because of my British education. Much to my displeasure this 
cultural capital often caused awe and admiration. My strategy to balance this was to 
adopt the position of a curious and unaware researcher, somewhat naïve and 
incompetent, who refrained from giving advice or influencing decisions. The power 
imbalance between my informants and myself became more obvious during my 
fieldwork in the UK. Some individuals would often note on the different kinds of migrant 
status that we held, defining themselves as ‘ordinary migrants’ referring to me as a 
‘student’ or ‘lecturer’, which was seen as a more privileged position. Again, it was the 
sharing of my own early migrant experience and hardships similar to their own that 
helped me become accepted as ‘one of them’. My own migrant experience also made 
me identify better with my research subjects and brought about a more empathetic 
understanding of what my informants were going through.76   
                                            
75 Leaving the field proved particularly difficult as by the end of my fieldwork some of my informants had 
become good friends with whom I regularly met and shared news. Although I sustain these relationships 
to the present day I deliberately tried to limit our interaction throughout the writing up of this thesis.  
76 Except for my educational level and migrant experience there were other factors such as age, gender, 
and social background that ultimately affected my fieldwork. My position of a young female and single 
researcher led me to situations in which male participants would wrongly interpret my interest towards 
them. A clarification of my intentions, however, managed to resolve such confusions and I was still 




This thesis comprises one theoretical chapter and four empirical ones. Chapter Two 
outlines the theoretical discussions and main scholarly contributions in the three key 
fields of inquiry of this thesis: migration, imagination, and class. The first part of the 
chapter critically examines the theoretical models which continue to dominate 
understandings of the reasons behind contemporary international migration. By 
outlining their limitations this first section points to the need for an approach that 
recognises migration as a culturally, rather than solely materially-informed event and 
stresses the conceptual importance of the interconnection between migration 
motivations and imagination. To contribute to the development of such a research 
perspective the second part discusses literature on the social imaginary, its role in 
mediating between subjective longings and material practices, and its dystopian 
potential. The section further draws on the advances of psychoanalytical, culturalist, 
and postcolonial literatures and introduces the notion of the ‘imaginary West’, which 
forms the backbone of the interpretive framework of this thesis. Finally, the chapter 
discusses the conceptual pitfalls and merits of postsocialist class analysis and 
emphasises the role of insights coming from a Bourdieusian reading of class in 
understanding collective class-based identities in the region, as well as their relevance 
for migration research.  
                                            
participants and those my age but restricted opportunities for interaction with older informants who had 
to spend more time with their families. On the other hand, those older than me saw me as someone 
unexperienced and worthy sharing their stories and perceptions with. In terms of social background my 
origin from and residency in the central part of Plovdiv (second largest Bulgarian city) might have been 
perceived as indication of high status; however corresponding power imbalances seem to be less 
significant than the ones stemming from my position as a researcher/academic.  
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Chapter Three introduces the reader to present-day Bulgaria through the perspectives 
and stories of this projects’ informants. It commences by showing how the conflicting 
self-identifications of my informants – expressed in the two emic ideal-types of ‘ordinary 
people’ and ‘Bulgarian Westerners’ –  mirror existing class antagonisms in postsocialist 
Bulgarian society and how these can be used as analytical categories to trace the role 
and reproduction of class identities throughout the migration process. I shed light on 
the diverse motivations underpinning migration decisions by arguing that shared 
perceptions of class belonging and related experiences influence the way in which 
people make sense of their situation and the meanings they confer to their migration 
projects. I further demonstrate the commonalities in would-be migrants’ narratives that 
denote a shared feeling of ‘not going anywhere’ in life – an existential impasse 
conditioned by multiplicity of subjective and class-based constraints. I argue that this 
condition, which my informants wished to escape through migration, is result of the 
shared disillusionment with the country’s ‘transitional’ project and its underlying 
progressive temporal modality.  
Chapter Four deepens the exploration of my informants’ reasons to migrate by 
analysing their imaginations and aspirations of life in the UK. It highlights the centrality 
of the emic notion of the West (Zapadat) around which expectation of a more 
meaningful life and a better future revolve. Through the concept of the ‘imaginary West’ 
I grasp the function of this native notion as a widely-shared, collective social imaginary 
– emerging and developing against a particular historical and cultural background and 
rooted within the promise of Eurocentrically-conceived modernity. The deconstruction 
of the West as envisioned by my two different groups of informants demonstrates its 
class-tinted variations and reveals that, although a reflection of hegemonic cultural 
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constructs, this imaginary is still invested with distinct meanings pertaining to one’s 
individual circumstances and social positioning. The drastic contrast between Bulgaria 
and the West that surfaced in my informants’ narratives epitomised a deeply-
entrenched understanding of the world as hierarchically structured. In this sense, 
migration stems out of a desire for existential advancement from a place of low to a 
place of high status.  
Having explained the meanings and expectations that my informants invested in their 
migration projects, Chapter Five engages with the lived realities of migration. Its first 
part discusses the obstacles that my informants faced in the early months after their 
arrival, most importantly the difficulty of procuring basic documentation, the inability to 
find secure and regular employment, and their dependence on the services and 
resources of a hostile immigrant community. I argue that formal and ‘hidden’ 
bureaucratic mechanisms, a highly flexible and exploitative labour market, as well as 
different forms of exclusion and discrimination push all informants into de facto 
‘illegality’ and precarious existence. The second part of this chapter follows the specific 
experiences of my two groups of informants in the mid-term period of their migration 
journeys. Despite the different amounts and kinds of capital at their disposal 
(economic, cultural, social, symbolic) ‘Bulgarian Westerners’ and ‘ordinary people’s’ 
lives in fact developed in a world parallel to the one of the British society. The drastic 
mismatch between idealised visions of Western prosperity and opportunities and 
actual realities of migration necessitated strategies for coping with disillusionment and 
for maintaining strength and perseverance in the pursuit of pre-migration plans.  
Chapter Six brings to a close the personal stories narrated in this thesis and returns 
to the main question with which this research started: What is it that propels and 
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sustains Bulgarian migrations to the UK in the face of widely-known hostility and 
exploitation? Firstly, I show how migrants’ lives were affected by the contingencies of 
lack of time, social isolation, and limited mobility, which combined with the general 
structural exclusion they suffered drove them into a new state I call ‘international 
stuckedness’. This existential stalemate was experienced as more painful and 
disempowering than the impasse my informants had struggled with back home 
because it turned into an entrenchment in the international hierarchy of places. On one 
hand, my informants realised that because of their inferior nationality they would never 
be able to achieve international advancement through migration, while on the other, 
they found the prospect of return unacceptable for a variety of reasons. I also point out 
how the shock and disillusionment that migrants experienced in the UK surprisingly did 
not result in the denouncement of the West and its deceptive nature. On the contrary, 
in the different visions of the future that they shared their hope of finding the ‘real’ West 
continued to persist. Based on this finding, I reflect on the teleological nature of the 
‘imaginary West’ and its reproduction in a ‘cycle of deception’ (Mahler 1995: 88) which 
was sustained in the discourses and practices of current, return, and prospective 
migrants. 
Chapter Seven summarises the main findings of the thesis and returns to the initial 
conceptual and contextual rationales for the study. It also outlines the key contributions 
that this research makes to different academic fields. Before identifying potential areas 
for further research, the chapter reflects on some contemporary developments and 
their implications on Bulgarian migration and the imaginary that propels and sustains 





The aim of this chapter is to position the three main themes on which this thesis is 
based – migration, imaginary, and class – within theoretical debates in migration 
studies, anthropology and sociology, and, furthermore, postsocialist, postcolonial 
studies, cultural studies, and psychoanalysis. This chapter presents both a review and 
critique of relevant theoretical engagements, as well as it introduces a theoretical 
framework for analysing the interconnection between migration, imaginary and class. 
The literature revised here covers research that has direct links to the themes identified 
in the process of data analysis. The empirical chapters of the thesis develop further 
the arguments outlined in this review and demonstrate how they connect to empirical 
reality.  
The first part of this chapter focuses on current debates in the field of migration studies 
concerning both the reasons behind contemporary population movements and 
migrants’ experiences in their new destinations. I will argue that this field and its 
understanding of the phenomenon of migration is still very much in the grip of a narrow 
economism and overly deterministic ‘push-pull’ explanations. The critique coming from 
different disciplinary angles aims to problematise this dominant logic by looking at the 
diversity of factors that come into play in the migration decision-making process. Efforts 
to reveal the ‘cultural side’ of migration and the connection between migration and 
imaginaries (imaginations), are still in their infancy but offer explanations that are much 
closer to people’s lived realities. The second part continues with a discussion of some 
of the most influential theoretical engagements with the social imaginary and its role 
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as a concept that helps to unpack the nexus between subjective longings and material 
practices. I present the notion of the ‘imaginary West’ (Yurchak 2006) as a cultural and 
mental construct driving migration movements and underline the class-sensitive nature 
of this social imaginary. The final section of the chapter presents a review of the current 
state of class analysis in studies of postsocialism and demonstrates the usefulness of 
a Bourdieusian concept of class which helps to better understand the significance of 
class as a lived category in eastern Europe and beyond.  
 
Understanding the reasons and experiences of migration 
This section outlines the analytical framework for understanding migration through the 
viewpoint of migrants themselves. It begins with a critique of the dominant approaches 
in the field of migration studies which continue to be guided by a simplistic ‘push-pull’ 
economic logic. I follow this with a discussion of the main models explaining the 
experiences of migrants in their new life and work destinations, which leads to 
engagement with theories and debates that account for how institutionalised and 
informally imposed constraints, and a capitalist labour market affect the precarisation 
and temporalisation of migrants’ existences. Finally, the review focuses on the 
importance of adopting a culturally-informed lens that can provide a balanced account 
of the multiplicity of subjective and macro-level material and ideational factors that all 
come into play in engendering and sustaining migration. Most importantly, by taking 
into consideration interdisciplinary contributions dedicated to revealing the non-
material aspect of individual motivations and expectations the central role of 
imaginaries (imaginations) in disentangling the puzzle of migration is underlined.  
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Challenging the hegemony of economic reductionism in explaining migration 
The most consequential theories of international migration whose basic premises 
continue to dominate public understandings have been devised by economists. 
Traditionally, they have been inclined to see migration as a result of income differences 
between countries and have presupposed rational choice and economic maximisation 
as main incentives guiding individual decision-making (see Borjas 1989). The uneven 
spatial distribution of labour and capital is said to leave some countries labour-scarce 
and capital-rich while in others the opposite ratio exists (ibid). By moving to regions 
where they can obtain higher remuneration for their labour it was expected that 
migrants would eventually contribute to the equalisation of income inequalities and 
population movements will come to a halt (see Harris and Todaro 1970). In this 
equation, individuals appear as rational decision-makers who take the decision to 
move after a careful cost-benefit assessment of available regional and international 
economic opportunities. For its simplicity and common-sense relevance, neoclassical 
economics has been responsible for the establishment of a still virtually unchallenged 
understanding of the reasons behind contemporary migration. Namely, the premise 
that money is the name of the game: pushed by material poverty, people leave their 
home countries, led by the desire to improve their economic situation, which ultimately 
brings them to wealthier places. In media and public accounts, the impression that 
people do indeed manage to achieve material enrichment upon migration and live 
more fulfilling lives than the ones left behind still holds resounding validity (Pajo 2007).   
The new economics of migration (Stark and Bloom 1985) school that developed out of 
the neoclassical model has challenged the centrality of the individual rational agent as 
a decision-maker in the neoclassical model. Instead, it put forward the proposition that 
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a larger collective – that of the family or the household – should be used as the main 
unit of analysis. Placing emphasis on the ‘push’ factors influencing migration, the 
theory holds that as a family strategy of risk minimisation, migration emerges out of 
feelings of relative, not absolute deprivation. A focus on the ‘pull’ side as providing a 
macro level explanation formed the basis of the prominent ‘dual labour market theory’ 
developed by Michael Piore (1979). He claimed that it is advanced industrial societies’ 
structural demand for cheap labour that sets population movements into motion. 
Migrants get absorbed in a secondary labour-intensive and low-productivity sector of 
the economy where they fill in the demeaning and low-paid positions shunned by locals 
(Massey et al. 1993).  
The relevance of classic ‘push-pull’ explanatory frameworks has been questioned by 
a variety of disciplines and has even initiated some internal re-considerations within 
economics itself. The main shortcomings of the macro equilibrium explanations are 
said to be their rather one-dimensional representation of reality and their inability to 
account for different interrelated externalities that all affect the process of migration 
(Arango 2000). Their biggest drawback, however, is their disregard for individuals’ own 
motivations and interpretations. In contrast, treating migration as a microeconomic 
phenomenon which revolves around the figure of the migrant as a self-interested, 
rational maximiser of economic benefit ignores the existence of broader structural 
determinants that effectively impinge on the process by influencing individual 
decisions. By and large, the economic determinism which structures the foundations 
of the most influential theories of international migration makes them ill-suited to grasp 
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the complexity of contemporary migration realities and insufficient to paint the full 
picture of why certain individuals chose to move beyond borders.77  
Another macro-level theoretical explanation of migration developed within the 
‘dependency’ (or ‘world-system’) model has been taken up by Alejandro Portes (1981) 
and Saskia Sassen (1988), amongst others. Inspired by Emmanuel Wallerstein’s 
‘world-system’ model (1979), the approach attempts to take issue with the deficiencies 
of ‘push-pull’ models, notably, their fragmented vision of social reality and lack of 
historical sensitivity. This holistically-conceived critical engagement with macrosocial 
processes reflected postcolonial shifts in global capitalism and their interrelation with 
international population movements. The historical-structural paradigm on which 
dependency scholars rest their premises is structured around the importance of 
relationships of domination between ‘core’ and ‘periphery’, which are reinforced by the 
movement of global capital. In search for cheap labour, new consumer markets and 
raw materials, capital, in the form of foreign direct investment, travels from core to 
peripheral countries to commercialise and modernise natural ways of life and local 
practices (Arango 2000). In the process, rural people, dislocated from their land, start 
moving to the cities where they become dependent on waged employment. As 
peripheral economies’ service sector is unable to absorb this labour force, part of the 
surplus population migrates to core economies ‘through the same channels that were 
                                            
77 The dominance of methodological individualism in academic and public thinking about migration could 
be attributed to what has been described as the ‘invasion of the economic man’ (Baert and da Silva 
2010: 125) into social sciences. With its origins, traceable to the early 19th century, the paradigm reached 
its greatest dominance in the 1980s with the introduction of the new public management and neo-liberal 
policy-making. The reduction of different aspects of social life and individual action to crude economic 




opened by the economic penetration, and through the cultural, transportation and 
communication links that followed’ (Arango 2000: 291). The ‘dependency school’ 
positions the functioning of international migration in the global system of labour supply 
engendered by the spread of capitalist mode of production across the globe (Sassen 
1988).  
This structuralist theoretical framework of analysis disregards the importance of 
individual free choice, advanced by neo-classical migration theory, and instead 
emphasises the limitations produced by the interplay of different structural factors. 
Positioned in the dynamics of uneven capitalist development, migrants emerge as 
voiceless pawns moved around by forces beyond their control. They are often 
objectified in the concept of a ‘reserve army of labour’ which presents them as mere 
fractions of labour power (Castles and Kosack 1973, Castells 1975). The conceptual 
merits of dependency theory rest on its historical grounding and sensitivity towards 
persisting global inequalities that have undeniable effect on individual behaviour. 
Those, however, have been shadowed by the rigid determinism of this approach and 
its complete dismissal of the subjective dimensions of migration.  
What made anthropologists come relatively late to the study of migration was the 
‘sedentarist bias’ (Malkki 1995: 208) – i.e. the almost exclusive focus on local cultures 
and closed societies – that the discipline upheld at least until the 1960s (Brettell 2000). 
Anthropologists have also been accused of succumbing to and reproducing the 
primacy of economic advantage as explanation for migration (Pajo 2007). 
Preoccupation with particular aspects of the experience of migration, i.e. remittances, 
and ethnic identities, have reinforced a piecemeal approach which has in effect 
contributed to a more or less explicit acceptance of the ‘fact’ that individuals move 
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either because they are in search of better economic opportunities or because they 
have been trapped amidst the interplay of lager structural forces (Pajo 2007). However, 
the rich ethnographic accounts and theoretical innovations introduced by 
anthropologists within the paradigm of transnationalism, especially in the decades after 
1990s have undoubtedly facilitated a better understanding of the diversity of 
international migration and have promoted the discipline’s leading role in migration 
discussions (Brettell 2000).  
So far, scholarship on east European migration in general and Bulgarian migration to 
the UK and western Europe in particular has been relatively unsuccessful in grasping 
the complexities and contradictions of contemporary migration movements and their 
motivations. Studies dedicated to revealing the reasons behind and the nature of 
Bulgarian migration to a significant degree conform to the ‘economic reductionism’ that 
is characteristic for east European migration research in general (Black et al. 2010). 
By overemphasising and generalising the importance of either micro- or 
macroeconomic factors, scholars pay less attention to the interplay between individual 
and structural complexities that underlie the difficult choice between ‘leaving’ and 
‘staying’ (Krasteva et al. 2010). In addition, very often Bulgarian migration experts and 
researchers use normatively charged and politically handy dichotomies between 
‘economic migrants’ (‘labourers’, ‘gastarbeiters’, ‘gurbetchii’) and, on the other hand, 
the ‘transnationally mobile’ (‘highly-skilled’ and ‘mobile’ ‘intelligentsia’, ‘professionals’ 
and ‘new Bulgarians’).78 Such categorisations uncritically adopt the explanations of 
low-skilled Bulgarians being ‘chased out’ by material poverty and attracted by desire 
                                            
78 See Chavdarova (2006), Ditchev (2008), Stoilkova (2005), Liakova (2008). 
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for increased earnings. The ‘new type’ (King 2002) of young and educated migrants, 
on the other hand, are said to use migration in the enactment of their idealistic (as 
opposed to materialistic) desire to ‘see the world’, acquire new experiences and realise 
their potential. This portrayal takes for granted and reinforces, as I will show in more 
detail below, classist and orientalising narratives about civilisation and deservingness 
that cloud the existence and effects of neoliberal capitalist restructuring in eastern 
Europe and beyond.   
Understanding post-migration realities  
Initially, in the early and mid-twentieth century, research on migrants’ experiences in 
destination societies was conducted under the paradigms of assimilation and 
integration. Assimilationist models postulating individuals’ incorporation into the 
receiving society through the complete appropriation of ‘new’ language, cultural and 
social norms have been criticised for their simplicity and uni-directionality.79 The 
concept of integration recognises the possibility of diverse post-migration outcomes 
dependent on migrants’ social and cultural capital as well as the structure of the labour 
market, immigration policies, and the existence and composition of an ethnic 
community (Brettell and Hollifield 2000). The framework of transnationalism, most-
commonly associated with anthropological migration research, has been evoked as an 
alternative to both assimilationist and integrationist approaches. Conducting research 
on both ends of the migratory route, anthropologists and other ethnographers have 
been able to pay attention to the fact that migrants often remain emotionally and 
materially connected to two or more places at the same time. By contesting an 
                                            
79 See Portes and Zhou (1993), Bean and Brown (2015), De Haas and Fokkema (2011). 
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‘uprooted’ view on migration and an understanding of a gradual but irreversible 
incorporation of migrants’ lives into the receiving society, transnational scholars have 
outlined the emergence of a ‘new’ type of migrant80 whose life develops in a social field 
created beyond the boundaries of home and host societies. Basch, Glick Schiller and 
Szanton-Blanc (1994: 7) define transnational migration as a ‘process by which 
immigrants forge and sustain simultaneous multi-stranded social, economic and 
political relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement’. Such 
articulation contests conceptually-imposed splits in migration research and renders 
clear the interconnections between the different ‘stages’ of migration and the 
processes of decision-making and settlement, as well as the new cultural and social 
practices, individual identifications, ideas and beliefs that emerge out of this process 
(Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton-Blanc 1994).  
Anthropological research on migrant communities that is based on the concept of 
transnationalism reflects the discipline’s traditional interests in questions of cultural 
change, identity construction and ethnicity (Brettell and Hollified 2000). As an analytical 
framework, transnationalism analyses contemporary population movements as 
engendered by global capitalist transformations and recognises the economic 
vulnerability of migrants. Still, the model remains mainly preoccupied with exploring 
the social, political, and economic engagement of immigrants with their homelands, as 
well as with the identity changes they undergo in the process of adjustment to the new 
society. In this sense, transnational migration scholars have been less concerned with 
                                            
80 The newness of the concept of transnationalism has been contested by Portes (2001), who claims 
that transnational practices among migrants are not a new phenomenon and have been documented in 
prior research. For more general criticism of the temporal and theoretical novelty and usefulness of the 
approach see Kivisto (2001). 
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migrants’ everyday activities and environments - the receiving state and its legislative 
and more informal constrains on migrants’ lives (e.g. policies, public discourses, and 
the structure of host labour markets) – which has limited their understanding of 
migrants’ immediate concerns and struggles (Kivisto 2001).81 
Albeit working on a macro analytical level, models of immigrant economic integration 
can provide a useful insight into migrants’ daily life challenges (Piore 1970, Sassen 
1991). Such approaches have accounted for widespread employment practices and 
labour market positions that migrants assume in the receiving society and have drawn 
attention to the main reasons behind the marginalisation and precarity that many 
experience as a result of their movements. In the Global City (1991), Sasskia Sassen 
argues that post-industrial cities like London have become an arena of contestation 
between high-income earners in finance, banking, and insurance and low-paid blue-
collar workers catering to the needs of a privileged stratum. Proceeding from 
theorisations on the bifurcated nature of advanced modern economies and their 
primary and secondary labour markets, Sassen’s analysis helps understand the 
workings of a post-industrial economy and migrants’ embeddedness within it. She 
claims it is mostly immigrants working as sales assistants, nannies, drivers, cleaners, 
and construction workers that satisfy the corporate economy’s demand for low-skilled 
                                            
81 The main reason for this has been the ‘unbound’ approach used and its reluctance to limit its unit of 
analysis to the boundaries of a single nation-state. Moreover, transnationalism scholars’ interpretation 
of migrants’ practices as strategies of resistance and subversion of ‘the global political and economic 
situations that engulf […] (migrants)’ (Glick Schiller, Basch and Blanc-Szanton 1992: 11) underplays the 
fact that both in the past and present individuals have been more likely to comply with the capitalist 
system either because of lack of alternatives or genuine belief that successful incorporation into the 




services. Immigrant occupations are characterised by a lack of job security, health and 
other social benefits and by restricted opportunities for social mobility (Sassen 1991).  
Low-skilled migrant employment in advanced economies was recently further 
theorised in debates on precarious workers by scholars with focus on the UK and 
London in particular.82 They have rejected assimilationist and integrationist 
approaches in arguing that migration is nowadays implicated in a process of exclusion 
and ‘de-citizenship’ (Standing 2011, Mezzadra 2016). Migrants’ settlement is said to 
be bounded by the precarisation of their livelihoods and their molding into easily 
disposable and highly exploitative mobile labour force that is advantageous to the 
needs of global capitalism. Guy Standing (2011) adopts Bourdieusian articulation of 
precarity83 and extends it to the process of globalisation and imposed flexibilisation of 
labour responsible for the disappearance of a traditional working class. He claims that 
today a growing number of workers find themselves in an insecure position in relation 
to capital and state (Standing 2011).  
The articulation of a clear and workable definition of precarity has proven an arduous 
task given the concept’s slippery and potentially catch-all meaning (Anderson 2010). 
Its usefulness, however, lies in its ability to capture global economic and state-imposed 
pressures that bring instability and flux for particular groups of workers. Migrants have 
been disproportionately represented in atypical forms of employment defined by 
                                            
82 See Standing (2011), Anderson (2010), Alberti (2014), Macarie (2017). 
83 Initially precarity is used to describe temporary and seasonal labour. See Bourdieu (1997) La précarité 
est aujourd’hui partout: Intervention lors des Rencontres européennes contre la précarité [Precarity is 
today everywhere: Interventions during the European meetings against 
precarity] Grenoble. International Labour Organisation.  Available at:  
http://natlex.ilo.ch/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_dialogue/---actrav/documents/meeting 
document/wcms_161352.pdf [Accessed February 2016]. 
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functional flexibility - agency work, self-employment84, part-time and casual labour 
arrangements (Anderson 2010, Standing 2011). By employing the analytical lens of 
the ‘denizen’, Standing explains migrants’ ‘readiness’ to engage in precarious work 
arrangements as a result of the denial of their civic, economic and social rights. He 
claims that there are in fact institutionalised mechanisms for shaping/producing a 
super-mobile and exploitable ‘floating reserve’ (2011: 102).  
Michael Burawoy’s (1976) conceptualisation of an international system of migrant 
labour helps to further explain the benefits of a low-cost, compliant, and highly-mobile 
labour force for structurally advantaged economies. He posits that the reproduction of 
international labour force, usually consisting of single, able-bodied individuals, is only 
possible through the separation of maintenance and renewal processes: the costs of 
labour renewal (education, social provision, public services) are to be borne by the 
institutions of the sending state while the maintenance is organised by the receiving 
one. The mutual sustenance of the two processes is ensured by what Burawoy calls 
the ‘dependence of the reproductive worker on the productive worker’ (1976: 1053). 
With the implementation of different legal and political mechanisms, the receiving state 
entrenches the vulnerable and weak position of migrants, their separation from their 
families, and the reproduction of oscillatory movements between work and home 
(Burawoy 1976).  
This research presents Bulgarian migration to the UK as one of the many routes within 
the international system of migrant labour. It demonstrates that even when it is desired, 
long-term settlement is often impeded by systematic constraints and by a capitalist 
                                            
84 Including ‘false’ self-employment (see Davis 2015). 
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labour market restructured in line with demands for temporariness and flexibilisation. 
In the empirical chapters I will show how Bulgarians, who formally enjoy a ‘legal’ free-
mover status because of their EU citizenship, are equally affected by processes which 
de facto strip them off their granted rights and protections. I demonstrate how through 
the workings of formal and informal mechanisms (economic, political and bureaucratic) 
migrants’ temporariness and circularity become ‘institutionalised’ (Mezzadra 2016). 
This is a clear case of the precarity systematically produced in the international system 
of labour supply (Burawoy 1979), where hopes to obtain a better life channel the supply 
of cheap labour from peripheral east European EU member states to the secondary 
and informal labour markets (Sassen 1991, Anderson 2010) in western Europe. This 
thesis thus questions the ability of one-directional assimilationist models to explain 
migrants’ incorporation or lack thereof into the host society. 
Connections between imaginaries and migration 
In recent years, primarily due to the efforts of anthropological and ethnographically-
engaged geographical research, the economic reductionism dominant in migration 
studies has slowly given way to a more nuanced understanding that accounts for the 
interplay between economic and non-economic factors of migration. This scholarship 
has been led by considerations expressed in the call the geographer Tony Fielding 
made more than two decades ago:  
The feelings associated with migration are usually complicated, the decision to 
migrate is typically difficult to make, and the outcome usually involves mixed 
emotions [...]. Migration tends to expose one’s personality, it expresses one’s 
loyalties and reveals one’s values and attachments (often previously hidden). It 
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is a statement of an individual’s world-view, and is, therefore, an extremely 
cultural event. And yet, when we study migration scientifically, we seem to forget 
all this (1992: 210).  
Rooted in the ‘cultural turn’ in social sciences (Silvey and Lawson 1999), the 
conceptualisation of migration as a cultural process reflects the complexity of migrants’ 
motivations and the multiplicity of factors which, although not always rationalised or 
acknowledged, affect the decision-making process (Halfacree 2004). Studied in the 
context of individual biographies, migration emerges as a process – rather than a 
single event – which develops in a complex entanglement with individuals’ life stories 
(Silvey and Lawson 1999). When thought about as a ‘story’ (Champion 1999) riddled 
with contradictory emotions, preoccupations, fears and aspirations, the lived 
experiences of migration and their articulations largely defy abstract models prevailing 
in most academic accounts.  
Most importantly, the adoption of a culturally-laden lens has proved useful in outlining 
the important connection between imagination and migration. The powerful role of 
imaginaries in determining why, where and when people move has been gradually 
gaining recognition in the work of scholars preoccupied with studying diverse types of 
human mobility – lifestyle migration, tourism, postcolonial migration, ‘labour’ and high-
skilled mobility.85 They have been able to demonstrate the significance of expectations 
and aspirations in motivating migration decisions by revealing how the act of migration 
becomes a ‘technology of imagination’ (Vigh 2009: 105), through which people lay 
claim upon a particular vision of a better and more fulfilling life. Salazar (2013), for 
                                            




instance, argues that people’s determination to cross borders is connected to their 
ability to imagine other places and possible lives as better than the ones currently 
experienced. It has been recognised that migrants often expect that by settling in a 
particular ‘elsewhere’ they would be able to lead a life imagined as offering more 
fulfillment and meaning not only in terms of economic gain but also general existential 
possibilities (see Salazar 2013, Benson 2012, Pajo 2007). 
Those who have stressed the conceptual importance of imaginaries and other non-
economic dimensions in migration movements have done so in consideration with the 
effects of wider historical, cultural and economic processes.  Benson claims that in 
order to explain why migration occurs one needs to consider the diverse contingencies 
coming together and enabling individuals to enact their imaginings (2012). In this 
respect imagination alone cannot explain migration decisions as they are a complex 
combination of ‘individualised biographies, trajectories and actions, as well as wider 
cultural contexts and structural conditions’ (Benson 2012: 1681). Thus, rather than an 
effort to discard the contributions of economistic models, culturally-informed 
understandings of migration have tried to challenge their explanatory monopoly by 
advancing nuanced and complex accounts of migration motivations. By refusing to 
succumb to a binary that simplifies the process of migration as fully engendered by 
either economic or non-economic factors, researchers have demonstrated the scope 
for complementarity between ideational and material approaches to studying 
migration. In the same vein, this thesis questions the conceptual merit of the 
economistic premises of migration studies and renounces an understanding of 
Bulgarian migration to the UK as solely conditioned by an economic ‘push-pull’ logic. 
Instead, it presents an effort to contribute to an existing but still rather faint 
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interdisciplinary inquiry into the role of non-material factors in influencing decisions and 
experiences of migration. Thus, this research aims to grasp the lived experiences of 
migration and thereby reveal the central role that imaginaries play in it. The following 
section will discuss the origin, conceptualisation and most useful application of the 
‘imaginary’ for migration research.  
 
The social imaginary and its role in international migration  
To account for the role that individuals’ imaginations assume in the construction of 
migration motivations, choice of specific destination and migratory patterns, this 
section turns to a more in-depth discussion of the nature of the imagination and its role 
in social life. It begins by laying out a basic conceptualisation of imagination as a social 
rather than individual quality and introduces the concept of the imaginary for capturing 
the dynamic relation between individual imaginations and wider cultural formations 
across space and time. Drawing on the key works of Castoriadis (1987), Taylor (2002) 
and Appadurai (1996), I explore how the imaginary has been understood as a vehicle 
for reproducing social order and hierarchies, and, relatedly, the dark side of modern 
capitalism. I also discuss the distinction between imaginary and imagination, which has 
been mostly conceptualised as an expression of agency and individual creativity. I 
further expand the critical perspective on the imaginary as an ideological construct 
(Althusser 2008) luring large groups of people into supporting or acquiescing to the 
capitalist order and its logics of reproduction, thereby limiting their capacity for critical 
reflection and resistance. The collective propensity for conformism working through the 
imaginary is further explained in the psychoanalytical work of Lacan (1977), Zizek 
(1989), and Sloterdijk (1984) who see the structuration of collective desire and 
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behaviour as related to an individual propensity for fantasy identification and 
compensation of internal lacks and traumas. Finally, I introduce the concept of the 
‘imaginary West’ (Yurchak 2006) and outline its relevance for understanding the 
perspectives and lifeworlds of my informants. 
Imaginary, social action and capitalist modernity  
Cornelius Castoriadis is probably the social theorist to have developed the most 
elaborate and influential contribution to the understanding of the imaginary and its 
embeddedness in the relationship between individual and society. His philosophico-
theoretical engagement presented in the Imaginary Institution of Society (1987) 
provides the basis for much contemporary application of the concept to the 
understanding of different aspects of individual and collective lifeworlds. Castoriadis 
differentiates between an individual and a social imaginary86, which, he argues, are in 
a state of dynamic interaction – it is the collective workings of individuals’ imaginations 
that bestow meaning upon symbols, institutions and material things and give the so 
produced social imaginary the status of ‘a symbolic matrix that enables human action’ 
(Gaonkar 2002). Castoriadis is primarily interested in the function of the social 
imaginary and its effects on the way people think, make sense of things, and act. In 
his reading, the social imaginary operates as a unifying group ethos, which:  
gives a specific orientation to every institutional system, which overdetermines 
the choice and the connections of symbolic networks, which is the creation of 
                                            
86 Bourdieu makes a similar distinction when he talks about imaginary and ‘imaginary in the ordinary 
sense of the word’ (1984: 150). He sees the imaginary as a quality – socially and historically determined. 
‘Imaginary in the ordinary sense of the word’ refers to the popular usage of imagination as individual 
capacity for dreaming and fantasising. For him imagination is always contextual no matter how utopian 
(see Smith 2006).  
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each historical period, its singular manner of living, of seeing and of conducting 
its own existence, its world, and its relations with this world (1987: 145). 
The imaginary, which always reflects a particular historical and cultural background, is 
seen as a framework within which people perceive and understand their collective 
social life (1987). The imaginary is not omnipresent or omnipotent, however. 
Castoriadis believes that individuals have the potential for achieving a multiplicity of 
outcomes by challenging the imaginary, the institutions on which it is built and its 
significations.  
Charles Taylor’s (2002) discussion of the imaginary perpetuates the tendency towards 
homogenisation and abstraction laid forward by Castoriadis. Departing from Benedict 
Anderson and his understanding of the imaginary as a framework of consciousness in 
which all representatives of a nation or group recognise themselves as ‘an imagined 
political community’ (1991: 15), Taylor advances an understanding of the imaginary as 
a widely shared cognitive schema (Strauss 2006). As it is ‘shared by large groups of 
people, if not the whole society’, argues Taylor the social imaginary is ‘the way in which 
people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go 
on between them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the 
deeper normative notions and images that underline these expectations’ (Taylor 2002: 
106).  
Taylor does not recognise the embeddedness of the imaginary within human creativity 
and is mostly preoccupied with the societal level of its workings. On the one hand, this 
puts him in a better position to trace the origins and development of the ‘modern social 
imaginary’ in the new ideas and theories emerging as part of economic and historical 
changes brought about by the rise of western modernity. On the other hand, in an effort 
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to completely dismiss a liberal conception of an autonomous self, Taylor (2002) reifies 
the imaginary as a force beyond individual control – a coherent structure, internalised 
by individuals that to a great extent conditions the way in which they understand the 
world and their place within it. The social imaginary thus also foregrounds a moral order 
in which subjective ideas, practices and understandings are granted their normative 
endorsement and are accepted as meaningful. Taylor’s conception forecloses, 
however, the possibility of people challenging and changing this order through different 
forms of action.    
Another scholar with whose work the imaginary has been associated mostly in recent 
years is the anthropologist and theorist of globalisation Arjun Appadurai. In Modernity 
at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization (1996) Appadurai claims that 
imagination has become a ‘social fact, and is the key component of the new global 
order’ (1996: 31).87 In his reading, imagination is exclusively approached as an 
individual quality.  As a main characteristic of modern subjectivity, free from all forms 
of social control and ideological confinement, imagination is seen as an activity through 
which individuals make sense of their lives, take decisions, and devise self-
identifications. Thus, instead of reproducing an entrenched social and moral order, 
imagination in Appadurai’s conceptualisation is a force for empowerment that enables 
subaltern people to form solidarities, challenge the power structures of the nation state, 
and to even devise resistance strategies against modernising ideologies and their 
negative effects on local communities (1996).  
                                            
87 Appadurai (1996) does not make a clear distinction between imaginary and imagination.  
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It can be argued that neither of these three most influential and frequently cited 
theoretical engagements is able to provide a satisfactory and balanced understanding 
of what the imaginary is and of the relationship between the individual and the social 
world it foregrounds. On one hand, we have the ‘cultural model’ understanding of the 
imaginary advanced by Taylor, who insist that as a ‘symbolic matrix’ the imaginary 
legitimises individuals’ practices and is reflected in their dispositions and actions. In 
this respect, the imaginary is firmly rooted in the structural conditions of its creation 
and is intrinsic to the reproduction of dominant social and historical legacies. On the 
other side of the structure-agency dichotomy is Appadurai’s conception of the 
imaginary as a ‘form of negotiation between sites of agency and globally defined fields 
of possibility’ (1996:31). While Appadurai is certainly right to position the imaginary 
within the everyday sphere of human life and to insist on its role in motivating certain 
activities, he appears to completely dismiss the objectively existing material basis and 
structures in which individual imaginaries are rooted. An understanding of the 
imagination (individual imaginary) as a self-contained and self-realising force is 
incapable, Smith (2006) claims, of granting authority to individual autonomy as it 
ignores a context of capitalist production which bears effects on all aspects of human 
activity. Echoing Wallerstein’s (1990) and Amin’s (1998) reluctance to see imagination, 
culture and narrative as purely ideational dimensions of social reality that have no 
connection to the tangibility of everyday materiality, Smith invokes Bourdieu’s 
suggestion to see the imaginary as a ‘social quality’, or in other words, to recognise 
that ‘there is a history and context to that which is imaginable’ (2006: 58). 
What can prevent us from placing too much weight on either side of the structure-
agency dichotomy in which the working of the imaginary is unquestionably embedded 
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is the adoption of a more nuanced interpretation of the ‘continual interplay between 
structures and practices and how these are mediated in everyday life’ (Benson 2012: 
1693). The understanding of the imaginary and its relation to the practice of migration 
that this thesis is concerned with acknowledges the historical and socio-economic 
context within which individual imaginings take shape. When we think of imaginaries 
as contextual rather than placeless we can better account for their dependence on 
cultural models, explicit ideologies, and different interpretative schemas circulating in 
the wider public domain. At the same time, this does not negate the possibility that 
individuals invest imaginaries with meanings and interpretations corresponding to their 
own individual circumstances or appropriate those aspects of them that resonate to 
their positioning within the social order (Benson 2012). Thus, while the empirical 
chapters of this work clearly demonstrate the powerful role that wider cultural schemas 
play in constructing individual imaginations and thus propelling migration, I am careful 
not to assume a deterministic relationship. What prompts people to act is the ability to 
appropriate dominant imaginaries and make them meaningful in their own terms and 
according to their own interpretations.  
When discussing culturally-significant imaginaries and their ability to guide human 
action, attention should be paid to the regressive effects that they are capable of 
inflicting and their role as vehicles of deception. In his later work, Castoriadis starts to 
seriously question the imaginary’s capacity to critically challenge the existing order and 
institute an alternative model of society. His pessimism is related to a modern reality of 
disillusionment brought about by pervasive cultural production, ideological 
justifications of technoscientific proliferations and the resulting entrenchment of apathy 
and individualism in western societies (Elliott 2002: 138). He warns against the 
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homogeneity and conformity brought about by the cultural production and rationality of 
modernity. Instead of offering alternatives, the imaginary starts to conceal and 
reproduce the negative effects of the capitalist mode of production and the mass 
organisation of social life.  
In this sense, Castoriadis expresses the concerns with modern capitalism already 
pointed out by critical scholars in postcolonial studies and earlier critiques of modernity 
(see Horkheimer and Adorno 2002/1944). In his analysis of failed promises of 
modernisation in postcolonial Africa, James Ferguson (1999) directs his attention to 
the sphere of collective social imagination, where the interaction between mythological 
representations and people’s aspirations takes place. Ferguson is convinced that 
‘modernisation’ has been nothing but a ‘myth, an illusion, often a lie’ (1999: 253). Pietre 
de Vreis (2007) substantiates Ferguson’s argument by outlining the mechanism 
through which ideological promises of western development and modernity structure 
popular imaginations and aspirations despite and even because of the systemic 
failures of developmental interventions.  
This critical reflection on the nature and function of modern imaginaries in individual 
and social life helps explain how individuals led by their imagination often exhibit 
homogenous preferences, ambitions and engage in the corresponding actions.88 Even 
if we acknowledge the existence of an unpredictable and uncontrollable dimension of 
individual imagination that allows each individual the freedom to dream with an 
audacity reaching beyond the confines of her material predicament, we are still left in 
                                            
88 See the case of historical mass migrations to the US, prompted by an omnipresent cultural imaginary 
of the ‘land of plenty’ (Adams 2004), or the global phenomenon of personality cults, characterised by 
idealised adorations of political leaders, pop culture icons, or business entrepreneurs (on the personality 
cult around Steve Jobs see Valaskivi and Sumiala (2014)). 
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bewilderment by the fact that the contemporary world is a place of suffering and 
inequality. Led by concrete imaginaries of a better life, people undergo tremendous 
suffering and sentence themselves to lives marked by unforeseen sorrow. How else 
can we explain a paradoxical reality in which an extraordinary number of people yearly 
are willing to embark on life-threatening journeys to the West despite being at least 
partially aware of the multiple ordeals awaiting them? In an effort to shed more light on 
this puzzle the next section turns to a more focused exploration of the ‘dystopian 
potential’ of imaginary creations and their ideological effects. 
The dark side of the imaginary 
Influenced by the work of Freud in psychoanalytical studies and de Saussure’s 
understanding of language as a system of signifiers, Jacques Lacan rejects the idea 
of an autonomous self and creative self-expression and postulates that individual 
desires are structured by language and other symbolic systems of representation 
(Strauss 2006).Thus, to understand Lacan’s interpretation of the imaginary it should 
first be established that contrary to Castoriadis he saw individuality as inter-subjectively 
constituted within and through social and cultural relations. It is through language that 
people come to gain access to discursive systems, syntax orders and interpretive 
schemas, all of which come to condition the psyche’s insertion into the institutionalised 
social order (Lacan 1977).  Lacan emphasises the existence of three orders of being 
that exercise control over psyche’s workings: the symbolic, the imaginary, and the real 
(1977). In simple terms and in lines with a Freudian tradition, Lacan considers the 
imaginary a fantasy, an illusion which is created by individuals themselves in an effort 
to misrepresent reality and compensate a sense of lack inherent to the inner process 
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of transformation (Strauss 2006). Therefore, both the imaginary and the symbolic 
represent a source of ‘misconstruction’ or concealment of the real, with the difference 
that the former is a subjective unconscious effort whereas the latter is an externally 
imposed mechanism (ibid).  
Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser gives us the analytical tools for exploring the 
ideological function of the social imaginary in reproducing relationships of domination 
between antagonistic class groups. It is through the establishment of what Althusser 
calls ‘Ideological State Apparatuses’ (ISA) that the ruling class can assure the 
hegemonic domination of its ideology and the successful reproduction of the relations 
of production (2008).  Althusser defines ISAs as a number of ‘specialised institutions’ 
such as churches, schools, the family, political parties, and different media outlets, all 
of which, despite their diverse activities, and audiences are ‘in fact unified …beneath 
the ruling ideology’ (2008: 20, his emphasis).  
For Althusser, the main purpose of ideology is to ‘recruit’ or ‘transform’ individuals into 
‘subjects’ - ‘a precise operation’ which he calls ‘interpellation’ and which he exemplifies 
through the hail of a police officer who exclaims: ‘Hey you there!’’. After the hailed 
individual turns around, she or he Altthuser claims, becomes a subject of ideology, 
merely through this ‘one-hundred-and-eighty-degrees physical conversion’ (2008: 7).89 
The distinctive contribution of Althusser’s analysis of ideology, which helps him avoid 
a simplistic criticism of people’s naïve ‘fetishism of imagination’ (Smith 2006), is his 
                                            
89 The power and pervasiveness of ideology for Althusser lay in the very fact that individuals do not 
recognise their deep immersion in it – ‘What seems to take place outside ideology in reality takes place 
within ideology. What really takes place in ideology seems therefore to take place outside it’. (2008: 49) 
This unique function of ideology is contained in its ability to tacitly ‘impose obviousness as obviousness’ 
and make people recognise this obviousness and exclaim: ‘This is true!’ (Althusser 2008: 32).  
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recognition of the grounding of ideology in material practices and relations of 
production. He argues that ideology is not simply ideational or spiritual but always has 
a material nature in a double sense: firstly, because of its production in material 
apparatuses (themselves embedded in relations of production and class conflict), and 
secondly, because of its existence and reproduction in established practices and 
actions.90 Thus, Althusser develops an account of the coercive and contradictory 
nature of life in the capitalist system, which makes people conform, out of necessity or 
a perceived lack of alternatives, to institutions and practices which they know are 
detrimental to sustainable development of society and satisfaction on the individual 
level.  
Drawing on the contributions of both Lacan and Althusser, Slavoj Zizek, one of the 
most prominent contemporary critics of ideology, sheds more light on the mechanisms 
through which ideology permeates all aspects of individual life. In his The Sublime 
Object of Ideology (1989), he draws on Lacan to claim that individuals are guided by 
internal tendency toward fantasy identifications which have the purpose of concealing 
internal lacks and inherent traumas. The lack of meaning that people feel in relation to 
their personal life and social reality as a whole constitutes ‘nothingness’ which they 
attempt to sooth by devising different fantasy creations. In an effort to grasp the 
totalising capacity of ideology, Zizek concludes that its function ‘is not to offer us a point 
of escape from our reality but to offer us the social reality itself as an escape’ (The 
pervert’s guide to ideology 2012: n.p.) from that internal lack which is experienced as 
                                            
90 In the example provided by Althusser, a religious follower, whose belief in God comes from the ideas 
set up in her own consciousness by the corresponding ideological apparatus, will without doubt engage 
in certain behaviour that reflects this devotion – church going, praying, mass attendance (2008). 
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traumatic. This implies that ideology, rather than being simply forced upon subjects, as 
Althusser would have us believe, is subjects’ spontaneous reaction towards social 
reality. In other words, argues Zizek, ‘we are made to enjoy our ideology’ (The pervert’s 
guide to ideology 2012: n.p.).  
Zizek explains further the functional relation of fantasy identification to the conditions 
of life in late-capitalism by drawing on Sloterdijk’s (1984) notion of ‘cynical reason’. 
Sloterdijk argues that the overwhelming bitterness and disillusionment brought by 
modern industrial civilisation have led to the diffusion of pervasive cynicism into public 
discourse. The only way for individuals to function as a ‘normal’ part of society is by 
adopting a cynical worldview which rejects naïve optimism and does not buy into 
‘cheap’ promises of a better future. The ‘enlightened false consciousness’ (1984: 192) 
thus bred by the mass phenomenon of alienating cynicism is immune to traditional 
ideological critique, Sloterdijk claims, because of the reflexive capacity to denounce 
the falsity on which ideological claims are conceived. 
In the same vein, Zizek sees irony and cynicism as mechanisms through which 
individuals consciously blind themselves to the function of ideological fantasy (1989). 
This implies that even when recognising the ‘distance between the ideological mask 
and the social reality’ (1989: 29) individuals might still find no reason to tear this mask 
down91. Individuals engage in this paradoxical behaviour as it allows them to cope with 
constant lacks and desires and gives the impression of exercising free subjectivity. 
                                            
91 For Zizek the reason for this lies in the fact that ideological illusion is not placed in ‘knowledge’ but in 
‘doing’ - even though people are able to recognise the reality in which their social activity takes place 
they are still blind to the fact that their actions are guided by an illusion (1989). The analogy which Zizek 
(The pervert’s guide to ideology 2012: n.p.) makes between the behaviour of today’s subject of ideology 
and the fetishist’s attitude towards the fetish, grasps well this peculiar contradiction: ‘I know well that (for 




However, rather than contributing to the emergence of post-ideological reality, such a 
stance ensures the greater efficacy of political ideology and the reproduction of 
capitalist relations of production. 
The above discussion draws attention to the limitations of theoretical approaches that 
see the imaginary as a potential force for devising new strategies for self-emancipation, 
constructing more fulfilling futures or a better world. In its ideological function, the 
imaginary often presents people with misleading, illusionary, and one-sided ideas 
which can have negative effects on their and others’ lives. However, as argued by 
Zizek and Sloterdijk, the lack and incompleteness that individuals feel in the face of 
their material predicament or psychological constitution, makes them nevertheless 
engage with such imaginaries and the ideology they present. Their attraction to 
ideological promises – even if portrayed as a self-aware case of ‘enlightened false 
consciousness – nevertheless serves to reproduce the imaginaries, ideology and 
relations of production of contemporary capitalism.   
Building on this discussion, this thesis is concerned with an exploration of the 
ideological seduction that imaginary constructions hold for individuals and their power 
to mobilise them into accepting that the only way of achieving a better way of life and 
a possible future is through migration to a particular place. In my empirical analysis, I 
show how my informants conceive of migration to the UK as the only way for obtaining 
a better life. Such conviction stems from the interpellation of their desires into a 
particular imaginary construct, that of the ‘imaginary West’. Furthermore, I will 
demonstrate how the imaginary is contained and reproduced by people even after their 
pre-migration aspirations have proved to belie the realities of migrant life in the UK. Its 
persistence and its capacity to shape individual identifications and future aspirations 
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even when its illusionary nature is recognised reveals the function of the imaginary as 
an ‘ideological fantasy’ (Zizek 1989). This theoretical discussion finishes with the 
introduction of the notion of the ‘imaginary West’ which is used for unpacking the 
structuring role of dominant social imaginaries and their power in propelling human 
mobility across borders.    
Imaginary West 
When taken as a ‘native category’, modernity, according to Ferguson (1999), is still a 
valid and powerful dream, the realisation of which continues to captivate the 
imagination of diverse non-western populations. For those acutely aware of their 
debased position in a global hierarchy of places, the West routinely emblematises 
modernity and remains a template for social and economic organisation and 
advancement towards membership in a First World order. The West is thus an 
imperishable ideal and a force instigating collective and individual efforts (Ferguson 
1999).  
In the east European context, Alexei Yurchak’s (2006) concept of ‘Imaginary West’ 
best captures the formation of a western-centric idea of modernity that informed the 
collective imaginary of people in the Soviet Union and incited individual longings for a 
magical world that appeared attainable and elusive at the same time. In Yurchak’s 
reading, the ‘elsewhere of late socialism’, as he denotes the ‘imaginary West’, is a 
hyperreal construct with no exact temporal or spatial coordinates. The creation and 
dissemination of this imaginary, according to him, was instrumental to the logic of 
Soviet ideology, as it helped to limit the adoption of Western bourgeois values but still 
gave a sense of agency to the people who could appropriate and radically re-interpret 
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Western symbolic forms by investing them with local meaning. Furthermore, the 
consumption of Western (ised) cultural goods, entertainment and literature provided 
‘access’ to a utopian ‘parallel universe’ in which the daily grind of socialist reality could 
be left behind (Yurchak 2006).  
Building on the above discussion on the nature of the imaginary and its function in 
social life, I interpret the ‘imaginary West’ as a cultural schema (Taylor 2002) that 
informs the way in which people make sense of their situation and the surrounding 
reality. I am particularly interested in the role of the ‘imaginary West’ in constructing 
expectations and imaginations of life in the UK and thus propelling Bulgarian 
migrations. In applying the concept of the ‘imaginary West’ to the context of 
postsocialist Bulgarian migration I try to grasp the complex interplay between individual 
life-worlds, migration narratives and specific historical and material conditions. In the 
following chapter, I analyse how the hardship, precarity and dissatisfaction that 
Bulgarians experience in their lives lead them to the conviction that there must be a 
place where life is easier and fulfilling, much like in the ‘elsewhere of late Socialism’ 
envisaged by Yurchak. As I will show in chapter Four, the West is a focal point around 
which people convey personal and collective aspirations related to migration, present 
their social and moral positions and devise definitions of what a ‘good life’ should look 
like. 
I understand the ‘Imaginary West’ as a theoretical notion through which a more critical 
understanding of the native concept of ‘(the) West’ (Zapad(at)) and its characteristics 
can be advanced. Hence, I interpret the West as a collective social imaginary 
embedded in a mythological narrative of western modernity. I will further demonstrate 
how in my informants’ narratives and interpretations; the West emerges as a standard 
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of an exemplary ‘global form of life’ that is expected to fulfill desires and aspirations 
they never had the chance to realise while in Bulgaria. I will also reveal the utopian and 
teleological nature of this Western-centric imaginary, which comes to the fore in the 
chapters on migrants’ experiences of life in the UK. The way in which Bulgarians hold 
on to an idealised notion of the West by re-adjusting its temporal and geographic 
coordinates demonstrates, as I will argue, its status of a telos of modern capitalist 
ideology (Zizek 1989; see above).  
As discussed above, the ability to get access to, adopt and act upon certain imaginaries 
depends on the different amounts and kinds of capitals at people’s disposal (economic, 
cultural, symbolic).92 When seen as a social quality (Bourdieu 1984), the imaginary is 
always class-specific: certain classes are predisposed towards certain imaginaries 
while completely disregarding others (see Chapter Four)93. In this respect, I 
differentiate between two different aspects of the ‘imaginary West’ that have been put 
forward by Bulgarians sharing two different class-based identities (see next section 
and Chapter Three). As I will show, the ‘imaginary West’, the same way as social 
imaginaries in general, works as a scheme through which individual and group 
identifications and positions within a particular social milieu or in the global order are 
perceived, defined and reproduced. This intersection of the analysis of class and socio-
economic inequality, on the one hand, and social ordering and symbolic hierarchies in 
postsocialist societies, on the other, as well as their importance for migration processes 
and imagination, is discussed in the next section.  
                                            
92 See Smith (2006) and Benson (2012). 
93 For example, see Buller and Hoggard (1994) and Benson (2012) who discuss how the migration of 




Class in postsocialism 
This section begins by briefly outlining the state of class analysis in postsocialist 
literature and its adherence to a strictly materialist reading of social inequalities that 
does not account for individual and collective self-identifications and experiences of 
class. I contrast this to a Bourdieusian reading which sees class as a relational 
category that depends on the accumulation of different capitals (economic, social, 
cultural, symbolic). Bourdieu’s work is particularly useful in its recognition of the 
importance of symbolic practices of class identity construction through differentiation 
and classification and through political and public articulations. Applications of his 
approach account for the role of hegemonic ‘elite’ versus ‘masses’ discourses in the 
formation of culturally-laden class identifications in eastern Europe. It is Mihal 
Buchowski (2006) who clearly demonstrates how such classifications often 
instrumentalise an Orientalising logic which informs individuals’ practices of boundary-
building and othering.  
The need for class analysis and class as a lived category 
Class analysis has been fairly marginalised in the work of anthropologists and other 
social scientists in the recent past, mostly at the expense of increased engagement 
with questions of cultural identity and discourse (Kalb and Carrier 2015). It has recently 
been recognised that the need for reinvigorated class-based research becomes ever 
more pressing in the face of deepening social inequalities, neoliberalisation, insecurity 
and a corresponding rise in class polarisation. These dynamics of ‘capitalist 
restructuring and dispossession’ (Carbonella and Kashmir 2015: 42) have transformed 
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the stable class oppositions between a Fordist working class and the ‘poor’ into a 
myriad of class formations and identities that become increasingly hard to 
conceptualise and explain.  
Eastern Europe is a good case in point given the fact that the introduction of capitalist 
market relations has put class formations on a ‘fast track’ (Schroder and Vonderau 
2008:5) and created unprecedented social divisions between economically successful 
elites and an impoverished majority. In public and political discourse in postsocialist 
countries, the concept of class has remained obliterated, as Schroder (2008) notes, 
although not in the name of socialist ideology of equality, but in line with a neoliberal 
proclamation of individual responsibility for wellbeing and achievement. In Bulgaria, 
academic research dominated by post-1989 political agendas has largely rejected 
class as ideologically-laden category and instead focused on studying social 
stratifications, in which status is viewed as a quantifiable category measured by 
indicators such as income, educational qualifications, and professional attainment 
(Boyadjhieva and Kabakchieva 2015).  
The emergence of new social divisions in eastern Europe has been analysed in relation 
to capitalist restructuring and corresponding large-scale privatisation of state assets, 
the rolling back of welfare support and social services, decline in industrial production 
and rising living costs.94 Class differentiations have been mostly conceptualised in the 
rather simplistic opposition between ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of the ‘transition’ (Schroder 
2008). The beneficiaries or ‘winners’ of postsocialist transformation have been 
identified as new entrepreneurs and proprietors consisting in part of former members 
                                            
94 See Ost (2015), Buchowski (1996), Kideckel (2004). 
85 
 
of the socialist nomenklatura who have taken part in the process of privatisation and 
have successfully managed to turn their social capital into economic advantage 
(Buchowski 1997). The category of ‘losers’ covers the disadvantaged majority of the 
population, most of whom have lost their previously privileged or meaningful status – 
workers, farmers, pensioners, and some parts of the intelligentsia (ibid). The new 
postsocialist middle class has emerged as a thin silver line between the two very 
general categories of ‘rich’ and ‘poor’.95 The small group in the middle, scholars claim, 
has been composed of representatives of all social milieus of the socialist society – 
party activists and managers, former intelligentsia and skilled workers, all of whom 
were pushed into the market sector, as well as new self-made businessmen and 
professionals (Buchkowski 1997, Schroder 2008).  
Such materialist readings reduce class to an ‘objective’ economic status and tell us 
little about the individual or collective experiences of class, self-identifications, and 
meanings that the concept holds for social agents in their everyday realities. E. P. 
Thompson’s reminder (1980) on the importance of class as a process in a constant 
making and a lived category as opposed to a fixed pre-existent social structure is 
especially salient in the context of the changes undergone by east European societies.  
Towards a Bourdieusian reading of class 
In order to understand the construction of class identities and practices in eastern 
Europe, we need to, as Schroder (2008) suggests, move beyond immediate concerns 
with income and labour relations and conceive of class as emerging out of a 
                                            
95 The consolidation of a discernible and stable middle layer has been anticipated by some postsocialist 
class scholars as a sure demarcation of a successful capitalist development (Boyadjhieva and 
Kabakchieva 2015, Buchowski 1997). 
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combination of political and cultural factors. Taking into account that political 
articulations of class identities often influence individual expressions in cultural and 
social practice, Schroder claims that class analysis should be related to questions of 
‘recognition and respect and to wider normative concerns with what is good in terms 
of practices, beliefs, ways of life and character.’ (2008: 5). In this regard, it is Bourdieu’s 
(1984) approach to class analysis with its focus on the dialectical interplay between 
processes of internal and external constitution of collective subjectivities that allows us 
to overcome strictly material readings of class and to recognise the way in which 
people perceive of themselves and others in relation to social location. The first 
important point of Bourdieu’s contribution is that as a relational category, class results 
from the interplay between various kinds of capital. Apart from economic capital (in the 
form of income and material wealth), Bourdieu (1984) attributes great importance to 
the cultural and symbolic resources that agents mobilise in a classificatory struggle – 
a process of establishing symbolic boundaries between individuals in constituting their 
collective belonging. Bourdieu understands individuals’ everyday choices in the realms 
of culture and material consumption as symbolic practices of building social identity 
and classification of others as similar or different from oneself. Acts of classification 
directed to those within or outside the social group are not necessarily conscious, as 
they are performed through an ingrained set of dispositions, which Bourdieu calls 
habitus (1984). Nevertheless, these are acts following a strategic purpose and, by 
engaging with seemingly routine practices, cultural dispositions and lifestyle choices, 
scholars can discover their importance. Thus, for Bourdieu, class boundaries are not 
fixed by one’s economic position but are ‘actively produced and reproduced by 
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individuals’ quest for ‘distinction’ and social difference from other (‘lower’) classes and 
class fractions’ (Joppke 1986: 54).  
Secondly, Bourdieu points to a formal process of classification that overcomes the pre-
reflexive, spontaneously constructed boundaries drawn by the work of the habitus. The 
‘codification’ of class identities is a symbolic, political work of manipulation performed 
through discursive practices of naming (or labeling) in the purview of the so-called 
‘specialists in representation’ – politicians, journalists, intellectuals, and academics 
(Wieninger 2005). Through their public articulation, identities that have been confined 
to individual realms become transformed into collective entities with a recognised 
social existence. The discursive construction of class identities has the capacity to turn 
‘classes on paper’ into actually existing social groups whose members recognise their 
common belonging and capacity for collective action. Wright (2005) notes that this 
process can be met with resistance by individuals who may simultaneously act as 
classifiers and classified. The capacity to classify and escape classification, however, 
as already established, depends on the kinds and volumes of capital that individuals 
dispose of, which means that working-class members often have less ‘world-making 
power’ (Goodman 1978) than ‘specialists’.  
Lastly, it is important to keep in mind that the classification of difference through 
lifestyle choices, consumption practices and/or discourses may not correspond to pre-
existing ‘objective’ differences such as income or wealth; and that differentiation in the 
former domain may even be used to compensate for lack of status in the latter. Thus, 
members of the same (economic) class might have quite different subjective 
experiences of their collective social belonging, a discrepancy foregrounding 
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dissonance and even conflict. In Bourdieu’s words, the ‘social neighbourhood [. . .] has 
every chance of [. . .] being the point of greatest tension’ (Bourdieu 1980: 137).  
Classification through Orientalisation 
Echoing Bourdieu, Ingo Schroder (2008) insists that all anthropological preoccupations 
with east European class identity formation should investigate the process by which 
hegemonic discourses disseminated by those in power obliterate the existence of class 
divisions and replace them with cultural images of ‘modernity’ and the ‘market’. 
Scholars of postsocialism have studied the proliferation of ‘elite’ versus ‘masses’ 
discourses in east European societies in ‘transition’. They have revealed their role in 
justifying the socio-economic and political misgivings of the structural transformation 
process with the deficiencies of particular groups - workers, peasants, pensioners, 
uneducated and minorities96. Such pro-liberal narratives put forward by politicians, 
mass media, and intellectuals have suggested that market ‘transition’ should be guided 
by ‘civilisationally competent’ elites implementing changes despite the insufficient 
democratic culture of the ‘masses’ and their inability to recognise the benefits of the 
new capitalist economy.97  
The main cultural attributes for which the postsocialist majority has been held 
responsible were, on one hand, their alleged adherence to norms and practices 
characteristic for the stereotypical image of Homo Sovieticus (Vonderau 2008) and, on 
                                            
96 See Baysha (2014), Buchowski (2006), Heintz (2006), Kideckel (2002), Lavergne (2010), Medarov 




the other, their ‘Balkan mentality’ related to backwardness and lack of civilisation, both 
seen as residues of Oriental historical legacy (Heintz 2006).  
The expectation that the socioeconomic transformation would lead to a natural 
reorganisation of all spheres of life according to a western model has been assumed 
to depend on the ability of each individual to transform his/her personality with all its 
pertaining values and dispositions into what Makovicky, after Rose, has called an 
‘enterprising self’ – flexible, self-actualising, responsible for its own success and 
development (2014: 2). According to the dominant ideology, it was only those ‘new 
individuals’, able to adapt to this new template of human existence, who could expect 
to become successful and prosperous in the new market reality. The ‘enterprising self’ 
came to signify a new normative model of personhood that would overcome the 
pathological deficiencies of Homo Sovieticus and the ‘Orientalist mentality’ allegedly 
specific for the peoples of the Balkan Peninsula (Mackovicky 2014).98   
In line with the above, it can be argued that the essence on which such ‘elite’ versus 
‘masses’ discourses have been based are the ideological dichotomies which underlie 
the Western mythological narrative – ‘East’ versus ‘West’, ‘modernity’ versus 
‘backwardness’, ‘civilisation’ versus ‘primitivism’. Mihal Buchowski (2006) has 
demonstrated how political manipulation structured around an Orientalising logic 
codifies class-based identities appropriated by citizens of postsocialist Poland.99 His 
                                            
98 As ‘entrepreneurs’, individuals are encouraged to perceive themselves and their lives as a project in 
constant making, requiring self-actualisation and advancement not only through education and training 
but also through the ‘continual exercise of lifestyle and consumer choices’ (Mackoviky 2014: 2). 
99 He extends his conclusions, however, as relevant for other central and east European societies. 
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argument utilises the concept of Orientalism and the related notion of Balkanism, which 
are both of relevance for this thesis.   
Originally coined by Edward Said (1978), Orientalism refers to the hegemonic 
discursive representations of non-Western peoples and societies developed in western 
Europe in line with the political and military process of colonialisation. By presenting 
the East as inferior in a political, societal, religious and cultural sense, Orientalist 
knowledge gathered by colonisers became a powerful tool for justifying cultural and 
political dominance over conquered subjects. As a mode of thought, Orientalism is 
based on the ontological and epistemological distinction between the Orient – 
backwards, stagnant, traditional, and mystical – and the Occident – rational, modern, 
progressive (Said 1978). This is how the Orient has been constructed as the West’s 
ultimate Other (Said 1978). 
The works of Wolff (1994) and Todorova (1997), among others, have demonstrated 
the applicability of Said’s critique to eastern Europe and the Balkans. Larry Wolff (1994) 
elaborates on the emergence of eastern Europe as a cultural construct in the work of 
European Enlightenment’s writers, journalists, intellectuals, and travelers. The role of 
eastern Europe as western Europe’s complementary Other and its association with 
barbarism and backwardness foregrounds its ambiguous location ‘within Europe but 
not [as] fully European’ (1994: 9). At the same time, such Balkanist thinking served to 
obfuscate the (re-) production of this ‘incompleteness’ through political and economic 
dependencies. Maria Todorova’s groundbreaking work in Imagining the Balkans 
(1997) explores the applicability of Said’s Orientalism to representations of the Balkan 
Peninsula. By critically mapping out the discourse of Balkanism as it developed in the 
past centuries, she concludes that despite existing similarities, the phenomenon 
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cannot be considered a variation of Orientalism for several reasons. Most importantly 
because the Balkans have a concrete historical and geographical reality, they are 
mostly Christian and white, there is an absence of colonial legacy and lack of a 
prominent geopolitical importance. The in-betweenness of the Balkans that Todorova 
tries to signify with the metaphor of a bridge – a region that tries to Europeanise but is 
never able to fully shed off the remnants of the Ottoman legacy – presents it as semi-
developed, semi-colonial, semi-civilised. The Balkans, she claims, because of their 
religious and racial similarity to the ‘Western signifier’, are not constituted as 
incomplete other but as Europe’s ‘incomplete self’ (1997: 17) – functioning as a 
‘repository of negative characteristics’ (1997: 188) against the backdrop of which a 
more positive image of the West can emerge. 
Based on these discussions of Orientalism and Balkanism, Buchowski (2006) 
introduces the concept of ‘the new European orientalism’ - a way of thinking and a 
practice of creating the Other that has managed to overcome spatial and temporal 
confines and has been turned into a tool for constructing social divisions within central 
and east European nation state borders. This new Orientalism100, produced by 
processes of globalisation, flexible capital accumulation and transnationalism, 
stretches beyond oppositions of ‘orient versus occident’ to accommodate the ones of 
‘capitalism and socialism, civility and primitivism, and class distinction between elite 
and plebs’ (Buchowski 2006: 466). Of particular significance to east European 
formation of class identities is Buchowski’s finding that this ‘domestic orientalism’, once 
in the purview of elite dominant discourses, has gradually penetrated the 
                                            
100 I question the novelty of this phenomenon in my brief historical synopsis in Chapter Four. 
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consciousness of different social groups, who progressively define their collective 
identities by constructing their own, internal Others (2006). During his research in 
Polish rural communities, Buchowski observes how the downward gradation 
constructed by such discourses of otherness seems to have no bottom level but 
resembles ‘a network of mutual social perceptions in a huge and intricate hall of 
mirrors’ (2006: 473). Thus, for example, white-collar workers re-direct the Orientalising 
rhetoric used by ‘transitional’ elites towards proletarians, who in turn look down upon 
farm workers. By constructing their own social others, each of these groups resists 
subjugating elite discourses which blame them for their inadequacy to the new market 
realities (Buchowski 2006: 474).   
Following a Bourdieusian understanding of class, this thesis analyses existing class-
based identities as relational constructs (Wright 1997) emerging not so much out of a 
shared economic position but with reference to a set of dispositions (ideologies, beliefs, 
moralities, values) and cultural practices. In this respect, I engage not only with the 
cultural but also subjective aspects of class. Furthermore, I demonstrate how individual 
class subjectivities have been ‘codified’ (Wieninger 2005) by hegemonic ‘elite’ versus 
‘masses’ narratives, and guided by an Orientalising logic. It is along these theoretical 
treads and context that I analyse the two different self-categorisations put forward in 
my informants’ narratives. I discuss those under the labels of ‘Bulgarian Westerners’ 
and ‘ordinary people’. Throughout the empirical chapters, I demonstrate how, both 
before and after their migration to the UK, individuals engage in different everyday acts 
of classification (Bourdieu 1984) – those express as material, discursive and symbolic 
struggles that aim to delineate class boundaries and overcome feelings of symbolic 
marginality and inferiority.  
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Those with less cultural and economic capital are less able to challenge such 
classificatory discourses and passively reproduce them through their acceptance and 
in the way they think about themselves and others. The material, discursive and 
symbolic struggles to delineate class boundaries and efforts to challenge and re-direct 
externally-imposed labels become evident in the everyday practices and interactions 
of people in Bulgaria. 
Many of my informants saw migration as the only available strategy for reconciling the 
dissonance between their self-perceived and objectively prescribed class identities, as 
well as for achieving the symbolic and material assets that correspond to a desired but 
currently unavailable class status. The following empirical chapters explore how self-
assigned class identifications, which often contradict people’s social position 
identifiable by objective criteria, lead to different interpretations of the meaning 
assigned to migration and the reasons justifying it. Furthermore, the two groups 
defined on the basis of my informants’ self-identifications – ‘Bulgarian Westerners’ and 
‘ordinary people’, put forward differing imaginations of life following migration.  
I demonstrate how in many cases, my informants’ quest for recognition of their self-
appointed class identity and attempts to advance to a place of higher status prove 
elusive in the face of the realities they faced in the UK (see Chapter Five). Thus, 
instead of resolving problems of personal class dislocation, many find themselves 
immersed in a downward spiral which threatens to strip them off even their original 
status. In the process of migration class identities do not lose their importance for how 
people evaluate their situation, make sense of their predicament, and get involved in 
different practices. On the contrary, they are reproduced and even reinforced in 
practices and discursive patterns emphasising cultural-normative as well as material 
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distinctions. Moreover, the classificatory struggles for providing ‘the legitimate 
definition of the social world’ (Bourdieu 1984: 72) increase their significance in the 
highly competitive post-migration context where the fierce reaffirming one’s status vis-
à-vis ‘other’ compatriots helps my informants to compensate their frustration with 
disappointed aspirations and continued status deficits.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have reviewed the main theoretical debates on the three main themes 
that my thesis focuses on and to whose development it seeks to contribute: migration, 
imagination, and class. I have discussed the different ways in which the social 
imaginary has been understood and theorised and, on this basis, introduced the core 
concept through which I analyse Bulgarian migration to the UK – the ‘imaginary West’. 
In the following chapters I will show how this cultural construct helps explain Bulgarian 
would-be migrants’ motivations to migrate to the UK (see Chapter Four) and their 
persistent fight to realise their hopes and dreams about Western life despite the 
disappointing realities they encounter (see Chapter Five and Six). Furthermore, the 
‘imaginary West’ and corresponding notions of Westernness and ‘Balkan mentality’ 
help to shed light on societal hierarchies and struggles for differentiation and 
delineation of group boundaries that have been in the purview of recent analysis of 
class in postsocialist eastern Europe (Chapter Three). Against the heavily-contested 
status of class as a category of social analysis in the region, I have put forward an 
approach based on the work of Pierre Bourdieu, which emphasises the cultural and 
ideational dimensions of class identity formation and their importance for subjective 
experiences and articulations of class. I demonstrate the relevance of this approach in 
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the analysis of the pre- and post-migratory experiences of my informants and the 
intimate connection between their imaginations of western modernity and conceptions 
of class, social hierarchy and civilisation. In the following chapter, I give insight into 
prospective migrants’ lives in Bulgaria and show how their disappointment with the 
process of ‘transition’ and their feelings of stagnation made them conceive of migration 


















‘There Are Two Possible Solutions to the Crisis in Bulgaria – Terminal One and 
Terminal Two of Sofia Airport’: Stories of Precarity in Post-Transitional 
Bulgaria  
‘Immediate resignation!’, ‘Oligarski101 go home!’, ‘Protest loudly and act wisely!’ said 
some of the posters carried by protesters marching on the central pedestrian street in 
Plovdiv on a warm evening in late June 2013. Most of them were students and young 
professionals; others had brought their children who held small brooms102, thrummed 
on drums and loudly whistled on hooters. They stopped at the municipality on the 
central square and started splitting into small groups, sporadically bursting into loud 
boos and cries: ‘Ostavka’! (Resignation!). I approached one of the groups that was 
interviewed by a local journalist, who asked: ‘Why are you here tonight?’ ‘It all depends 
on us’, replied one interviewee. ‘At the end, it will be us [the protestors] or them [the 
politicians]. If we give up, the political mafia gang [politico-mafiotska shaika] will win 
again. Democracy will be overthrown by dictatorship; the light will be conquered by 
darkness. We need to remain united till the end’.  
On the following day, I saw the published interview on a well-known local online news 
platform. The interviewee turned out to be a promising local architect and he and his 
fellow protestors – actors, lawyers, art critics – were described as the young elite of 
Plovdiv.  
                                            
101 A pun with the name of the Bulgarian prime minister of the time - Oresharski and oligarch.  
102 These symbolised the protestors’ desire to ‘sweep away’ the political class. 
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When I started my fieldwork in Bulgaria in the summer of 2013, many of the people I 
met talked about the anti-government protests that were taking place in Sofia and other 
large cities since the spring. The so-called ‘summer’ protests, one episode of which I 
have just described, followed the ‘winter’ protests of the same year, which had been 
sparked by electricity price hikes. While the two events were generally seen as part of 
the same protest wave – the first significant expression of collective discontent in the 
past ten years – many flagged up the differences in their character, participants and 
demands raised.103 The first spontaneous protest in February 2013 quickly spread 
across the entire country, mobilising many impoverished and despaired workers, civil 
servants, long-term unemployed and pensioners to voice their grievances. Although 
not consistent in their demands, protesters were outspoken against austerity, foreign 
investment and predatory monopolies and demanded the nationalisation of industries 
and the restoration of dignified living for the vulnerable masses. The ‘winter’ protests 
were marked by several cases of public self-immolations by working-class people of 
different ages.  
The subsequent protests of May 2013 were mostly concentrated in the capital (Sofia) 
and started in reaction to the newly-elected coalition government and its ambiguous 
office nominations. The demonstrations quickly gained the support of students and 
middle-aged professionals and were, later on, joined by public intellectuals, university 
professors and journalists. Many of the protestors self-identified as part of a creative 
urban middle class and made sure to emphasise the civil and moral character of their 
demands which, they believed, stood in contrast to the economic and social rationale 
                                            
103 See Ivancheva (2013), Nikolova (2014). 
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behind the ‘winter’ protests. The young and highly-skilled urbanites did not regard 
poverty and economic deprivation as deserving of their solidarity and made sure to 
delimit their postmaterialist motivations with slogans such as ‘I can pay my bills’. In a 
strong anti-communist rhetoric, protesters raised claims for morality in politics, Western 
values, and less state intervention in the economy. On many occasions, they declared 
their disdain for the average Bulgarians whom they accused of lacking civic initiative, 
not being able to cultivate Western values and practices thereby impeding the 
democratisation of the country, its integration into the EU and transition to a ‘truly 
Western’ rather than Oriental capitalist economy.  
This insight into people’s concerns and related societal debates of 2013-2014 
illustrates the two main issues with which this chapter is concerned, namely the 
existence of two conflicting class-based articulations of collective identity reflected in 
my informants’ self-representations and, secondly, an overwhelming sense that in 
Bulgaria no progress, no meaning, and no future was available for people sharing 
either one of these two different identifications. This chapter focuses on how this sense 
of existential stagnation figures in would-be migrants’ narratives of migration. By 
looking at individual stories, I try to grasp how Bulgarians understood their decision to 
leave behind their ‘home’ as an attempt to achieve a more meaningful existence and 
a better life.  
In her ethnography of Central and South American migrants to the US, Sarah Mahler 
(1995) contends that people’s migrations are always a result of two mutually-
constituting processes – on the one hand, socioeconomic and political factors that 
‘uproot’ them from ‘customary forms of life’ in their homelands and, on the other, 
mythologised visions of a certain ‘promised land’ that create and structure their 
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aspirations for a better future. Following her lead, in this chapter I take issue with the 
first one of these two components – the personal and collective experiences of life in 
present-day Bulgaria which made my informants consider long-term departure from 
their familiar surroundings as the only way forward in life. The personal testimonies 
presented here attest to the complex and diverse motivations that underpin each 
migration decision. I demonstrate how the significance attributed to the act of migration 
as a life-changing event is revealed in its embeddedness in biographical trajectories 
and life stories. At the same time, the personal route towards the decision to migrate 
and its subjective interpretation can make sense only when depicted in relation to the 
multiplicity of economic, political and social constraints that impact on individual 
livelihoods. 
On the basis of migrants’ emic classifications – the way in which they conceived of 
their social position and that of others, this chapter starts by presenting the two different 
categories of informants that this thesis discusses: ‘Bulgarian Westerners’ and 
‘ordinary people’. I relate the formation of these two self-designated identities to the 
class-based discourses that have become particularly popular at the time of my 
fieldwork but also to the ‘elite’ versus ‘masses’ discourses circulating since the 
beginning of the ‘transition’ (see Chapter Two). The following two sections of this 
chapter present the stories of two representatives of each of these two categories to 
show how different class identities foreground specific migration motivations. I argue 
that shared perceptions of class belonging led members of each group104 to hold 
common explanations of the strategies and meanings conferred to their projects. The 
                                            




latter reflect the routes that led people to their migration decisions and the socio-
political and cultural factors obstructing the realisation of their desired life paths in 
Bulgaria. In conclusion, I argue that both ‘Bulgarian Westerners’ and ‘ordinary people’ 
held in common a collective feeling of ‘not going anywhere’ – an existential stagnation 
conditioned by a multiplicity of factors that communicated shared disengagement with 
the ‘transitional’ project and its underlying progressive temporal modality.  
 
‘Bulgarian Westerners’ and ‘ordinary people’ 
In their coverage of the protests discussed above, liberal media commentators105 and 
intellectual mouthpieces translated the differences between the two waves into 
opposing social categories that fed into distinct class-based narratives. The ‘winter’ 
upheavals have been described as sparked by the discontent of the ‘working class’ 
(culturally marginal workers, uneducated, Roma, and pensioners) – those unable to 
adopt European civilisational values.106  The ‘summer’ protests, on the other hand, 
were interpreted as expression of the moral indignation of an urban ‘middle class’ – a 
young, beautiful, and educated pro-Western elite.107 Bulgarian scholars have correctly 
pointed out that such demarcations did not reflect actually existing economic 
stratifications and often concealed the ‘precarious’ socio-economic situation to which 
all of the protestors were subjected.108  
                                            
105 It refers to political figures, intellectuals, businessmen and other publicly-engaged people dominating 
a political and media environment with right-wing, populist, nationalistic and anti-communist leanings. 
106 See Ivancheva (2013).  
107 See ibid. 
108 See Nikolova (2014), Ivancheva (2013). 
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The importance attributed to cultural and social divisions within the ranks of what can 
be ‘objectively’ classified as a working-class majority points to a shift in public 
discourses and understandings of class from narrower materialist ones towards a 
broader and more politically and culturally informed concept (Boyadjhieva and 
Kabakchieva 2015).109 They also echo earlier oppositions between ‘two geographical, 
cultural, political and social worlds, between the past and the future, between 
communism and liberal capitalism, […], between tradition and modernity’ reasserted 
in the ‘elite’ versus ‘masses’ discourses promoted by the think tank experts110 who 
‘engineered’ the Bulgarian ‘transition’ (Lavergne 2010: 134).  
Even though during my stay in Bulgaria I hardly met anyone who had participated in 
either of the two protest waves, the topic was brought up in most discussions of 
migration motivations with my informants – everyone was eager to express their 
position towards these recent events and identify with one of the two protest waves. I 
noticed how most of the middle-aged workers, small entrepreneurs, and unemployed 
young people living in provincial towns felt their concerns to be better represented in 
the ‘winter’ protests, as they identified themselves with those occupying a 
                                            
109 Data from the early 1990s demonstrates that income (or wealth) was seen as the main marker for 
social stratification by Bulgarians. Self-identifications of the time have been concluded to reflect the 
actually-existing economic stratification with a very small number of respondents identifying as middle-
class members (see Tilkidjiev et al. 1998). The current framing of middle-class identity in Bulgaria refers 
to a broader set of criteria including those based on educational and cultural capital and has successfully 
‘recruited’ individuals from diverse economic positions (see Nikolova 2014). Such self-identification 
denotes support for neoliberal policies, Western values and civic causes. The division between ‘ordinary’ 
Bulgarians (commonly referred to as ‘the masses’) and their capitalism-friendly, liberally-minded, and 
‘Western-oriented’ ‘middle-class’ counterparts is thus less an economic one than a cultural and 
dispositional. 
110 It refers to Bulgarian experts and commentators part of international research networks and projects, 
as well as Bulgarian think tank experts guiding the postsocialist economic and political ‘transition’ along 
the lines of neoliberal transformation and ideology. Their relations with local and international financial 
circles made them an influential factor in the formation and passing of laws through lobbying and media 




disadvantaged position in the social hierarchy – lacking educational capital and 
struggling to cover high subsistence costs.  
In contrast, the well-educated professional urbanites and struggling middle-sized 
business owners I met expressed more sympathy with the civic and moral demands 
put forward by protestors in the summer of 2013. They too shared concerns about the 
alleged rampant moral degradation and lack of ‘civilisational’ capital exhibited by the 
rank-and-file Bulgarians which were commonly blamed for Bulgaria’s negative image 
in western Europe and its underdeveloped position, lagging ‘years behind’ other EU 
countries.  
Thus, my informants not only validated the superimposed class categories of ‘Western-
minded elites’ and ‘ordinary’ Bulgarians111 as representing actually existing divisions 
between working and middle class but accepted them as relevant to their own 
perceptions of class belonging.  
By following would-be migrants’ own categorisations as they emerged in conversations 
and observations during my fieldwork, I thus distinguish between two emic collective 
identities: ‘ordinary people’ (obiknoveni hora) and ‘Western-minded people’ 
(zapadnomisleshti; zapadnoorientirani hora), whom I denote as ‘Bulgarian Westerners’ 
for convenience. Most of those who identified as ‘ordinary people’ were less-educated, 
middle-aged men and women employed as blue-colour workers both in the public and 
private sectors, owners of small family businesses and underpaid or unemployed 
university graduates. None of my informants spoke good English and only few had 
                                            
111 I see such dominant discourses as a variation of the ‘elite’ versus ‘masses’ opposition of the 1990s 
that I have discussed in the previous chapter.  
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travelled outside of the country. They also commonly referred to their Balkan 
worldview, way of life, and emotionality; usually with embarrassment rather than pride. 
‘Bulgarian Westerners’, on the other hand, were a heterogeneous group of freelancers, 
white-collar professionals, public employees, indebted and struggling entrepreneurs 
and school-leavers who identified as part of an ‘urban middle class’ – despite their 
varying social backgrounds and their unstable position on the social ladder. All of them 
possessed high levels of cultural capital in the form of university diplomas, language 
proficiency and experience-based knowledge and engagement with Western culture 
and lifestyle. These ‘Western-minded’ and modern individuals understood themselves 
to be contributing towards the transformation of Bulgaria into a ‘truly Western’ country. 
Despite the fact that those to whom I spoke almost never referred to the notion of 
‘class’, I see the above-described categories as denoting popular class differentiations. 
The use of idioms like ‘us’ and ‘them’ stood for collective identities constructed in 
opposition to those seen as ‘others’. The active drawing of symbolic boundaries as a 
strategy of creating distance and building social identity, in which all of my informants 
engaged, indicates a process of classification of others as similar or different from 
oneself (Bourdieu 1984). The theoretical discussion on class in a postsocialist context 
presented in the previous chapter has already explained the intersection between class 
subjectivities and dominant ‘elite’ versus ‘masses’ narratives underpinned by an 
Orientalising worldview. 
I take the above-described protest wave of 2013-2014 as an exemplary demonstration 
of the power of ‘codification’ (Bourdieu 1989) through which political discourses negate 
existing socio-economic inequalities and supplant them with cultural-civilisational 
differences between more and less Westernised subjectivities. I see my informants’ 
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class-based identifications as shaped not so much by the economic assets they 
possessed but by shared cultural practices and capitals, value dispositions, ideological 
beliefs, and morality (Bourdieu 1984). The following sections (Chapter Four as well) 
demonstrate the discursive distancing and legitimisation through which class identities 
were built and sustained as woven in migration narratives.  
What all my informants held in common was their migration destination, their intention 
for long-term settlement and their conviction that migration was the only available ‘way 
out’ of a presently-experienced state of stagnation with an intolerable future. The 
despair and disillusionment expressed in both waves of protest was the leading trope 
around which conversations concerning the lack of improvement and failed 
expectations revolved. Almost all my encounters with would-be migrants started with 
what had now become the most commonly evoked catchphrase epitomising both the 
urge to migrate and the deepening sense of meaninglessness and lack of a vision for 
the future: ‘There are two possible solutions to the crisis in Bulgaria – Terminal One 
and Terminal Two of Sofia Airport’. Тhe resurgence of this slogan during the protests 
of 2013-2014 carried with it a more general concern with the widely-shared conviction 
according to which the existence of open borders was the only available safety-valve 







‘Ordinary People’ – ‘Going for money, what else?’ 
Blagovest 
One of the first emails I received in response to my initial efforts to recruit informants 
through an advertisement in an online forum for current and prospective migrants was 
sent by forty-five-year-old Blagovest. He invited me to visit him in his hometown – a 
small administrative centre situated halfway between the capital Sofia and the second 
biggest city Plovdiv. He said that seeing for myself how ‘dead’ this place was could 
give me a better idea of why he wished to leave it ‘once and for all’. After meeting at 
the train station, we walked through the main town square. In passing, he explained 
the stories behind the run-down buildings, all built before 1989 and all attesting to the 
former importance of the town – a strategic transport hub and centre of woodwork and 
railway carriage industries during socialism.  
This is our ‘town’, as you can see it is nothing more than a village, everything 
closes at 8 pm. Can you sense the smell coming from the houses nearby? 
People are keepings pigs and chickens in their gardens. Who can blame them? 
Everyone is trying to survive and, as it is, there are not many options left.   
The few people that Blagovest stopped to greet in the centre were huddled in front of 
the two small grocery shops, the café and the corner betting shop. These were the 
‘hotspots’ for the remaining, mostly elderly town dwellers, he informed me. He went on 
to explain how the town’s industry was almost completely run down except for a few 
factories and workshops that functioned with reduced capacity. The high 
unemployment and general lack of livelihood opportunities, he said, had chased away 
the ‘young’ and most of Blagovest’s friends now lived either in the bigger neighbouring 
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cities or in the UK. He sadly interpreted the absence of children’s clamour on the 
streets as a sure sign of the depopulation of the place, which he believed would surely 
lead to its eventual demise. 
The ‘ghostly’ sights of this ex-industrial town and the hopelessness that transpired 
through Blagovest’s account resemble the aftermath of postsocialist industrial decline 
reported across most of eastern Europe (Kideckel 2008, Morris 2016). It was in the 
light of this apocalyptic view of the present that Blagovest and I sat down for a coffee. 
After lighting up his first cigarette, he started laying out the events of his past which 
had a stake in his decision to migrate. He made sure to draw parallels between the 
development of his life trajectory and the societal upheavals in Bulgaria’s recent past.  
Blagovest started his story by first looking back to the most recent period of positive 
development in his and the small town’s life. In 2007, he left his carpentry job and 
invested his modest savings in the opening of a small furniture shop. At that time, there 
was no ‘crisis’ and people had more money to spend, he told me. The orders quickly 
picked up and Blagovest was barely managing to satisfy the town’s demand for fit-in 
furnishing. Within short time, he started making more money that he could have ever 
imagined (8,000-10,000 BGN per month).112  
Things changed abruptly after 2009 when, in Blagovest’s rendering, ‘the crisis that the 
banks and the big loans in the US brought up’ to Bulgaria hit the small town. People 
stopped ordering furniture and his turnover dropped to 2,000 BGN (ca. 830 GBP) a 
month. In the next two years, the business crumbled further to a point where he had to 
                                            
112 Bulgarian currency Lev (plural Leva), coded as BGN, for the period of fieldwork was rated at around 




run the shop without making any profit, driven solely by the hope that the stagnation 
could be somehow overcome. Two months before our meeting Blagovest was forced 
to close down the business and sell the remaining furniture and his transport van. 
This was certainly the most profitable but not the only entrepreneurial project that 
Blagovest had embarked upon in the last twenty-four years. During the ‘murky’ 1990s 
when ‘nothing was regulated’ and ‘everyone was fighting for survival’, he combined his 
full-time factory job with informal, short-term business endeavours. He first started 
buying contraband VHS tapes with American ‘super’ films (super filmi) that he rented 
out to friends and neighbours. Later, he made a bigger investment and together with a 
couple of friends rented a small dam that he planned to turn into a commercial fishery. 
The costs were higher than the anticipated revenues and the project quickly fell 
through, leaving Blagovest empty-handed. Subsequently, he had the idea of starting a 
heavy-freight parts business with the help of a friend who lived in the States and 
promised an initial investment. With his friend proving to be an unreliable business 
partner, this endeavour eventually turned out unfeasible as well.   
In fact, Blagovest never considered himself to have a flair for business and had no 
ambition to become a ‘rich man’. He believed that money making required a special 
kind of ‘talent’ that only a select minority was given. His entrepreneurship was 
constituted by trial and error ventures and strategies of ‘filling gaps’. His basic survival 
instinct thus helped him live through the ‘transitional’ hardships that have marked a 
great part of his adult life. The continuation of his story revealed that his true passion 
lay elsewhere and that the fulfilment of his life aspirations had become impossible with 
the ‘arrival of democracy’.  
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As a matter of fact, before the ‘Tenth’113 I had a completely different vision of 
how my life would develop. I was three, or wasn’t it even four, times national 
weightlifting champion, did I already mention this to you? [...] Anyways, 
nowadays no one cares about this. I wanted to continue my sports career; they 
[trainers] invested high hopes in me. After finishing the army service, I planned 
to go to university in Sofia and become a weightlifting trainer. Obviously, things 
didn’t turn out as expected, far from it.  
Not long after he came out of the army, Blagovest lost his father and was forced into 
the role of main breadwinner. In the early 1990s, he and his mother were amongst 
those given the chance to buy their state-allocated flat using an interest-free loan. The 
loan needed to be repaid in only eight years’ time which meant that eighty percent of 
Blagovest’s monthly salary went to the bank. This tense situation was further 
exacerbated by the massive lay-offs and breath-taking price hikes caused by the 
‘shock therapy’ policies implemented at the time. In those ‘scary times’ pursuing a 
degree was the last thing on Blagovest’s mind as he was barely managing to put food 
on the table.  
The economic stagnation brought up by the global financial crisis of 2008 marked the 
end of Blagovest’s most successful life period and gave him a bitter sense of 
meaninglessness and desperation. Taking a close look at his life achievements, he felt 
compelled to devise a way out of what he experienced as a dead-end situation.  
                                            
113 Refers to 10th November 1989 when Todor Zhivkov (the Bulgarian socialist leader) stepped down 
from his position of general party secretary after 33 years in power. In common parlance, the expression 
‘after the Tenth’ denotes the end of socialism and the beginning of democratic transformation.   
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I must use this time to think about my future and what I want to do with my life 
from now on. Unfortunately, I am part of the generation which took on so many 
negatives, our development was just stifled. We were made chavdarche then 
komsomolche114, then democrats, Europeans, Nato-eans, what else will they 
turn us into? [sarcastically] What I am so gutted about is the fact I didn’t manage 
to achieve anything big in life. I feel Iike I am sitting on a threshold. 
He realised that ‘nothing good’ awaited him if he stayed in Bulgaria: there were no 
opportunities for securing a steady income and finding personal happiness. He 
recognised the need for a drastic change: ‘The UK is my last chance for making it in 
life. Don’t get me wrong I know I am not going to become Rockefeller, I just want to 
live a better life.’ Blagovest was convinced that the ‘good life’ he envisaged would 
remain permanently unavailable to him in Bulgaria. ‘If you really want to do something 
meaningful in Bulgaria you need to have a good “back” to tell you – “go there and do 
this”, “get your hands on this business” – someone needs to open your eyes for where 
the profitable opportunities lie, if you know what I mean’, he said. ‘The small fish’ like 
himself, Blagovest thought, would never be able to ‘make it’ in this cutthroat 
environment.  
To him, the breakdown of his business, under the weight of the recent economic crisis 
felt like hitting ‘rock bottom’. Because of this and his failure to create a family he 
concluded that the past twenty-something years had brought him nowhere close to the 
fulfillment of his personal dreams. The perennial ingenuity and hard work he had 
                                            
114 Chavdarche is diminutive of chavdar which denotes a membership stage in the youth organisation 
of the Communist party organisation (Dimitrovski Komunisticheski Mladezhki Sayuz or Komsomol) 
followed by pionerche and komsomolche (komsomolets). Komsomolche denotes full membership.  
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demonstrated throughout the years seemed to have been in vain. It became clear in 
our conversations that his efforts have always been driven by a desire to ‘make it’, 
which extended beyond the achievement of tangible acquisitions to a more general 
feeling of ‘going somewhere’ in life.  
Being able to relate his experience to those of his former schoolmates and colleagues, 
whose aspirations were similarly suffocated, Blagovest concluded that the blame was 
not entirely on him. It was the failed ‘transition’ and the corrupt politicians that he held 
responsible for his unfortunate situation. Migration had always been a possibility that 
he never ended up seizing. At the age of forty-five, he felt that he needed to grasp this 
last chance for leaving the country and bringing a fundamental change to his life.  
 
Nikolay 
Although much younger than Blagovest, Nikolay (twenty nine) felt the same despair 
with his disadvantaged position in society and with his inability to act upon his personal 
dreams and aspirations. I first met him in the job recruitment agency where I carried 
out part of my fieldwork. In the past three years Nikolay had been working as a nurse 
in the busy emergency care unit of one of the largest state hospitals in Sofia. Raised 
in a working-class family in a small town in southern Bulgaria, he had experienced 
periods of deprivation and insecurity since early childhood. This made him strongly 
determined to find a profession that would ‘bring the money to him’ so he would not 
need to ‘chase after it’. Dentistry, he thought, would ‘settle’ him for life, so after finishing 
school he spent three consecutive years trying to get into a university degree 
programme. However, he never managed to become a dentist because he fell victim 
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to the corrupt educational system, as he claimed. Nikolay was crushed by what he 
experienced as ‘a complete injustice’ and wanted to give up his plans for pursuing a 
university degree. Eventually, thanks to his parents’ persuasion he decided to get into 
a nursing programme which, despite its lower prestige and financial unattractiveness, 
still promised to give him some valuable skills.  
Nikolay blamed the state and its corrupt mechanisms for the failure of his dreams; as 
they always kept ‘people like him down’ and away from opportunities for bettering their 
situation:  
If you are a child of ‘someone’ you give money below the table and you get a 
place in a prestigious university. If you are ‘no-one’ you have no chance. They 
will fail you no matter how well you have prepared yourself. No one cares about 
the ordinary folk (obiknovenite hora) in this country. 
Not being able to rely on his parents’ financial support Nikolay had to take up badly 
paid part-time jobs throughout his university years in Sofia in order to cover his tuition 
and subsistence costs. He was bitter about the unjust treatment he had received from 
his employers who only cared about taking advantage of him and never demonstrated 
any respect for the hard work that he put in. He gave me the example of one summer 
employment in KFC, where he spent four months doing daily sixteen-hour shifts, 
accompanied by the constant humiliating remarks of his employer, who refused to treat 
him as a ‘human being’ but considered him an ‘easily exploitable robot’. The money he 
made during this summer was more than he had ever earned before, but it didn’t bring 
him any happiness. Instead, it was a reminder of the abusive practices he had suffered 
through. His next job as a salesman did not last long either, as he quickly realised he 
could never become a ‘fraud’: 
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How can I persuade an old grandpa to buy a pan for 5000 BGN (ca. 2300 GBP) 
because of its special surface when I know very well that this is a lie? How to 
sell something which I know it is not helping people, but on the contrary, is to 
their detriment? Not everyone can do such kind of jobs.  
For Nikolay, the lack of respect and the kind of treatment that attacked human dignity 
were the most pressing reasons for his migration. In his present employment in an A&E 
centre, he continued to be subjected to the demeaning attitude of superintendents, 
colleagues, and patients. He was often asked to work unpaid extra hours and to deal 
with the most severe cases that the doctors did not want to provide care for – tasks 
clearly exceeding his expertise and responsibilities. His protest and discontent was 
met by indifference and he was constantly reminded that there was a queue of people 
waiting to replace him.    
Nikolay often condemned the corrupt practices of his work colleagues who constantly 
tried to extort informal payments from patients for carrying out routine procedures like 
applying bandages or giving injections. His colleagues, on the other hand, ridiculed his 
refusal to succumb to such practices and called him ‘naïve’ and ‘guileless’. To him, 
both ‘under the table’ payments and sales representative practices were examples of 
immoral market activities, which, although justifiable given the economic hardship 
experienced by many, he never became comfortable engaging in.  
The ‘embarrassingly’ low monthly wage of 500 BGN (ca. 230 GBP) that he received 
for his twelve-hour long shifts was just enough to cover basic living expenses but did 
not allow him to go out with friends or practice his hobbies. Contingencies and bigger 
purchases led to months of privation and rationing expenses. Unlike some of his 
colleagues who invested into studying English and applying for jobs that matched their 
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qualifications in the UK and elsewhere in the West, Nikolay’s meagre income did not 
allow spending for expensive language courses. This pushed him towards the decision 
to take on a care taker position in a nursing home in the UK, a job that clearly entailed 
a great deal of deskilling. On the one hand, he was proud of his ability to manage with 
the little that he had, but on the other, he was exasperated for missing out on the life 
enjoyed by his peers:  
I am a thrifty guy, I like to have something laid up for a rainy day so most of my 
time I spend either at work or home. Like all young people I also like to let off 
steam and go out for a few drinks, but in my case, this only happens once a 
month after payday. If I had the money I would like to travel more, I would love 
to be able to practice some extreme sports. 
Unlike Blagovest, Nikolay exhibited no entrepreneurial spirit. In fact, the kind of 
entrepreneurship he was forced to engage in made him think that success was only 
possible for those who bend the rules for their own benefit and at the expense of others. 
At the same time, his employment in the state medical sector, where financial wellbeing 
was dependent on informal practices, put pressure on the professional ethics and 
understandings of ‘decent’ work that he held valuable. His unwillingness to adapt to 
the situation and follow socially established practices for achieving success in the 
postsocialist market economy condemned him to economic and symbolic humiliation. 
The disappointments he had suffered on his path to professional realisation and social 
advancement had instilled in him the conviction that one’s chances were always 
predetermined by one’s socio-economic origins. The greatest injustice, for him, lay in 
the fact that no matter how diligent one was or how determined to uphold a high moral 
character, the struggle for material and symbolic respectability was always doomed to 
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fail. His migration was thus conditioned by his desire to restore a positive feeling of 
self-worth and recuperate lost dignity. The chances for a better future, recognition of 
moral equality and individual control over his life that migration to the UK was seen to 
offer stood in stark contrast to his visions of deepening material misery and symbolic 
subordination that awaited Bulgarians who lacked marketable skills and capitals.  
‘Ordinary people’ in a state of ‘survival’ 
These two personal stories present complex accounts of the reasons that made 
‘ordinary people’ consider migration as a viable, and in some ways only, option for 
escaping a life of constant struggle. My informants in this group often related their 
motivations for leaving the country to a growing pessimism and despair with a long-
standing precarious existence that most of them expressed in the notion of ‘survival’ 
(otceliavane, prejiviavane). The disentangling of the meaning of this condition and its 
class-tint dimensions elaborate on the shared conviction that there was ‘no more 
future’ in Bulgaria. 
Firstly, the frequently used term ‘survival’ reflects a state of economic deprivation and 
a constant struggle to ‘make ends meet’, as many experience it. The majority of 
workers and ‘petit’ entrepreneurs that I met were subjected to the in-work poverty 
documented among working-class communities throughout the postsocialist region 
(see Kaneff and Pine 2011, Knudsen 2012, Morris 2012, Stenning 2005). Many relied 
on subsistence wages, informal payments and ‘kinfare’ (Deneva 2012) support to 
provide for their families and cover bank loans and consumer credits. Very often, 
however, my initial curiosity about their migration reasons provoked irritation and 
seemingly straightforward responses like ‘we are sick of living with little’, ‘for money, 
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what do you think?’, ‘don’t want to count my pennies anymore’. These stood in an 
almost paradoxical contradiction to the sporadic confessions of the same informants 
that they had ‘nothing to complain about’, ‘had everything they needed’, and that there 
was ‘nothing more one could wish for’. This inconsistency is dissolved when economic 
deprivation is not understood as a threat to social reproduction but as leaving no 
disposable income for what my informants called ‘extra’ spending. The common 
complaint was that a great proportion of one’s salary was spent to cover constantly 
rising monthly bills and basic foodstuffs, leaving almost no disposable income for any 
‘luxury expenditures’.  
Georgi (twenty nine), for example, who worked on the assembly line in a Japanese car 
factory for 680 BGN (ca. 280 GBP) a month, complained that without the support of 
his parents, who provided living space and covered electricity bills, he would not be 
able to take care of his wife and new-born baby. He later assured me that although his 
family had an overall ‘good life’, they could not even ‘dream of’ renewing household 
appliances, electronic gadgets, or indulging into recreational activities. They, as many 
others, found themselves caught in what Vigh calls the ‘schism between the culturally 
expected and the socially possible’ (2009: 96). Regular trips abroad, branded clothing 
and accessories, mobile phones and electronic gadgets were all perceived as status 
symbols that my informants simply could not afford. The urge to engage in such 
consumption practices was driven by a constant evaluation of one’s social position in 
relation to that of ‘others’ within the group, as well as those standing ‘below’ and 
‘above’. As Nina (thirty five), a cleaner in a state company explained: ‘You think you 
have all you need but then you see that someone’s got something new and better, a 
nicer vacuum cleaner let’s say, and you think to yourself – “I should get one as well”’. 
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The desire for such material status is not necessarily explained by its capacity to 
ensure one’s physical well-being, but by its symbolic value. In this sense, while 
perceiving themselves as ‘flawed’ consumers’ (Bauman 2005: 3) within the local 
community, many of my respondents saw migration as a strategy for overcoming their 
symbolic marginality in a society that celebrated the ‘success’ of an ambiguous politico-
economic elite and prioritised the needs of a ‘Western-minded’ ‘intellectual’ class115. In 
many cases, the only way of satisfying such consumer aspirations was the 
accumulation of considerable debts which increased the financial pressure many 
wanted to alleviate through migration. Therefore, I argue that the economic dimension 
contained in the notion of ‘survival’ should be interpreted not so much as an ‘absolute’ 
but ‘relative’ deprivation emerging out of need to respond to material pressures in an 
effort to ‘keep up with the Joneses’.   
Secondly, the sense of diminishing possibilities summed up in the notion of ‘survival’ 
was related to the lack of social and cultural capital through which opportunities for 
professional and self-realisation could become available. My informants in this group 
constantly drew my attention to what had become a publicly circulating mantra in 
Bulgaria– ‘if you have no connections you are no-one’. Many believed that success in 
Bulgarian society depended on having a ‘good back’ (dobur grub). 
A ‘back’ of some sort was seen as vital for the successful completion of all sorts of 
activities – seeking medical treatment, finding a place in a kindergarten, paying your 
taxes, or buying a car. ‘Good back’ mostly referred to informal connections to economic 
                                            
115 Such conclusion is also in lines with scholarly observations on the specificities of postsocialist 
working-class households which while rich in different assets such as housing, qualification, and social 
networks remain cash poor (Kaneff and Pine 2011). 
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and political powerholders that could provide access to well-paid employment or 
lucrative business opportunities. For instance, once while Nina and I were having 
coffee in the murky basement staff room in the building where she worked, she 
expressed her frustration with the limited powers she had to change her situation. She 
regretted her inability to mobilise a ‘good connection’ in order to get a much-desired 
promotion. Pointing at a colleague passing by, she told me how he had recently ‘turned’ 
from a security guard to a driver for the owner (which meant that his salary doubled). 
This was because his father – a former village mayor – managed to ‘find a connection’. 
She claimed that the education and competence of those who occupied ‘good’ 
positions did not determine their success as much as their ability to mobilise informal 
connections to ‘big people’ (golemtsi).   
The ‘mass’ migration of former workmates, friends and neighbours has depleted 
previously existing social networks (Dunn 2004) and class-based resources (Morris 
2012) which held a decisive role in managing general economic uncertainty. The 
decline of cooperation and solidarity within their social group and society as a whole 
was further entrenched, according to my informants, by people’s increasingly 
individualistic attitudes and the commercialisation of interpersonal relationships within 
families and social circles more generally.  
Another determinant of the inferior positioning of ‘ordinary’ people in socio-economic 
and symbolic terms was their devalued or insufficient cultural capital. Many of my 
middle-aged informants were affected by the well-documented postsocialist 
devaluation of certain occupations and of various forms of cultural capitals and 
professional experience (see Kaneff and Pine 2011). Access to well-paid and 
symbolically valued positions in attractive sectors like IT, the ‘creative’ sector or the 
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tourist industry depended to a large extent on one’s knowledge of foreign languages, 
western cultures, computer skills, and relevant educational credentials that my 
informants did not possess. The problem for them was not the lack of job openings but 
the scarcity of well-paid positions for those without the right knowledge or education. 
Because of the dismal pay and their exploitative character many small-scale business 
occupations and different forms of formal employment were perceived as unattractive. 
Voluntary withdrawal from the labour market (as in the case of Blagovest who vowed 
to never engage in waged employment in Bulgaria) was a common strategy that 
emerged out my informants’ unwillingness to take on jobs offering inadequate payment 
and low prestige. Instead, many preferred engaging in informal occupations or state 
employment which, despite its low pay, provided security, better disposal of one’s time 
and long leaves of absence.  
Finally, ‘ordinary people’s’ references to ‘survival’, understood as precarious existence, 
were also related to perceptions of their subordinated position in Bulgarian society. 
Already the commonly used self-identification ‘ordinary’ denoted a sense of marginality 
in comparison to ‘oligarchs’, ‘businessmen’, and ‘the rich’ in general, as well as - 
‘intellectual elites’ and ‘middle classes’. In his discussion of class transformation in 
postsocialist Romania, David Kideckel (2004) advances the widely-accepted scholarly 
conclusion that it was the working classes that had been most gravely affected by the 
processes of economic restructuring after 1989. The subalternalisation of workers and 
other suffering groups, he claims, was not just a result of the dramatic structural 
reforms but was also inflicted by the symbolic work of manipulation carried out by the 
dominant classes. With their social and symbolic capital devalued, ‘the victims of the 
economic downturn’ suffered not only ‘high unemployment and underemployment, 
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plummeting standards of living [...], and alienation of new standards of consumption’ 
but [also] ‘denigration or condescension from the wider society’ (Kideckel 2004: 41)116.  
‘Ordinary people’ were aware of the stigmatising dominant rhetoric, according to which 
their restricted economic and cultural capital reflected their ‘backwardness’ and lack of 
initiative. They reported, just like Nikolay, how belittled they felt in daily interaction with 
employers, colleagues, teachers, civil servants and others who looked down upon their 
everyday problems, practices, and claims and effectively denied them dignity and 
respect117. In her analysis of working-class subjectivities in Kyrgyzstan, Elmira 
Satybaldieva (2017) demonstrates how individuals’ efforts to counter their symbolic 
marginalisation and mistreatment involved the drawing of moral boundaries against 
more successful neoliberal subjects. Her informants, similarly to mine, however, were 
rarely successful in rejecting the projected stigma and, by putting forward their claims, 
often contributed to the hardening of class-based antagonisms and the vilification of 
their public image. The undesirability and stigma associated with a working-class 
status adds plausibility to the attempts of ‘Bulgarian Westerners’ to delineate 
themselves against ‘ordinary people’. I discuss these in turn. 
 
  
                                            
116 It has been argued that the economic and symbolic marginalisation of the postsocialist working class 
has been particularly painful (especially in comparison to the sufferings of western European workers’ 
communities) because of the privileged material and ideological status that workers occupied in the 
socialist state (Kaneff and Pine 2011).  
117 For discussions on lacking working-class dignity see Morris (2012). 
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‘Bulgarian Westerners’ – too different to fit? 
Miro  
When I told Miro (thirty five) what my research was about he said he would not be able 
to help me as he did not think of himself as a migrant. He reproduced the dominant 
conviction that since Bulgaria’s accession to the EU and the establishment of free 
movement of people, there could be no more talk of ‘migrants’: the term had become 
legally unfounded and should be replaced with ‘free moving individuals’. He added that 
while ‘migrant’ could still be useful to denote those Bulgarians who went abroad ‘for 
money’; this label was offensive for people like himself who wanted to ‘achieve 
something more in the UK’.  
In the past fifteen years Miro had been managing his father’s car parts warehouse in 
Sofia. His hard and committed labour had ensured a comfortable lifestyle for his wife 
and six-year-old daughter. They had a nice, modern flat in a central Sofian 
neighbourhood, a car and went on regular holidays. Just a year ago, he quit his job 
because his never-ceasing drive for success and innovation, he said, clashed with his 
father’s play-it-safe attitude and ‘complete lack of initiative’. In an effort to ‘keep up with 
the competition’, Miro wanted to create more international contacts and shift towards 
online trade, changes which his father opposed as being too risky.  
Miro described himself as entrepreneurial, ‘Western-thinking’ and adventurous. He told 
me how the time and efforts he invested in trying to build a successful business did not 
bring him the satisfaction he had expected and this took its toll on the relationship with 
his wife who had recently moved out of the family home:  
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I was totally fixated on my work. I wanted to be the best, to know about the 
business more than anyone else. I was spending my days reading guides for 
running successful business, listening to TED talks and lectures for boosting 
one’s creative performance. The moment I decided to quit was when I felt as if 
I had hit the ceiling.  
Although Miro had considered starting his own business in Bulgaria, he was more 
tempted to make a ‘fresh start’ in the UK where he believed his knowledge and 
experience in online sales, web design and marketing would open doors to lucrative 
business opportunities. He put forward several rationales for his conviction that doing 
business in Bulgaria was like ‘going against the tide’ (pluvash sreshtu techenieto):  
If I decided to start something on my own here I would need to take a loan and 
would constantly be on the edge (na ruba) in the beginning. In Bulgaria things 
change all the time, there is no stability, the wheel turns by three hundred and 
sixty degrees. The state policy towards small and middle size businesses is not 
consistent; they burden us with high taxes and heavy bureaucracy. Plus, 
Bulgarians are doing business for how long? Twenty-something years now, they 
still don’t know how to do ‘proper’ business; they know nothing about how 
business is done in the West. They stick to their Balkan way of doing things.  
Apart from the instable business climate, distorted values of Bulgarian ‘businessmen’, 
and the dubious work ethics that the majority of the population shared, another factor 
that discouraged Miro from staying in Bulgaria were the moral concerns that guided 
his filial and professional consciousness.  
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I know everyone in the car parts business in Bulgaria, I can easily draw on my 
previous contacts and set up a successful company that will compete with and 
eventually eliminate my father’s business. Is this moral? No, I don’t think so. 
Would many people in my shoes have second thoughts? No, I doubt it. This is 
how Bulgarians do business, but not me.  
Miro concluded that as a whole his decision to leave for the UK was prompted by the 
pressing need to change the ‘surroundings’. The desire to break away from the familiar 
and have a fresh start, he told me, was provoked not only by the inability to progress 
in his career but by a growing feeling of fatigue and detachment from the people around 
him. The estrangement between him and many of his close friends, he believed, came 
from an unbridgeable discord between the personal values, interests and practices that 
made up their completely different personalities.118 As much as he was committed to 
broadening his horizons by adopting a Western-like work ethic, lifestyle and mind-set 
for the purpose of self-improvement, his friends, as all ‘typical Bulgarians’, shared a 
‘constrained vision’ – suspicious towards everything ‘new’ and preoccupied with 
drinking, indolence, and round-the-clock bemoaning of their fate.  
The inertia, apathy, and backwardness that he found in those around him and which 
he summed up in the notion of ‘Balkan mentality’, he believed were at the same time 
a reflection of and a driving force behind the ‘moral decline’ in which Bulgarian society 
had lapsed during the years of ‘transition’. Miro voiced what had now become a popular 
concern amongst the Bulgarian middle class and political and intellectual elites – ‘the 
                                            
118 Miro was another one of my informants who preferred not to share his migration plans with those 
around him. He feared that they will fail to understand his motives and will take him for a fool for leaving 
the lucrative family business and his family for migrant uncertainty.  
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crisis is not in Bulgaria [as in the state government] but in Bulgarians themselves’. This 
common view shifted the focus from state powers, bad government policies or faults 
in the market economy and put the blame for the present socioeconomic and ‘moral’ 
crisis on the average Bulgarian. As ‘people of simple pleasures’, Bulgarians, he said, 
were only interested in ‘eating, drinking, and procreating’; they preferred to remain 
oblivious to the ‘grand questions of life’, those goals, ideals and aspirations that drove 
individual and collective progress. He rejected justifications of this ‘flawed mentality’ 
with material deprivations but instead lamented that it was more of an inherent and 
unchangeable characteristic of the ‘people living in this part of the world’ (the Balkan 
peninsula).  
This story of Miro shows how some ‘Bulgarian Westerners’ were better positioned to 
live up to the ideal of an ‘entrepreneurial’ subjecthood (Makovicky 2014:12) as a result 
of their higher degrees of cultural and social capital. In this respect, Miro, unlike 
Blagovest, had managed to establish himself as a successful middle-sized 
businessman, secure a decent income and sustain a desired lifestyle for him and his 
family. He did not deem such achievements satisfactory, though, as he felt that his 
professional realisation did not reflect the full extent of his creative potential and 
capabilities. He blamed his arrested ambitions on the ‘mediocrity’ and ‘backwardness’ 
of his immediate social circle and society at large.  
 
Gloria 
Eighteen-year-old Gloria was one of the several young graduates of prestigious high 
schools that I met in Plovdiv who were eagerly preparing to continue their education in 
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the UK. Gloria had been planning to study abroad for as long as she could remember. 
She could not think of the exact moment she made up her mind but insisted she was 
the one in charge of her decision. However, she admitted the active persistence of her 
parents who did not want to ‘hear a word’ about her staying in Bulgaria. At the time of 
our first meeting, Gloria’s parents had been working in London for almost a year. Their 
sudden migration was necessitated by the effects of the 2008 economic crisis that 
brought salary cuts for her father, a chief engineer in a security company; and 
bankruptcy for her mother, a self-employed embroidery designer. Not willing to 
compromise the higher education plans of their daughter, they concluded that the only 
way to provide her with adequate financial support was through undertaking low-skilled 
employment in London.  
Gloria wanted to work with children with autism. She believed, however, that no 
Bulgarian university could prepare her for a successful career in this field.  
Bulgarian universities don’t do a proper job. They lack qualified lecturers. For 
example, no one works on autism in Bulgaria, there are no specialists. I doubt 
most people [Bulgarians] even know what autism stands for. Acquaintances tell 
me they are not learning anything useful. They are taught from outdated 
Russian textbooks. Can you imagine?  
Gloria’s claim that Bulgarian education was of low quality and ‘below’ standard was 
based on widely circulating popular evocations and her own high school experience. 
She told me how many of her teachers were poorly qualified and lacked motivation, 
which caused slackness and demoralisation amongst pupils. What she found most 
disappointing was that her hard work and efforts were undermined by the equally high 
marks that her less-diligent classmates were awarded. The corrupt educational system 
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in Bulgaria, she claimed, allowed for anyone to pay their way through university, which 
diminished the local and international prestige of Bulgarian degrees.  
Gloria’s disappointment with the low quality of Bulgarian education, its lack of 
coordination with the demands of the business sector, and its outdated relevance have 
been confirmed as the main motifs behind young people’s determination to continue 
their education in west European universities. In addition, the widespread corruption 
narrative that many of my young informants adopted in motivating their decisions has 
been considered a well-established ‘socially acceptable theme’ that often served to 
justify migration decisions without necessarily being a leading motivation (Liakova 
2008). 
Furthermore, the cultural capital in the form of university education, foreign languages 
and a pro-Western attitude that has been considered decisive in ensuring the 
successful adaptation to the market economy (Ghodsee 2005), was not considered by 
‘Bulgarian Westerners’ as a valuable resource that could provide social mobility on the 
local, even less so on the global labour market. Many young representatives of this 
group regarded only qualifications acquired abroad as legitimate and valuable. These 
were also seen as a proof for one’s initiative, determination, and cultivation of a 
Western mind-set.  
Moreover, Gloria, like Miro, viewed herself as too different from and not understood by 
the majority of her peers. She claimed they were guided by values and exhibited 
interests that she could not relate to. For her, this inability to ‘fit in’ and the need to 
surround herself with like-minded people was another reason why she desired to leave 
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for the UK.119 For Gloria those of her peers who remained in Bulgaria lacked ambition 
and had ‘no clear vision’ about their future. Those not considering migration, according 
to her, did so not because of lack of finances but because of ‘messed-up’ priorities: 
‘How else to explain the fact that they have money for expensive clothes and trendy 
bars but not for their own education?’. In contrast, those leaving to study abroad, she 
said, had set higher goals for themselves, wanted to enrich their personalities and live 
a better life. They were people who, like herself, had had the chance to ‘travel a little’ 
and broaden their horizons. The different set of values (and mentality) that defined the 
fundamental difference between ‘leavers’ and ‘stayers’, according to her, was also 
reflected in one’s taste for music, clothes, and particular lifestyle. 
I was able to witness myself how strongly determined Gloria was to realise her ‘dream 
of England’, when she explained the reasons why she broke-up with her long-term 
boyfriend. Gloria had started dating eight-year-older Nayden when she was sixteen. 
He moved in with her after the departure of her parents a year ago. During that time, 
he was always ‘the rock’ that she could ‘lean on’ and she greatly appreciated the love 
and care he had provided her with. Nayden was aware of her plans to study in the UK, 
had agreed to join her and even offered financial support. In the past couple of months, 
however, he started ‘backing off’, Gloria claimed, and she had doubts about their 
common future:   
He is a great person but very indecisive. It seems to me he doesn’t really have 
a clue what he wants to do with his life. He lacks ambition and determination, 
                                            
119 When I asked Gloria to introduce me to some of her friends and classmates who also planned to 
continue their education abroad she explained that she is not on good terms with anyone in her class 
and she only has acquaintances but not ‘real friends’. She believed that those around her were envious 
of her achievements or that they don’t understand her determination to succeed through education.  
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and this will not allow him to succeed in the UK. I think he is too used to live the 
easy life that his parents provide for him. 
With luke-warm determination, she concluded that ending the relationship would be 
the most rational, despite the most painful decision that she had ever taken. Her desire 
to ‘make it’ in London was so strong that she could not allow this ‘calf love’ relationship 
to pull her back. After all, in London she could always meet ‘someone interesting’ and 
possibly British, she claimed.  
For Gloria, continuing her education in the UK was a logical step and she could not 
recall having any alternative visions for her future. The only meaningful way of 
developing her personality and professional profile was through obtaining a prestigious 
diploma from a western university. Similar to Miro, she believed to be guided by 
normative principles and determination which set her apart from her peers: migration 
was the only available option for validating her exceptionality and capitalising on her 
‘Western mentality’.  Unlike Miro, Blagovest and Nikolay, who all had invested time and 
efforts into realising expectations for a better future in Bulgaria, many young and well-
educated people like Gloria were reluctant to explore any possibilities for realisation at 
home, either because these were considered not to exist or because they could not 
bring a desired prestige and recognition. 
I found Gloria’s migration narrative and that of other young ‘Bulgarian Westerners’ to 
be constructed in concurrence to a dominant ‘brain-drain’ rhetoric that has been put 
forward as an explanation of young people’s migration since the beginning of the 
1990s. According to this ‘popular truth’, it was the ‘best and the brightest’ – those with 
good education, ambition, and entrepreneurial spirit – that had left the country in a hard 
but often successful quest for professional advancement (see Ghodsee 2002). Gloria’s 
128 
 
story also demonstrates the dire effects of the recent global financial crisis on many 
middle-class professionals and small-scale entrepreneurs. Gloria’s parents, as other 
‘Bulgarian Westerns’ who had lost previously-enjoyed middle-class status and 
materiality, were forced into migration as the only way of realising the aspirations that 
came with such a status.  
 
‘Bulgarian Westerners’: precarious and aspirational middle class 
The migration narratives of ‘Bulgarian Westerners’ were very clearly tinted by their 
subjective perceptions of middle classness based on their symbolic and cultural 
proximity to the West. When constructing their stories, they were carrying out a 
symbolic boundary-building in an effort to delineate themselves from a majority of what 
they called ‘typical’ Bulgarians.  As a first step, they made sure to emphasise that rather 
than ‘economic’ their rational for leaving the country was ‘ideational’ - a moral necessity 
for escaping a culturally and spiritually impoverished society. Studies of aspirational 
middle-class cultures in postsocialist contexts have pointed to the importance of 
consuming commodified images and consumer goods which were expected to confer 
an imagined Western status and respectability (Fehervery 2002, Patico 2008). Quite 
to the contrary, my informants considered such material desires characteristic for the 
indebted ‘masses’ who recklessly lived beyond their means. The sporting of (fake) 
branded outfits, smart phones and cars, home refurbishments, visits in overpriced 
cafes and shopping trips to trendy malls were all mocked as a conspicuous and 
‘shallow’ consumer craze. 
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Such a postmaterialist stance, I argue, should not be taken at face value as it does not 
express a transcendence of material needs or a moral condemnation of money as the 
ultimate measure of personal worth in the postsocialist period. In comparison to 
‘ordinary people’, ‘Bulgarian Westerners’ were better equipped in adapting to the 
‘transitional’ realities in Bulgarian society, either because of their family background, 
material resources, amassed cultural capital or ability to mobilise social networks. Their 
better positioning in the societal hierarchy (in an economic and symbolic respect) was 
also a result of their efforts to align their understandings of self, economy, business, 
and social relations with a Western standard. The relative degree of material prosperity 
that many ‘Bulgarian Westerners’ had attained, in the form of a house and a car, luxury 
items and leisure travels, proved to be highly volatile. This has been the case 
particularly in the aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis when many of them started 
struggling with declining businesses, salary cuts, precarious freelance jobs and low 
public-sector incomes. This signifies that rather than absent, socioeconomic precarity 
and materialist longings were often silenced or downplayed in the migration narratives 
of this aspirational middle class, and most likely so because they were too closely 
associated with a working-class culture of migration.120  
                                            
120 On the other hand, such postmaterialist demonstrations can be referred to what Bourdieu calls ‘denial 
of the ‘economy’ (1980: 285) – the phenomenon of ‘disinterestedness’ or disavowal of financial profit he 
observes in different social spheres – art, bureaucracy, religion, and so on. In the artistic field, for 
example, creators and craftsman are suspicious of economic success as they take it as questioning 
their value as artists (Bourdieu 1980). It could be argued that my informants followed a similar logic 






The ‘new’ middle-class elites in global peripheral regions have been said to consist of 
those able to enjoy western living standards and cosmopolitan belonging to a global 
social order (Heiman, Freeman and Liechty 2012). In eastern Europe, they have been 
the most celebrated fraction of the so-called ‘transitional winners’ – whose existence 
has been taken as a symbol of progress and a sign attesting to the successful 
advancement of postsocialist countries towards First World status (Schroder and 
Vonderau 2008). Samuli Schielke, among others, has pointed to the global proliferation 
of a different sense of middle classness, which is of great significance for people who 
are desperately struggling to acquire some sense of material security and social status 
(2012). Despite lacking economic privilege that would allow engagement in 
cosmopolitan lifestyles and consumption, the representatives of this ‘lumpen’ middle 
class, as he calls it, make sure to underline their support for and appropriation of a 
modernist ideology in regard to appearances, cultural tastes, consumer longings and 
political and religious commitments (Schielke 2012).  
‘Bulgarian Westerners’ exhibited a similar tendency for upward identification. They 
aspired for a symbolic, but also economic recognition of their self-assigned middle-
class belonging as they often did not possess the materiality and background that such 
identification required. Like other peripheral aspirational middle classes, they can be 
defined as ‘working class’ or ‘transitional losers’ from a purely materialist class 
perspective, but they often try to compensate their declining status by differentiating 
themselves from and claiming moral superiority over others.  
When viewed as part of a growing number of people from the global periphery who 
identify as ‘middle class’ in this aspirational sense, ‘Bulgarian Westerners’s’ migrations 
can be seen as an attempt to overcome a sense of dislocation in a double sense. 
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Postsocialist promises of middle-class success and prosperity extended to all those 
who managed to successfully adopt a new mode of personhood characterised by self-
responsibility, self-actualisation and individual choice. In postsocialist societies the 
‘modal personality engineering’ (Kalb 2014) of turning individuals with anti-market 
inclinations into what Elizabeth Dunn has termed ‘choosing subjects’, who are ‘flexible’ 
and ‘self-directed’ (2004), has been seen as part of an unbounded process of social 
and economic neoliberalisation. My informants had a hard time reconciling with the 
fact that they, as perfect embodiments of this exact model of personhood, were unable 
to achieve or sustain economic success. Yavor (thirty one), for example, a teacher by 
training, could not see why he had to work as an office assistant in an environment of 
‘primitively-thinking’ people and for a salary that just about covered his monthly bills. 
He felt that all his efforts to obtain a university diploma, English-language proficiency 
and additional qualifications had gone to waste. He claimed that this was the reason 
for his forthcoming departure for the UK where, even if unable to legalise his 
qualifications, he could at least be ‘around like-minded people’.  
This aspect of personal dislocation came from the discrepancy between the 
subjectively recognised middle-class belonging and the lack of lucrative employment 
opportunities. In many cases migration was the only available path towards resolving 
this discrepancy and obtaining the quality of life that was understood to match a middle-
class status.  
Another reason for the class dislocation felt by my informants was the fact that their 
moral and cultural superiority failed to receive due recognition in the symbolic order of 
the day. Both Miro and Gloria felt unable to fit into the climate of present-day Bulgaria 
and were greatly embittered that their efforts and achievements were not appreciated. 
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They, as many others, saw great injustice in the ‘fact’ that the dominant normative 
model in Bulgaria favoured culturally-impoverished and morally-compromised 
individuals while stifling the efforts of ‘Western-minded’ elites. More fundamentally, in 
a society stuck in a ‘savage’ mode of capitalism, social recognition was of little value 
for my informants and not even worth fighting for. They could not see their place in a 
society whose ‘heroes of the day’ were ‘people with no culture and value system’.  
It is along these lines, that the personal dislocation that ‘Bulgarian Westerners’ hoped 
to transcend through migration should be interpreted. In their own eyes, my informants 
appeared as the ultimate ‘transitional’ losers of the last twenty-something years. Those 
who correctly interpreted and adopted the true essence of a Western-styled 
personhood were supposedly the ones to reap the economic benefits of the 
postsocialist reforms. However, not only was the material reward for their efforts 
indefinitely postponed, but their symbolic status as cultural and moral leaders of 
Bulgarian society was increasingly pulled into doubt. They existed in an economically 
and symbolically marginal position that posed a contradiction to their self-image of 
Europeans and Westerners. 
 
Being ‘stuck’ in a post-transitional time  
So far, I have presented the stories of two categories of would-be migrants whose self-
ascribed class belonging was built on mutually conflicting values and mentalities. 
When outlining the general societal context in which their lives were developing, 
‘Bulgarian Westerners’ and ‘ordinary people’ pointed to different obstacles and 
constraints that made them unable or unwilling to imagine any meaningful future for 
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themselves and their families in Bulgaria. Despite their divergent evaluations, these 
two groups shared a feeling of desperation with the direction that their lives had taken, 
their diminished sense of control over the present and the apprehension with which 
they imagined the future. A shared sense of lack of individual and collective existential 
movement forward was what made life in Bulgaria unbearable for all my informants 
and what made them envision migration as the only way to overcome this impasse.   
In his research on Lebanese transnational migrants and white racists in Australia, 
Ghassan Hage develops the notion of ‘viability of life’ as a ‘sense of existential mobility’, 
‘forward movement in time’, one that presupposes ‘meaningfulness and 
purposefulness of life’ (2005: 471). Drawing on Spinoza and Bourdieu, he explains the 
longing for an ‘experience of a growth from one state of being to a more efficient one’ 
as universally intrinsic to the human condition and opposes it to a feeling of 
‘stuckedness’ (2009:97) as existential immobility – ‘going nowhere or too slowly’ (2005: 
470).  The exact parameters of this feeling of being ‘stuck’ are hard to pinpoint and 
Hage is reluctant to attribute what is an encompassing subjective state of being to 
concrete objective and not always measurable factors. He is clear on the fact that this 
state can affect people from different social milieus and that in all cases it comes down 
to a feeling of lacking or insufficient agency – an individual who is ‘stuck’ has no 
alternative routes to take and is unable to seize new opportunities (Hage 2009).  
Feelings of inadequate or unsatisfactory ‘existential movement’ were expressed in the 
notion of ‘survival’ by ‘ordinary people’, as well as in the class and status dislocations 
invoked by ‘Bulgarian Westerners’. The socio-economic situation of my informants was 
clearly one of the factors preventing them from ‘moving well’ (Hage 2009: 471). Still, 
none of the prospective migrants who took part in this research belonged to those most 
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destitute and suffering Bulgarians who struggled to put food on the table, were 
homeless or had fallen out of all informal networks of social support. Rather, most of 
my informants were not satisfied with their living standard and most importantly, feared 
that whatever they had could be lost in the future. ‘Ordinary people’ often struggled to 
satisfy basic subsistence needs and many felt deprived of the ‘right’ to consume goods 
that although not vital to their social reproduction they considered everyone deserved 
to have. A small part of ‘Bulgarian Westerners’ acknowledged to ‘have enough’ but 
they always emphasised the insecure status of this attainment. The majority preferred 
not to talk about their compromised economic situation as they believed this would 
liken their motivations to the crude logic of ‘ordinary’ Bulgarians. The words of Assen, 
the unemployed father of a one-year-old baby girl, express this commonly shared 
sentiment:  
When you meet your friends here, do you ask them how they live? Everyone 
will tell you that things are getting from bad to worse. People are jammed and 
vegetate. There is no development, nothing can happen here, it is just a brutal 
fight for survival. I don’t have any hope that things will change, not for me and 
my children anyways.  
Hage (2005), after Bourdieu, relates the feeling of ‘not moving’ or ‘moving with 
unsatisfactory speed’ to individuals’ ability to accumulate different amounts of capital 
that determine their symbolic position in different social fields. Feelings of ‘stasis’ can 
occur independently of one’s externally-perceived social advancement and relate to 
what Bourdieu calls ‘positional misery’ – a form of misery that goes beyond material 
deprivation and denotes a sense of social suffering stemming out of perceptions of 
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one’s depreciated position in the social group (Bourdieu, 1993: 11, cited in Perry and 
Cross 1997: 48).  
I have demonstrated how for both groups a sense of existential immobility was also 
related to perceptions of symbolic depreciation of their practices, adopted mentalities 
and models of personhood. ‘Ordinary people’, bereaved of social and cultural capitals 
such as ‘Western mentality’, ‘good connections’, and ‘entrepreneurial mind-set’, were 
pushed into symbolically marginal positions. This was detrimental to their sense of 
personal value and dignity. ‘Bulgarian Westerners’, on the other hand, were seemingly 
‘moving’ in a better way, but they also experienced frustration about ‘not being able to 
move forward’ in the reality of their underqualified and low-paid jobs. For relatively 
successful people like Miro, it was their restrained capacity to express the full extent of 
their cultural competence and ‘Western mind-set’ that made them feel ‘stuck’. The 
mismatch between their self-perceived middle classness and the lack of financial and 
social recognition of their distinctiveness made many of them feel as if they had their 
‘wings cut’ in a social order not of their own choosing.  
In their stories, my informants always related the subjective feeling of ‘not moving well’ 
to the desperation produced by the failed promises of the ‘transition’. For their socio-
economic and symbolic entrapment, they blamed the inadequate or lacking movement 
of the Bulgarian state, which they considered ‘stuck’ in a ‘post-transitional’ temporality.  
 
Take your transition back! 
One of the widely circulated and much debated images of the anti-government protests 
in 2013 was that of a woman holding a poster that read: ‘Take your transition back’. 
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Blagovest, like many others I met considered the ‘transition’ (prehodat) to be a grand 
scheme orchestrated by a small ‘old’ dressed as ‘new’ oligarchic elite, which fabricated 
mass promises while plundering state resources and people’s dignity. Other popular 
narratives shared by informants, claimed that ‘transition’ has become a permanent 
feature of Bulgarian society and its end could only come with the demise of the country 
itself. Many had the feeling that prehodat was occurring in a chaotic, non-linear manner 
envisioned as a reverse ‘one step forwards and two steps back’ movement. These 
different reasonings demonstrate the overwhelming confusion of my informants who 
struggled to make sense of a socio-economic and political context which 
presentedthem with a constant change while at the same time ensured that things 
always remained the same (Kofti 2016). While there was no agreement on whether the 
transition was ongoing, completed, circular, or never taken place to begin with, it 
became clear that the promises produced in ‘the beginning of the change121’ (nachaloto 
na promyanata) became satisfied only for a small economic elite, those who were able 
to always ‘move well’. The remaining majority, to which my informants from the two 
different groups belonged, was said to have been permanently confined to a state of 
‘survival’ with varying degrees of wellbeing and insecurity.  
                                            





Figure 1. A student protesting in front of the Bulgarian Parliament holding a poster saying, ‘Take 
your transition back’, November 2013. Source: https://hystericalparrhesia.wordpress.com 
 
The last twenty-something years were commonly represented as a succession of 
different crises; ‘points of rupture’ which often did not follow a chronological sequence 
but were ranked according to the severity of the impact they had on individual and 
collective livelihoods. Some of the most commonly mentioned peaks of insecurity were 
‘the hunger crisis’ (1990), ‘the fuel crisis’ (1990), ‘the currency crisis’ (1993), ‘the food 
crisis’ (1995-1996), and ‘the bank crisis’ (1996). Apart from rupture, crisis also denoted 
a sense of continuity as often people struggled to remember a moment in which there 
was no crisis looming. The ‘financial crisis’ of 2008 the effects of which my informants 
were still struggling to overcome during my fieldwork, had been normalised by many, 
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as just ‘one more crisis’ of the ‘transition’.122 At the same time, as revealed in my 
fieldwork, this last crisis presented a fundamental turning point and the ‘last push’ 
prompting many to take the decision to try to re-settle their lives to the UK.  
My informants’ stories revealed that migration had always been on their horizons, as a 
‘last resort’ escape from the different socio-economic and political crises that came 
along with the ‘transition’. It was in the moments they felt pushed towards a precarious 
threshold with no foreseeable ‘ways out’ that they contemplated geographical mobility. 
Many of those I spoke to had made conscious efforts towards leaving the country in 
the past twenty years by: taking part in the Green card lottery123, seeking refugee status 
in western Europe, looking for a connection that could ‘pull’ them abroad, or engaging 
in illegal seasonal labour in neighbouring Greece or Italy. In most cases, such 
endeavours proved unsuccessful as they were either not realised or failed to bring the 
expected results. Many of those I interviewed claimed that they had done their best to 
avoid migration while waiting for the situation in the country to settle down.  
The ‘financial crisis’ surpassed my informants’ willingness and ability to once more 
‘stick it out’. It appeared that continuing endurance did not enable feelings of being in 
control but, on the contrary, impacted on my informants’ sense of personal strength 
and dignity.124 The real proof of one’s stamina became the capacity to break away from 
the stifling despite a familiar sense of stuckedness and to be courageous enough to 
throw oneself into the uncertainty of migration which at least carried the ‘possibility of 
                                            
122 See Kofti (2016). 
123 Refers to the Diversity Immigrant Visa Program of the United States Department of State, colloquially 
addressed as the ‘American lottery’. 
124 For discussion of the dignity of stuckedness see Hage (2009). 
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mobility’ (Hage 2009: 474). Such feelings were captured in the words of Eleonora (forty 
four) who was struggling to find stable employment for the last three years: 
Throughout the years, we [she and her husband] always postponed migration 
hoping that things will eventually work out for us. But the family business kept 
on declining and I kept on changing jobs every few months in a search for decent 
and well-paid employment. I finally realised there are no such jobs in Bulgaria, 
employers are only trying to use you for their own benefit. We finally made up 
our minds; we cannot suffer this dead-lock any longer. We are young, we want 
to live now, the only way forward for us is migration.   
The determination with which those I spoke to were ready to embark on their journeys 
to the UK came from the exhaustion of their hopes for a better future in Bulgaria. The 
fear, desperation, and disillusionment that I captured in this particular ethnographic 
moment was present ever since the start of the market changes (see Creed 2011), but 
what made it particularly poignant for my informants was the painful realisation that 
‘things would never get better’. In his ‘ethnography of decline’ amongst Zambian 
Copperbelt mine workers, James Ferguson (1999) explores how times of acute socio-
economic collapse lead to a change in the prevailing ‘temporal sensibility’ (Guyer 2007: 
409). He contends that the modernist template informing people’s interpretation of the 
world and their lives within it is ‘turned upside down’ and becomes replaced by a sense 
of irreversible decline which puts an end to hopes for linear progression. The ‘abjection’ 
of Zambians from the ‘global stairway’ creates experiences of ‘disconnection’ which 
Ferguson is careful to emphasise mean ‘not simply a lack of connection’ but loss of 
previously existing connection (1999: 238).   
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My fieldwork amongst would-be migrants revealed Bulgaria as one of the peripheral 
‘redlined’ spaces which the global geographies of capitalism, Ferguson claims, shove 
in the category of global second-class membership (1999: 242). The hope of 
membership in a First World global order – the leitmotif of the ‘transition’ -  came to be 
perceived as unrealistic by my informants who pictured themselves and the country in 
a state of what Stef Jansen calls ‘collective spatiotemporal entrapment on the road to 
Europe’ (2015: 173). Symptomatic of the dismantling of linear teleologies of 
development were widely used metaphors: ‘we are sinking’, ‘the country is dying out’, 
‘everything is disappearing’, ‘things are going down’, ‘we live in a dried oasis’. 
Generalising the situation in his hometown as symptomatic for the country as a whole, 
Blagovest, for example, once denoted this feeling of ‘reverse movement’ by comparing 
what he called the ‘disappearing of Bulgaria’ to the opening scene of the movie 
‘Lucy’125 which depicted the effects of the hostile environment on the reproduction and 
evolution of animals and their eventual extinction. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has introduced some of the people whose stories this thesis follows to 
demonstrate how migration is always a result of the confluence of personal life 
circumstances and structural socio-economic factors beyond one’s control. In 
individual life stories migration is constructed as a ‘major event’ (Fielding 1992: 201) 
embedded within individuals’ biography – always a result of complex considerations, a 
multiplicity of circumstances and the intersection of varied factors that all lead to up to 
                                            
125 Lucy (2014) Film Dir. Luc Besson. Universal Pictures. USA 
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the decision of leaving behind familiar surroundings. My respondents’ narratives have 
demonstrated how individual decisions go beyond preoccupations with improvement 
of one’s economic condition and relate to perceptions of individuals’ positioning in the 
social hierarchy throughout time. Class-based identities depend not only on material 
attributes and professional occupation but on the accumulation of different forms of 
capital (cultural, social, and symbolic). The way in which people explain their reasons 
for migrating also reflects dominant class narratives and is expressed through the 
everyday enactment of diverse dispositions – aesthetic preferences and tastes, 
consumer choices, moral regimes, values, ideological beliefs, and modes of 
personhood. In narrating their migration reasons, my informants make sure to position 
themselves in relation to those within and outside of their social circle in a way that 
matches their self-identifications.  
The chapter has showed that despite their different experiences and perceptions the 
two groups of respondents were in a similar state of existential ‘stuckedness’, defined 
by their inability to imagine a viable future in Bulgaria and a shared perception of 
lacking opportunities for personal advancement. I have explained their feeling of 
‘stagnation’ as interrelated with their reasonings about the post-transitional 
‘spatiotemporal entrapment’ (Jansen 2015: 19) of the Bulgarian state which was seen 
as standing outside of the modernist progressive template of development.  The 
following chapter demonstrates how the shaken belief in Bulgaria’s temporal 
advancement towards a Western standard of prosperity and development does not 
delegitimise the West as the ultimate centre of attraction. On the contrary, migration 
becomes the only available individual strategy through which individuals try to 
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‘confound the established spatial order’ (Gupta and Ferguson 1992: 17) and claim a 





The Imaginary West 
 
‘There is no place like the UK’, said Blagovest as we sat on a bench on the railway 
platform where I waited for the last train back to Plovdiv after one of my visits at his 
hometown. I asked him to elaborate. ‘Well, I think it is the best place, the most Western 
if you like, it is ahead of Germany, for sure not even comparable to France, Italy, Spain 
and all these sorts of places.’ ‘What about Bulgaria?’, I asked. ‘You are joking, right? 
There is not even any point in discussing this. It is like comparing Bulgaria to the 
Central African Republic’, he replied in bewilderment. He then raised one hand 
upwards to the level of his head, ‘Look here is the West’, keeping the other hand down 
on the level of his chest, he continued, ‘Bulgaria is here. Even Romania is better than 
it. It is hard to admit it but it is true. Well, even Turkey, if you wish, I mean the European 
part of it, you know, their standard of life is very high, they are also very modern, you 
cannot see a woman wearing a burka in Istanbul.’ ‘Have you thought about migrating 
to Turkey then?’, I asked and added, ‘At least it is much closer than Britain?’ ‘Are you 
crazy? (he looked offended by my question) [...] everyone is going to the West and I 
should go to the East? Why didn’t you go to study in Istanbul but you went to 
Birmingham instead?’  
This short dialogue captures the gist of my informants’ migration narratives and 
exemplifies their widely-shared convictions and deep-rooted visions of a global 
hierarchy of places (nations) and their own position within it. When discussing their 
plans for leaving the country, people very often, just like Blagovest, pointed not only to 
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the unsatisfactory experiences of a life they wanted to leave behind but to their positive 
imaginings of existing alternatives available in distant places. They juxtaposed 
Bulgaria, which in their eyes was marked by despair, stagnation and dwindling 
opportunities, to the prosperity and progress available in a place like the UK. This ability 
to imagine the availability of a drastically different alternative in a distant place was 
their main impetus to migrate (cf. Benson 2012, Salazar 2013).  
When envisioning their migratory trajectories, my informants often drew on a 
hierarchically structured world map very similar to the one presented by Blagovest. In 
this imaginary world order, different countries were ranked according to their 
desirability as migration destinations, which in turn pointed to their capacity to 
approximate an imagined West, an ideal template of what a ‘good life’ should look like. 
Blagovest’s vision demonstrated clearly that the economic advancement of a country 
was not the only criterion determining its appeal in migrants’ eyes. The imagined 
international order put forward by my informants also implied a geographical principle 
of organisation around an east-west axis, according to which, the further westwards a 
country was situated, the more desirable it appeared.  
This chapter examines the role of the native concept of the West (Zapadat) in migrants’ 
expectations and aspirations of life following migration. The West signified both a 
specific geographical location – western Europe (the UK in particular) – and an 
imaginary place offering infinite possibilities for a better future. Even people who did 
not have first-hand experience of the West were able to produce remarkably detailed 
and consistent depictions of how things functioned there. Blagovest’s only ever 
experience abroad, for example, consisted of his one time ‘escape’ to the Czech 
Republic in the early 1990s, where he spent two months in an asylum centre. Still, he 
145 
 
prided himself with his extensive knowledge about the world. Similar, to other 
informants, he drew his information from personal contacts in western Europe, TV 
programmes and a range of media images. He expressed a common conviction when 
he said that one did not need to have been abroad or to personally know someone 
living there to ‘know’ what life was like. The confidence and detail with which my 
informants were able to imagine the West and the life it offered, as well as the 
impressive compatibility of their accounts, indicated how individual imaginations were 
informed by widely circulating cultural constructs – ‘global imaginaries’, which ‘change 
the way in which people collectively envision the world and their own positionalities 
and mobilities within it’ (Salazar 2011: 577).  
In order to grasp the interconnection between individual imaginations and globally-
circulating cultural repertoires making up the emic category of the West, this chapter 
uses the already introduced conceptual prism of the ‘imaginary West’ (Yurchak 2006). 
By deconstructing the West as it was envisioned by my two groups of informants, I 
demonstrate how at its root is the promise of a Eurocentrically-conceived modernity 
and its mythologies (see Ferguson 1999). This chapter argues that although 
influencing the way in which people imagine their existence and succumb to a 
corresponding moral order, imaginaries are also invested with meanings and 
interpretations that on one hand pertain to a specific historical and cultural context and, 
on the other, relate to one’s own individual circumstances, class perception and 
positioning (Benson 2012, Smith 2006). In this sense, the imaginary of the West is not 
an independent factor mobilising individual and collective behaviour. It is the wider 
socio-cultural and economic circumstances that I see as determining its power of 
attraction. Its key role in driving my informants’ physical mobility should be interpreted 
146 
 
against the particular socio-economic, political and historical circumstances that I have 
presented in the previous chapter. This approach is in lines with the conviction of the 
theorists of the imaginary - Taylor (2002), Castoriadis (1987), and Gaonkar (2002) who 
claim that when taken as a ‘social’ rather than simply an individual ‘quality’, a particular 
imaginary requires an understanding of the wider societal context.  
Therefore, I begin this chapter by tracing the historical formation of the West as a 
powerful symbolic concept in the collective Bulgarian consciousness. I will 
demonstrate its interrelation with a western modernist project and its construction as a 
benchmark for development, in relation to which Bulgaria has always remained in an 
outsider position – ‘incomplete’ and ‘lagging behind’.  Subsequently, I outline the two 
different versions of the West constructed by my two groups of informants. Would-be 
migrants in the ‘ordinary people’ category shared visions of the West as ‘normality’ 
expressed in three main themes: predictability and affordability of life; social justice; 
and working-class dignity. ‘Bulgarian Westerners’’ visions of the West are best capture 
by the term ‘American Dream’, as they emphasised ideas of meritocracy and upward 
social mobility; success as a combination of personal and professional satisfaction; 
and freedom for practicing different personhood models and gender values. After 
deconstructing these two visions of the West I return to discuss the articulation of an 
imaginative hierarchy of nations that was inextricable part of my informants’ visions of 
the West. I conclude by advancing an understanding of Bulgarian migration as 
international existential advancement.  
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A genealogy of the ‘imaginary West’ in Bulgaria: historical construction in three 
periods  
The following historical review serves to contextualise the present empirical chapter by 
providing the necessary background for understanding the importance of the West in 
public perceptions and individual narratives. Special attention is paid to the historical 
and socio-cultural specificities which make the West such a durable and powerful 
cultural and symbolic construction in Bulgaria. Its emergence and development will be 
traced in three subsequent historical periods: 
• The period from the beginning of the Bulgarian National Revival commencing 
in the 18th century, encompassing the liberation and establishment of 
independent Bulgarian state (1878) and ending with the post-World War II 
establishment of state socialism (1946) and the country’s entrance into the 
Soviet sphere of influence; 
• The period of state socialism from 1946 to 1989; 
• The postsocialist period initiated with the dissolution of socialist structures and 
the start of the process of political democratisation and market reforms, during 
which Bulgaria also became part of the European Union (2007), and which is 
said to continue to the present day. 
From National Revival to the beginning of the Cold War period  
With the beginning of the Bulgarian national revival, a project for cultural and political 
consolidation of the Bulgarian people under Ottoman rule126 in the late eighteenth 
                                            
126 Bulgarian territories were under Ottoman rule between the 14th and the 19th century.  
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century, the dichotomy between East and West (Asia and Europe) started to penetrate 
the pre-modern Bulgarian imagination. The clash between these two cultural entities 
was presented in the antagonisms of ‘barbarian’ and ‘civilised’, ‘backwards’ and 
‘progressive’, ‘rational’ and ‘irrational’, referring to both forms of social organisation and 
collective mentality (dushevnost) (Tsvetkov 1993). The rise of Bulgarian nationalism 
was associated with the gradual reception of western Enlightenment ideas and values 
through commerce, education, and travel (Crampton 2006). Drawing on the opposition 
between Europe and the Orient, Bulgarian enlighteners and revolutionaries hoped to 
consolidate a sense of national belonging amongst the people by emphasising their 
supposedly superior Slavic (European) ethnic heritage vis-à-vis an imposed and 
allegedly genetically foreign barbarian influence brought about by the Ottoman rule 
(Galavanova 1998). From this point in time, a unified image of western Europe 
emerged and came to symbolise the West as a whole. This image went hand in hand 
with ideas of ‘progress’, ‘reason’, and ‘culture’, and came to be seen by some social 
groups as supreme embodiment of civilisation and the ‘ultimate goal of domestic 
development’ (Valtchinova 2016:137).  
At the same time, the growth of the West’s popular appeal was paralleled by an attitude 
of mistrust and disappointment with western Europe’s unwillingness to recognise 
Bulgaria’s civilisational maturity and readiness to receive freedom and political 
recognition. European rulers’ efforts to sustain the Ottoman power in the Balkans 
provoked the condemnation of many Bulgarians who accused the West of supporting 
slavery and despotism in the region (Daskalov 1998).127 This disillusionment led to the 
                                            
127 People’s discontent of the time was directed to a great extent towards the British who were following 
a strong pro-Turkish policy (Daskalov 1998). 
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steady shift of the Bulgarian gaze eastwards towards Russia as another possible 
‘liberatory force’ (ibid). The support that Russia provided for Bulgarian people’s 
struggle for independence at the end of the 19th century (albeit in the process 
advancing its own imperial interest in the Balkans) harnessed the sympathies of the 
majority of the population.128  
The ambivalent attitudes towards ‘Europe’ (western and northern Europe) were further 
entrenched with the development of an anti-modernist (and anti-occidentialist) 
conservative movement warning against the dangers coming from foreign cultural 
influences (Valtchinova 2016). The growing Europeanisation (poevropeichvane) of the 
urban population expressed in the embracement of Western values, ideas and trends 
was seen by Bulgarian patriots as a source of moral deterioration and was opposed to 
the preservation of the purity of traditional forms of life characteristic of Bulgarian rural 
communities. In this sense, ‘Europe’ came to be perceived simultaneously as an 
emancipatory force and a threat to national identity (Valtchinova 2016).129  
In the decades following the end of Ottoman domination (from 1878 onwards), the 
newly-independent Bulgarian state underwent a process of speedy modernisation 
including the instating of modern political institutions (local governments, courts, 
administration, etc.), economic reforms, and regulations, all aimed at fostering 
progress towards a universal model of western civilisation. The normative power of the 
                                            
128 This was specifically the case for the rural population and the petit bourgeoisie that saw Russia as a 
liberator and protector. The urban intelligentsia and salariat on the other hand expressed anti-Russian 
and pro-Western sentiments (Blagoev 1957). 
129 Meanwhile, the Bulgarian western-educated elites raised criticism against the superficial adoption of 




West came to subordinate everything Bulgarian as inferior and backwards and a 
source of embarrassment in collective consciousness (Valtchinova 2016).  
Some critical scholars have pointed out the colonial modus operandi of such 
transformations. Rather than political liberation, 19th century eastern Europe, they 
claim, was submerged into a new form of dependency, this time to a western imperial 
core. Manuela Boatca’s (2007) analysis of Romania’s neo-colonial peripheralisation 
from the period can also be extended to the Bulgarian case. According to her, without 
being formally colonised, the eastern European region has been systematically 
constructed as an incomplete and inferior ‘Other within’, which was in need of cultural, 
political, and economic intervention (Boatca 2007).  
The collective Bulgarian imagination of the time appears to be blending together 
contradictory attitudes – it was not uncommon for someone to express criticism against 
‘Westernisation’ as a hegemonic process of cultural and political domination while at 
the same time recognising the supremacy of western modernity and its progressive 
promise. As a ‘country which has one side turned towards the West as a model and 
supreme benchmark in the cultural hierarchy, and another turned towards internal 
cultural space and domestic values’ (Valtchinova 2016: 139) the orientation of Bulgaria 
vis-à-vis an ideal western culture was ambiguous. This ambiguity continued throughout 
the two world wars and the intra-war period up until the Soviet occupation of the country 
in 1944. 
Socialist period 
The establishment of state socialism in 1944 marked a process of radical ideological 
re-orientation of the country, a reversal ‘from Europeanisation to Sovietisation’ 
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(Hristova 1998). In the early socialist period, all spheres of life – economy, culture, 
education, were re-modelled in line with a Soviet modernisation model and Marxist-
Leninist principles (Crampton 2006). The East-West dichotomy was now elevated onto 
the level of state ideology and geopolitical competition between ‘communism’ and 
‘capitalism’. In official discourse, the West was constructed in ideological contradiction 
to socialist life: a place of social inequality, injustice, mass unemployment, and 
decaying mores. The opaque portrayal of socialism was dominated by claims about 
social justice, humanism, democracy and security. At the same time, the isolation from 
foreign influences and the prohibitions of everything western in socialist Bulgaria 
increased the attraction of the West (Daskalov 1998, Chapter One).130  
In the late socialist period, the depiction of the West in dominant ideology and the 
greater ‘openness’ of the system, led to the increased association of the West with 
consumption and lifestyle, and less so with distinct ‘culture’ or a ‘democratic’ political 
system. In the mind-set of the urban population in particular, the West came to be seen 
as a ‘promised land’ contact with which was sought in a multiplicity of ways 
(Valtchinova 2016). The consumption of western culture and commodities became not 
only a marker of social status but also an expression of revolt against the restrictions 
of the system and thus a symbol of freedom. The ambivalent place of consumption in 
socialist Bulgaria, was an important factor that contributed to the fetishisation of the 
West as a consumer paradise (Ditchev 2014). In the socialist modernisation project, 
consumption was, on the one hand, elevated as the ultimate teleological promise of 
                                            
130 At the same time, however, agrarian, and industrial areas demonstrated strong support for socialism 




the industrial production system while, on the other hand, it was inhibited by 
structurally-embedded production shortages and ideological reprimands of consumer 
desires as an expression of moral weakness and decay (Ditchev 2014).  
Thus, it could be argued that the prohibition of individual consumer desires and the 
obscene exposure to consumption goods (in media images, smuggled products, 
rumours, and stories) led to a collective longing for a Western consumption. The 
circulation of both official and unofficial representations of western ‘reality’ was 
ideologically-driven and far from providing a realistic, let alone critical representation 
of life in western Europe. The socialist period led to the entrenchment of a highly 
mystified and mythologised image of the West that had lasting effects on collective 
Bulgarian consciousness long after the ideological smokescreen was dismantled (see 
Chapter One). 
Postsocialist period 
The fall of socialism in Bulgaria in 1989 was more a result of intra-party power struggles 
than a popular revolution (Crampton 2006). Despite the enthusiasm with which a great 
part of the population welcomed democracy and the free market, the devastating 
effects of the early ‘transitional’ years provoked support for the old system (Creed 
1995).131 At the end of the 1990s, however, the drastic socio-economic collapse led to 
popular discontent with Bulgaria’s left-wing government and a full force turn of the 
                                            
131 For example, the former Communist Party was elected into government twice after 1989. Agricultural 
and factory workers who have been most severely affected by the dismantling of state industries, 
enterprises and privatisation of agriculture are said to have been the most fervent supporters of the 
Socialist Party as they feared symbolic and economic devaluation of their status post-1989 (Creed 
1995). The repeated election of the Socialist Party until 1997 was interrupted by the 1991-1992 rule of 




country’s ideological and political orientation to Euro-Atlantic institutions and actors 
(Crampton 2006). 
The end of the socialist system presented the majority of Bulgarians with increased 
opportunities for direct engagement with the western world. The widespread 
dissemination of cultural messages and the consumption of mediated images and 
material commodities provided ways for establishing an individualised connection with 
the West. The sustainment of international contacts through business, educational or 
recreational travel, however, was still a privilege enjoyed by cultural and economic 
elites (Ranova 2011). The much more open access to the imagery and materiality of 
the West, as well as the short-term direct exposure to western environments, did not, 
however, result in its de-mystification. On the contrary, juxtaposed to the harsh 
economic realities of the ‘transition’, the image of the West as a ‘consumer paradise’ 
has been said to have attracted thousands of Bulgarians who left the country in the 
early 1990s in an effort to experience first-hand the wonders of the western world 
(Daskalov 1998, Ditchev 2014, Stoilkova 2006).  
The ‘transitional’ narrative postulated that the only possible way for Bulgaria to reach 
this standard of material opulence and modernisation was to transform itself according 
to the frameworks of western liberal democracy and the free market. The West became 
the template guiding the process of Europeanisation, popularly referred to as ‘catching 
up’, or ‘going back’ to Europe132, which implied the alignment of the political system, 
institutions and the economy to EU prescriptions and regulations (Katsiakas 2011). 
                                            
132 The resumed movement forward that such discourses proclaimed, exhibited a desire for restoration 
of continuity with pre-socialist independent liberal state (19th century). In Bulgaria, as in many other 
postsocialist states communism was presented as disruption of the ‘normal’ historical temporality and a 
painful aberration from the ‘natural’ course of world history (see Rausing 2002, Kiossev 2008). 
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Beyond that, Europeanisation was also portrayed as a ‘civilisational’ choice that had 
to determine once and for all the national self-identification of Bulgarians. The dutiful 
adoption of European mores and values was expected to on one hand, enable people 
to re-fashion their mentalities and let go of their residual Oriental or Balkan way of 
doing things, and on the other, overcome their socialist mind-set. Such discourses 
further reinforced the idealisation of the western modernisation narrative (Bechev 
2011).  
The postsocialist transformation has brought intense hardship, destitution, and 
suffering for the majority of the Bulgarian population (see Bogdanova 2011, Buchanan 
2002, Creed 2011, Kaneff 2002, Kaneff 2011, Mitev 2001). The accession of the 
country to the European Union in 2007 was initially welcomed as a big success and 
long-awaited recognition. In the following years, however, many people still found 
themselves trapped in a dead-end situation: on the one hand, they were promised the 
freedom and benefits of democracy and capitalism, but on the other, they were 
paralysed by a lack of economic opportunities and social routes to follow.  
The seven-year transitional restrictions imposed by EU member states on Bulgarian 
workers and the constantly delayed entry into the Schengen area served to ‘cool off’ 
the excitement provoked by the EU accession. The strictness with which the EU 
imposed its policies and the humiliating status of the country as the poorest member 
state further deepened the historical perceptions of East-West disparities (Ilieva 2010). 
They aggravated people’s perceptions of their subordinated status as ‘second 
category’ Europeans and ultimately stirred up some official and popular ‘Europhobic’ 
moods (Valtchinova 2016).  
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The harsh consequences of the 2008 global economic crisis have deepened the sense 
of disillusionment and decline for a large number of Bulgarians. Some commentators 
of the region have gone as far as to proclaim the end of modern teleological thinking 
(see Kofti 2014, Popovici and Pop 2016). The previous chapter demonstrated how the 
lack of hope about the realisation of ‘transitional’ promises and collective societal 
progress made it impossible for my informants, and many other Bulgarians, to envision 
a future in Bulgaria. Such widespread disillusionment, however, should not be taken 
as the end of the teleological anticipation of the Western ideal. As this chapter 
demonstrates, the West is still seen as a place offering radical alternative to life in a 
country where people could not imagine a secure and dignified existence for 
themselves and their families. Migration to the UK, I further demonstrate, becomes an 
individual path for realising the promise of Western modernity.  
*** 
This historical overview of the emergence and development of the image of the West 
in Bulgarian collective imagination from the formation of the modern Bulgarian state to 
the present moment reveals a ‘centre-periphery’ dynamic characteristic for colonial and 
postcolonial contexts. Even though Bulgaria has never been an object of European 
colonial domination, the West has played the role of a ‘major signifier’ (big Other) in 
the construction of Bulgarian national identity and collective self-consciousness. 
Bulgarians seem to have always thought of themselves as positioned on the 
geopolitical and symbolical crossroad between two opposing foreign Others – the 
Ottoman empire in the east and Western powers in western Europe. This geographical 
positioning and the different historical episodes of Ottoman and European domination 
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and acculturation have conditioned Bulgaria’s sense of being Europe’s ‘incomplete 
Self’ (Todorova 1997: 17).  
As a dominant cultural formation, the West has always inspired mixed societal 
sentiments in Bulgaria, which range from irresistible attraction and idealisation 
foregrounding constant comparison, competition, and emulation, to disillusionment, 
resentment, and fear of ideological and cultural assimilation. Some have argued that 
the historical comparison and interaction with a superior ‘European Other’ has created 
a peripheral inferiority complex resulting in self-criticism, negation, and denial of all 
those traits seen to characterise Bulgarians as incomplete Europeans (see Kiossev 
2011). Armbruster, Rollo and Meinhof’s (2003) study of imaginations of Europe in 
border communities133 confirms the ambivalent feelings that east Europeans hold 
about the West (in their case Europe and the EU), on one hand, fearing subjugation 
and exploitation, and on the other, sustaining aspirations for economic betterment and 
progress.  
 
The efforts to overcome two of the main legacies that have been seen as determining 
Bulgaria’s past and present – the Oriental and the Socialist one – have produced two 
main compensation mechanisms: one of uncritical admiration and emulation of the 
West and vilification of all socialist and ottoman; and a second one that resists and 
rejects the ideal of European modernity through the invocation of a distinct eastern 
European or Balkan identity, culture and belonging (Ranova 2011).134 These positions 
                                            
133 Their study looks at the narratives of citizens of Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia prior 
to their admission to the EU in 2004.  
134 Nationalism is a third popular position which promotes the assertion of Bulgarian national interest 
against any external interference. This rhetoric sits uncomfortable between the above-mentioned two 
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give rise to antagonism, conflict, and differentiation within society. They serve as basis 
for the crafting of class-based identities, as I have argued in the previous empirical 
chapter. As I will show in the remainder of this chapter, the key characteristics of the 
image of the West, which are the basis for its cultural authority and powerful presence 
in Bulgarian social imagination, were reflected in my informants’ attempts to make 
sense of their own and Bulgaria’s position within social and political dynamics on a 
global level.  
 
The West as ‘normality’  
In this section, I discuss the expectations and imaginations of life in the West held by 
those of my informants who self-identified as ‘ordinary people’. These reflected first 
and foremost a desire for retaining a sense of ‘normality’, which they were missing in 
their present experiences and hoped to achieve through migration to the UK. This 
‘normality’ was denoted in the main categories of stability, affordability, social justice, 
and dignified existence, which I discuss in turn.   
Stability, predictability, and boredom  
Anguel (twenty five) worked as a security guard in a large exhibition centre of declining 
significance in the city of Plovdiv. Dissatisfied with the risky nature of his job and the 
awkward situations he had to deal with on a daily basis – and unable to find more 
satisfying employment or afford university education – he saw migration to the UK as 
the only way forward. His plan was to work in a farm for a few months, use his earnings 
                                            
compensational mechanisms. Nationalism, however, also draws on ideas of Enlightenment and western 
modernity (see Manolova and Lottholz 2015).  
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as a stepping stone towards finding better paid employment and eventually settle in 
London. One time he invited me to visit him at his workplace – a large glass-walled 
room at the entrance of the exhibition grounds overlooking a busy boulevard. We had 
just started talking about his expectations of life in the UK when he pointed through the 
window and exclaimed: ‘Look at them! The yellow cabs! They are back!’. While trying 
to reach the police on the phone he started explaining how the taxis in front of the 
building had already been there in the past few days, trying to trick foreign athletes 
taking part in an international fencing competition. The unscrupulous taxi drivers, he 
continued, not only parked in an unauthorised area but took advantage of the clueless 
foreigners charging them twenty times the regular fee. Anguel had already tried to 
chase them away by threatening to call the police. The police had come to fine them 
earlier that day but this had only a temporary effect. ‘This is what drives me crazy about 
life in Bulgaria – the complete lack of regulations and laws. This can never happen in 
the UK, right?’ I murmured that I was not sure and it maybe depended on the situation. 
He replied: 
No! I am sure it can never happen there.  People there live according to strict 
rules and regulations, as it should be. This is engrained in their mentality, they 
cannot even think of doing anything unlawful. Unlike us [Bulgarians], we are 
born with this mechanism in our heads – always seeking to overstep the rules 
for our own benefit. 
Adamant to persuade me of the high morals and unspoilt mentality of the British and 
westerners in general, Anguel continued to pile up one example after another. A while 
ago, some friends had told him how a group of Bulgarian gastarbeiters who lived in 
one of London’s migrant ghettos had started stealing electricity by filling their electricity 
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meters with coin-shaped ice cubes made in Heineken beer caps. What was baffling 
about the story, Anguel thought, was not this impressive Bulgarian ‘ingenuity’ but the 
fact that it had taken the dumbfounded British authorities almost a year to figure out 
this fraud. The reason, he claimed, was not their foolishness but the fact that such 
trickery was simply beyond their grasp. ‘Western people’, he believed, did not have the 
‘fraud gene’ characteristic for people with a ‘Bulgarian mentality’.   
Shifting the emphasis from ‘mentality’ to social organisation, other people I spoke to 
evoked similar discourses of strong regulations and their rigorous implementation in 
the UK. These were related to positive images of a strong state; the contributions of 
historical political figures and an imperial legacy of a colonial super power. Eleonora, 
a temporary employee in a small accounting company in Sofia and married mother of 
one, who was about to start an au-pair job in London, praised the glorious historical 
past of the UK and its successful promotion of its own interest against EU regulations. 
As a contrast, she highlighted Bulgaria’s insignificance in international affairs and the 
country’s historical position of slavery-dependence:  
Britain has conquered the whole world, they have history, they have stable 
rulers, they have it all! It is an imperial state; half of the world are their relatives. 
Bulgarians, however, are a sick tribe in their genesis, we have been enslaved 
for such a long time, and we don’t get along with any of our neighbours.  
This victorious historical legacy was in her eyes result of deeply entrenched social 
order and rule of law, which she found to be virtually absent in Bulgaria where life was 
chaotic and disorganised:  
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Their life has not changed for centuries. They keep on following the same old 
model. Here it is the opposite, we live in a constant change, and we have 
experienced several different regimes of government [stroeve] for a very short 
time. This isn’t normal by any means, people get confused and don’t know what 
to do anymore; they don’t have a model to follow.  
Western life was perceived by my informants to be based on clear rules recognised 
and accepted by the disciplined western citizens. In contrast, many ‘ordinary people’ 
felt vulnerable and unprotected in Bulgaria where the laws worked for the powerful of 
the day, those who could pay. Their anticipation of ‘normal’ lives carried a sense of 
much-desired security and basic trust in the way life works and reassurance that 
tomorrow will be more or less similar to today and yesterday. The order and stability 
defining one’s experiences were expected to ensure a better ‘grasp’ over one’s present 
and ability to plan and positively imagine the future.  
This temporal dimension of order and stability was metaphorically expressed in the 
notion of ‘boring life’. Such life, which people imagined to be the norm in the West, was 
characterised by ordinariness and non-eventfulness in which each passing day made 
life manageable and predictable, thus allowing a greater sense of control and security. 
Anguel, for example, admitted how when trying to keep himself awake during the quiet 
and eventless nightshifts, he would sometimes imagine what a life of a guy his age 
would look like in the UK: 
He goes to work in the morning, most likely in an office. Spends eight hours 
working, I mean disciplined work, no slacking off. Then he goes home to his 
family. Of course, he has a nice house and a car. Everyone has dinner in front 
of the telly. They are laughing while telling each other about how their day went. 
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It all repeats again on the next day. Maybe on the weekends they all go out of 
town for a picnic [...].  Quite an ordinary life, when you think about it, almost 
boring [laughing]. 
Eleonora elaborated further on this by describing the day to day routine that she 
expected her life in the UK to follow, which she admitted was not much different from 
what she was presently used to: ‘I don’t imagine something miraculous and grand to 
happen when I go there. I see myself going to work, coming back home, cooking for 
my family, and going to bed. This same thing repeats at least five, six days a week’. I 
asked her to explain what made this envisioned monotonous routine in the UK so 
desirable, when the same was related to a much-loathed sense of stagnation in 
Bulgaria. She replied: 
The difference is that in the UK all of this has a purpose; you know why you are 
doing it, so to speak. Your daily efforts, no matter how mundane, add up and 
you know that you are building something; [...] you are building a secured future, 
for yourself and, more importantly, for your children. In Bulgaria, the everyday 
strain is futile – you fight and fight just so you fail at the end. Here, it all melts 
away into thin air! 
In this sense, the imagined boredom that ‘ordinary people’ seemed to long for was 
related to sameness and repetition – signs of predictability and security of life. In 
contrast, the monotony of life in Bulgaria was characterised by pointlessness and 
despair, augmenting the feeling of lack of collective and personal forward progression.   
These positively charged imaginations of boredom present a sharp contrast to 
common western-centric perceptions of boredom as a mass phenomenon of modern 
162 
 
times characteristic of life saturated by activities, entertainment, and distractions. The 
monotonous banality of an everyday devoid of passion and spontaneity is said to 
produce alienation, apathy, and frustration in the western subject (eg. Klapp 1986). It 
was precisely the predictability of this repetitive sameness of life, free from material 
worry, one epitomised, according to Lefebvre (1991), in western middle-class suburbia 
that my informants desired as meaningful and cohesive. Boring lives were thus lives of 
smooth social reproduction and transition between different life phases - attending 
school, finding stable employment, starting a family, becoming a parent, and ensuring 
the same life cycle from generation to generation. Putting one’s existence into a 
progressive continuum in which the ‘natural’ flow of life was restored was expected to 
fill daily activities with meaning and provide a sense of coherence and purpose.  
‘Even those like us are living well!’- social justice and affordability of life  
On a hot summer day, I took the train from Plovdiv and went to meet Blagovest for a 
quick coffee just a week before he was due to leave for the UK, where he had been 
offered a job in the construction of a solar panel farm. When discussing how to stay in 
touch, he suggested I add him on Facebook as he was quite confident that the caravan 
in which he was going to live would have internet access. ‘I am keeping a low profile 
on Facebook, just to let you know.135 Don’t be surprised when you see my profile 
picture. It is a picture of a pirate. I don’t like to publish my own photos.’ In response to 
my question about his preferences for keeping an incognito profile, he explained: 
                                            
135 Blagovest’s reluctance to draw attention to himself was part of his decision not to share his migration 
plans with anyone but his mother. Even though, ‘half of [his] the neighborhood’ was in the UK he never 
shared his intentions or asked for assistance as he believed it was ‘better if no one knows’ and if he 




Well, on Facebook one only puts pictures which are worth looking at, something 
easy for the eyes, you know. I simply don’t have such photos. If I could 
photograph myself next to a nice car, a house, or in a nice holiday location, for 
example, I would have posted those, anything else is just not serious. Let’s see, 
I hope that soon I will also have something to boast about as my friends abroad 
- a nice car or some holiday location [laughing].   
Blagovest’s expectations highlighted the material dimension contained in the image of 
‘normality’. In his and in the narratives of other ‘ordinary people’ the West emerged as 
a place offering a standard of living and individual well-being unattainable at home. A 
lot of my informants believed that by going to the UK they would be able to achieve an 
average degree of economic independence and ensure a ‘decent’ life for themselves 
and their families. Such expectations weren’t based on purely materialistic logics, 
however, but foregrounded perceptions of the morally just principles on which the 
social and economic organisation of the western society was based. Thus, the 
provision of economic security was elevated to a normative understanding of a just 
society– a fair system which provided equal redistribution of material and social 
resources to each individual based on their individual merit and regardless of race, 
gender and social networks. Underlying this assumption was the belief that in the UK 
even those at the bottom of the social ladder were able to ‘have enough’. Expectations 
of just reward, affordability of life and an effective welfare state were other aspects of 
the social justice my informants expected to experience. They all become evident in 
Nina’s contemplation of life in western Europe and the UK in specific: 
In those countries, one is awarded for one’s hard labour, not for one’s 
connections (vruzki). If you are honest and hard-working you don’t need to worry 
164 
 
about anything – you will always have enough. The state cares about its people 
by giving decent salaries and good welfare support – say, if you have a child or 
if you fall sick and cannot work for some time, you will receive enough to live 
well. Those who live off welfare support in the UK are much better off than those 
like myself in Bulgaria who work from morning to dawn and still need to fear for 
their bread. Also, keep in mind that the prices for basic products and 
maintenance bills are much lower in the West.  
Going by what they said, for my informants ‘having enough’ primarily meant 
satisfaction of essential needs and sustainment of the day-to-day reproduction of their 
households. As already pointed out in the previous chapter, the state of ‘survival’ that 
‘ordinary people’ desperately wished to leave behind was partly denoted by their 
frustrated ability to engage in a desired consumption and lifestyle. A more careful 
reading of their longings revealed that it was precisely this materiality of life that they 
saw as universal norm in the UK. In this respect, Blagovest claimed that contrary to 
Bulgarians’ popular perceptions, according to which ‘all Westerners have deep 
pockets’, in reality ‘Western people’ (Zapadnyatsi) were just ‘normal’ workers 
sustaining what in the West was considered an average level of material wellbeing. In 
his view, it was the overblown conspicuous display of economic success, practiced by 
many Bulgarian migrants that induced commonly held misconceptions about wealth 
and abundance characterising life in the West. 
He insisted on sharing with me a widespread anecdote depicting the false promise of 
Western abundance that was subject of much amusement amongst his small-town 
community. A few years ago, a former classmate and neighbour of Blagovest left to 
seek work in the UK together with her husband. In the first year after their departure, 
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the couple did not return home even once, their parents claimed to have no regular 
phone contact with them and to be unaware of how they were managing. Just when 
their ‘disappearance’ started to provoke the circulation of rumors in the small town, 
their previously inactive Facebook profiles became deluged with photos demonstrating 
the couple’s opulent lifestyle. On one of the photos they were sipping French 
Champaign in a jacuzzi in what looked like a very luxurious bathroom; on another one 
they posed next to a black SUV. The photos became the talk of the day for the next 
few weeks, with neighbors being divided over their authenticity. While some tried to 
get in touch with requests for loans, others remained skeptical and considered this to 
be a fake show-off.  
Blagovest was one of the sceptics, he claimed, not because he was jealous of their 
success but because this opulence looked exaggerated to him. The true story behind 
the photos was exposed a few months later when two town dwellers working in the 
same cleaning agency as the couple revealed that the photos had been be taken in 
clients’ homes during working hours. With self-righteous satisfaction, Blagovest 
ensured me that he could have never fallen for the story even without the disclosure 
provided by his townsmen. ‘It is not easy to become rich in the UK. I am not saying it 
is not possible, but it is not given to everyone. It is like painting, not everyone can 
become Van Gogh.’   
While dismissing the aspirations for exceptional economic success and luxurious 
lifestyles sustained by many of his friends, Blagovest tended to take for granted the 
promise of satisfactory well-being available to all full-time workers. He saw the socially 
just principle on which western ‘normality’ was based as a main precondition for 
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universal material security: ‘If you work, you don’t need to worry, there will always be 
enough for you.’ 
According to my informants, the general affordability of life and the strong British pound 
were other factors ensuring comfortable living for everyone.136 Both ‘ordinary people’ 
and ‘Bulgarian Westerners’ always made sure to mention that their choice of the UK 
as migration destination was partly determined by the fact that the UK was one of the 
few western countries unaffected by the global economic crisis. For them, this attested 
to the almost unprecedented strength of the British economy and was a measure of 
the high degree of Westernness of the country. The high exchange value of the British 
pound in relation to the Bulgarian currency always triggered associations with lucrative 
earning opportunities. My informants routinely evaluated the earnings they expected 
to obtain in the UK against Bulgarian consumer prices and living standards, which did 
not make much sense given their plans to settle in the UK for good. Such juxtapositions 
left them with rather deceptive impression of the quality of life they would be able to 
enjoy in the UK.  
Blagovest presented me with budget estimates for the time when he would leave his 
low-paid job in the solar panel farm and move to London where he hoped to settle. 
These provisional monthly estimations aimed to demonstrate his familiarity with the 
‘reality’ of migrants’ economic success: 
The lowest salary in the UK is 1000 pounds, even for a simple labourer. Imagine, 
this is [...] 1000 times, let’s say 2.40 [the exchange rate to the Bulgarian Lev], 
                                            
136 At the time of my fieldwork (2013-2014) 1GBP equaled 2. 45 BGN whereas in the post-Brexit realities 
(2016-2017) 1 GBP equals 2.19 BGN.  
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this makes 2400 leva! You can never find a job that brings you this money here. 
Sure, there are expenses. Let’s say 200 pounds at most for accommodation, for 
transport – I am thinking of buying a car, petrol is quite cheap there. Food is 
even cheaper than here, so let’s say another 100-150 pounds max. Even if you 
put something aside you still have enough left at the end of the month.  
The belief in the lower cost of living in the UK in comparison to Bulgaria was 
widespread among my informants and was even evoked in ‘expert’ media 
commentaries and popular discourse. This was deemed true not only in terms of the 
living standard the two countries offered but even when comparing basic consumer 
prices in relation to wages. Many shared the impression that the cost of some essential 
products in Bulgaria not only approximated western prices but in many cases literally 
surpassed them. This was often assumed to be the case with the price of fuel, 
foodstuffs, clothing, and utility bills. Blagovest found proof of this in the fact that many 
of his friends who worked in the UK were quick to bring their families with them after 
finding employment, because the cost of living in the UK was same or even lower than 
in Bulgaria.  
Thus, it became obvious that shared imaginations of social justice and affordability 
were not based on actual experiences or factual knowledge of life in the UK. Rather, 
they reflected impressions gathered through media, social networks and widely 
circulating rumours and anecdotes which appeared truthful because they promised to 
remedy present experiences of injustice and destitution. To those would-be migrants I 
spoke to, it appeared only logical that the UK with its global prestige, imperial might 
and stable social organisation – the opposite of Bulgaria – provided a corresponding 
standard of life to all its citizens.  
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Regaining dignity through labour 
While economic security and principles of social justice were seen as main features of 
western society, my informants also imagined these as achievements which had to be 
earned and well-deserved. According to their reasoning, it was their hard and 
dedicated labour that would turn them into respectable citizens of British society and 
would entitle them to the expected benefits of ‘normality’ – stability and predictability, 
just remuneration and general material well-being. Imaginations of ‘normality’ also 
expressed working-class aspirations for obtaining dignity in labour, meaning a fair 
wage, stable employment conditions, job security and, not least, a sense of 
respectability. The assessment of labour relations in moral terms was particularly 
important for my informants given the humiliating treatment they received from 
employers, colleagues and society in general, and in light of the marginal status 
ascribed to their occupations (see Chapter Three). I have already discussed how the 
inability to obtain working-class respectability had damaged perceptions of self-worth 
and had negatively impacted on my informants’ sense of human dignity and individual 
value. For many the impression that money and respect could only be obtained through 
illicit and immoral business activities produced moral conflict and denigrated their work 
ethic and value orientations. In order to illustrate expectations for dignity of labour and 
restoration of personal worth, I go back to the story of Nikolay who had decided to 
apply for a care taker position in the UK, as a result of the demeaning work experiences 
he suffered in Bulgaria.  
One sunny summer morning, Nikolay came to the office of the recruitment agency for 
a Skype interview with a prospective British employer. He was wearing cheap black 
suit trousers, matching shoes, and a long-sleeved white shirt – the most formal outfit 
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he owned, as he later explained. As he did not speak more than a few basic words of 
English, I volunteered to serve as an interpreter. During the half an hour before the 
start of the interview, Nikolay, eager to make a good impression, started asking me 
about the ‘dos and ‘don’ts’ when communicating with the British in ‘order for him not to 
be considered a typical Bulgarian’. ‘I heard they really cared about politeness and 
affability, is it true? Using words like “thank you”, “sorry”, “please” is very important, 
right?’ I decided to confirm his stereotypes as I figured a few polite words would be 
helpful in a job interview in any cultural context.  
The interview lasted half an hour and seemed to have been successful as at the end 
Nikolay was asked to confirm the earliest possible date on which he could get on a 
plane to Birmingham. He was thrilled to share the first impressions from his new 
employer – the first Westerner he had ever communicated with:  
Did you see how he was dressed? Looked quite smart, I hope he didn’t think 
my clothes were too outmoded. And […] he was so nice to me, all the time trying 
to put me at ease and super polite, right? But wait, what really struck me was 
that he was really interested in knowing more about me. What do you make of 
all these questions – “What are your hobbies?”, “How do you plan to relax after 
work?’’, “Do you like going out with friends?”. It seems as these people really 
care about the worker. He said it himself – the job is psychologically and 
physically challenging and one needs to regularly unwind and re-charge one’s 
batteries. 
The interview confirmed what Nikolay had already heard from his colleagues working 
in Germany, Britain, and other west European countries – ‘they value workers there, 
not only medical workers, but all those who earn a living by honest labour’.  
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Nikolay was about to leave for the UK in order to take on a job that presented serious 
deskilling in relation to his nursing qualification. The reason he felt pushed to take this 
job despite its lower prestige was his lack of English language skills and the fact that 
his qualifications would not be recognised in the UK. However, he did not seem too 
distressed with the social demotion that he had to undergo; on the contrary, he was 
excited at the prospect of being in a western working environment. Nikolay did not 
underestimate the huge emotional and physical strain that the new job would bring. In 
fact, it was precisely the exceptional challenge that the occupation presented that he 
believed would bring him high degrees of respectability and appreciation in the eyes 
of the locals. Thus, paradoxically, he ascribed higher value to the care taker job in 
England than to the nursing position he was currently occupying in Bulgaria.  
My informants often praised the dignified position which was supposedly conferred to 
all workers in the West, while at the same time expecting to occupy a subordinate 
labour market status by virtue of their nationality. Would-be migrants recognised that 
the pay they would receive would be below the ‘normal’ payment enjoyed by native 
workers. They were also aware that they were more likely to engage in backbreaking 
and demeaning jobs shunned by the locals. Such expectations did not, however, come 
into conflict with visions of social justice and working-class respectability because they 
were seen as temporary arrangements that all newcomers had to go through. By 
proving one’s loyalty, determination, and strong work ethic, a migrant would earn the 
recognition of the locals and progress to a more respectable and well-paid position, 
they thought.  
As in the case of visions of social justice discussed above, my informants imagined 
dignity of labour in the UK as the logical counterpart of the humiliation and denigration 
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they experienced in Bulgarian society. They also demonstrated awareness that 
attaining dignity in the form of decent wage, stable employment and working-class 
respectability was conditional upon proving one’s qualities as a hard and honest 
worker, gaining the trust of British employers and disproving the negative stereotypes 
attached to Bulgarians.  
(Post)Socialist ‘normality’ 
‘Normality’ is said to be one of the most frequently evoked notions throughout the 
‘transitional’ period in the whole postsocialist region, both in political and wider public 
discourse (Kiossev 2008). In Bulgaria, the beginning of the market reforms has been 
put under the slogan ‘return to normality’ (or ‘back to normality’) – a political project 
that aimed at the temporal and spatial re-integration of the country into a capitalist 
western (European) world, the movement towards which had been perceived as 
ruptured by an ‘abnormal’ communist regime (Kiossev 2008). In this respect, the 
restoration of spatial and temporal continuity that was at the forefront of the 
‘transitional’ project had always presupposed the West as the mainstay of this much-
longed for ‘normality’. Korte claims that ‘in fact for many east Europeans western 
Europe became synonymous with ‘normality’ and for many ‘return to Europe proved 
simultaneously to be a return to European normality’.137  
I have already demonstrated the historical establishment of a Western teleology in 
Bulgarian context and its internalisation in national collective consciousness. This 
empirical section has revealed how ‘ordinary people’ imagined the West as a place 
                                            
137 Korte (2010:10 cited in Kiossev 2008: no page). 
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where they could enjoy a ‘normal’ life. The three main themes of ‘ordinary people’s’ 
conceptualisations of normality are also pertinent to some of the recent theoretical 
debates on the emic meanings of ‘normality’ in the context of eastern Europe. Firstly, 
I have shown how the ordinariness and non-eventfulness which was imagined to define 
Bulgarians’ everyday life in the UK was largely missing from their present realities. The 
day-to-day living that marked the state of ‘survival’ (described in Chapter Three) comes 
close to what Jane Guyer (2007) has defined as ‘enforced presentism’ in the context 
of the United States. Studying changes in the doctrines of fundamental Christianity and 
monetarism, she discovered that short-term horizons (day-to-day thinking) and long-
term visions (futurism) have come to replace near future vistas. It was precisely the 
restoration of this sense of coherent and progressive linear mid-term temporality and 
the ability for rational planning and prediction that my informants anticipated when they 
discussed the ‘boring’ ‘normality’ of the West. Such desire for a ‘present with a future’ 
is inextricable from the sense of existential stagnation underlying my informants’ 
desires to migrate. In his investigation of yearnings for ‘normal lives’ in a post-Yugoslav 
apartment complex in Sarajevo, Stef Jansen (2015) analyses the relation between 
‘normality’ and temporal horizons of ‘suspended modernity’ – his equivalent of the 
notion of ‘post-transitional’ time that I discussed in Chapter Three. As in the case of my 
informants, Jansen discovers that the disillusionment with modernist promises of 
collective political hope do not result in substantial re-organisation of people’s temporal 
sensibility. Instead, it is in the sustained longing for ‘normal lives’ – desired despite 
their impossibility – that Jansen discovers temporal preoccupations with trajectories of 
‘forward movement’ (2015).  
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Secondly, the most important aspects of ‘normality’ highlighted by my informants: 
security, predictability, social justice, and dignified labour stood in direct opposition to 
the unsatisfactory present which they found unable to forgo any longer. Thus, 
‘normality’ can be understood as a normative category which stands in contrast to 
current life predicaments. In this respect, ‘normality’ does not tell as much about actual 
realities in the UK (or in the West) as it presents a contrast to the currently experienced 
‘abnormality’ and frustration with the failed ‘transition’.  Previous studies focusing on 
explaining ‘normality’ in an east European context similarly position the notion in the 
intersection between the existent ‘is’ and desired ‘ought’, in which ‘normality’ emerges 
as a normative standard and future expectation.138  
While emphasising the unbridgeable gap between their current lives in Bulgaria and 
their hopes for a desired ‘normality’ projected in the West, the concreteness and detail 
with which my informants could imaginatively describe this state with all its pertaining 
dimensions, I claim, was indicative of an experience with a previously existing 
‘normality’. Thus, common evocations of ‘normality’ echoed traces of positively 
evaluated previously existing or idealised characteristics of socialist ‘normality’. Such 
associations were drawn mostly by older informants, who had been in their 
adolescence during socialism. Their knowledge of the ‘past’ came from recollections 
of lived experiences and memories of what life was like before. I, however, found that 
even young people, those in their mid-twenties and thirties, who had very limited if any 
experience of socialism, also made references to a past ‘normality’ on the basis of 
knowledge drawn from family stories and publicly circulating ‘facts’. Thus, although 
                                            
138 See Ditchev (2014), Greenberg (2011), Hartman (2007), Rabikowska (2010), Rausing (2002). 
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there was never any reference made to the socialist past as ‘normal’, the aspects of 
life in the West that my informants put forward as most desired were often associated 
with positively evaluated characteristics of life ‘before’. Similarly to Jansen’s 
perspective (2015), ‘normality’ is thus simultaneously embedded in backward-looking 
recollections of an already experienced or idealised socialist past and an aspiration for 
an imagined Western standard of normalness, both of which were constructed in 
contrast to present ‘abnormalities’. 
Finally, the imaginaries of ‘ordinary people’ depict ‘normality’ as consistent with a range 
of moral concerns that far exceed economic and materialistic aspects of life, but refer 
to fundamental normative questions of social organisation and the role and value of 
the individual in society. Such articulations stand in contrast to predominant 
interpretations of ‘normality’, which position it strictly in the realm of consumption of 
material signs and lifestyles seen as characteristic of western middle classes (see 
Fehervery 2002). I have recognised existing economic longings for an ‘ordinary’ well-
being, clearly surpassing an average Bulgarian standard of life, in my discussion of the 
high importance of social justice and affordability. However, such material expectations 
should not be interpreted as conforming to a narrowly economistic rationale but should 
be seen as pertaining to the wider existential concerns that the notion of ‘normality’ 
clearly outlined. Thus, imaginations of the West in terms of ‘normality’ that motivated 
‘ordinary people’s’ migrations advance an explanation that comes to contest the 
centrality of an economistic push-pull logic by foregrounding a desire for experiencing 




The West as ‘American Dream’  
My other group of informants, whom I have chosen to call ‘Bulgarian Westerners’, 
imagined life in the West to differ from their present lives in ways that are best captures 
by the term ‘American dream’. Although this term has accumulated a host of 
connotations and specificities and might appear a far-fetched interpretation at first 
sight, I will show how imaginaries of meritocracy, success and individual freedom 
outlined by my self-appointed ‘middle-class’ informants can be legitimately glossed as 
‘American dream’. 
Meritocracy 
Juliana was an eighteen-year-old rhythmic gymnastics student who had just graduated 
from the Sports High School in Plovdiv and was preparing her application for a 
prestigious London university where she hoped to study interior design. Despite having 
won several medals on national competitions and being recognised as a promising 
young talent by her trainers, she did not want to pursue a future in professional sports. 
She had lost her initial motivation for becoming an athlete as a result of the lack of 
respect, insufficient state support and widespread favouritism that marked Bulgarian 
gymnastics. She told me that she had grown tired of receiving just a ‘pat on the 
shoulder’ after each medal won and wanted her whole-hearted commitment to be 
rewarded in more tangible ways. 
In the pursuit of her sports career Juliana had taken part in international competitions, 
sport camps and trainings all over Europe. She had also travelled abroad for family 
holidays with her parents – her father was an esteemed medical doctor and her mother 
a construction engineer; had stayed with friends in London for extended periods of time 
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and participated in homestay language exchange programmes in the British 
countryside. She held dear these glimpses of western life and regarded them as eye-
opening and formative of her desire to settle her life abroad. The main reason why she 
wanted to study in the UK, she told me, was because there, the efforts of talented and 
hard-working people like herself were appreciated, both in material and moral terms. 
She believed that she had high chances of achieving professional realisation in her 
field of choice and that this would in turn enable her to spend her life as ‘it should be’. 
Throughout our first meeting she drew constant comparisons between her own life and 
that of her professional peers in the West in an effort to demonstrate the advantages 
of western life and the possibilities it provided for a better future:  
As far as I can tell, there, they are able to evaluate the abilities and talents of 
every single person and they do all they can to provide you with the opportunity 
to make your dreams come true. It is not just that the investment in sports there 
is incomparably higher. The respect with which athletes are treated is 
impressive. They receive constant encouragement to go for the top and they 
know that their hard work will bring results. 
Albeit determined to continue her sports career in the UK as a part-time children’s 
coach, Juliana considered a career in interior design a more sensible and pragmatic 
choice that still offered enough space for creativity and feminine glamour. She had 
taken the decision of making this her new profession just few months earlier when she 
started watching Your home in their hands – a BBC TV show presented by Celia 
Sawyer, a glossy business woman and renown interior designer. What made this 
reality show so fascinating to Juliana was the fact that aspiring designers from all over 
the country and beyond were given the opportunity to prove their skills by re-decorating 
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people’s homes. Those who managed the task well and got the admiration of the 
homeowners landed themselves a job in Sawyer’s design company. Juliana 
considered the programme and its self-made millionaire host a perfect proof for a 
working meritocratic system which granted equal opportunity for development to 
everyone according to their skills, talents and abilities and regardless of their sex, age 
and ethnic belonging. In this respect, Juliana maintained that: 
In the West, you are judged by your abilities and determination. No one cares 
about where you come from, the colour of your skin, your gender or who your 
parents are. Connections don’t count there, only what you yourself can offer in 
terms of capabilities and knowledge. There, you are given the chance to grow 
and how far you will go depends only on your efforts and ambition.  
The highly praised western meritocracy that my informants expected to take advantage 
of in the UK was seen as a legitimate and socially just principle. This interpretation is 
a good basis for discerning between the two different ‘moral economies’ (Thompson 
1971) that ‘ordinary people’ and ‘Bulgarian Westerners’ shared with regards to visions 
of just social order. As already pointed out, in the moral framework of ‘ordinary people’, 
only a system based on egalitarian principles of social distribution which ensured a 
decent existence for all members of society according to the value ascribed to their 
labour could be defined as just. In contrast, the interpretations of meritocracy put 
forward by Juliana revealed a vision of a system that rewarded an elitist stratum of 
highly-deserving members of society – those who had intellectual capabilities and 
educational capital to offer and had successfully cultivated a specific range of value 
orientations. The fact that such distribution of merit perpetuated the advantage enjoyed 
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by a particular social group at the expense of the marginalisation of those unable to 
mobilise sufficient degrees of cultural capital was not judged as unjust. 
In fact, some of my informants even expressed disapproval of non-merit-based 
institutional mechanisms and policies as breeding mediocrity and creating learned 
helplessness. Such concerns were related to practices of university admission and 
redistribution of social welfare, observed not only in Bulgaria but ‘even’ in western 
Europe. For example, Juliana disapproved of the modest fees and the lower entry 
requirements characteristic of German higher education as they allowed the ‘mass’ 
admission of people from different social backgrounds. She considered this to 
derogate the prestige and quality of German education and undervalue the 
achievements of more intellectually developed students. British higher education, on 
the other hand, with its high tuition fees and competitive selection, filtered the high 
achievers and those truly committed to succeed in their lives, as she claimed. 
Education was considered the main ‘tool’ for upwards social mobility in the meritocratic 
playing field of the West. The strictly instrumental value that educational qualifications 
held for the recent graduates I spoke to was mirrored by their readiness to pursue any 
degree just so they were able to obtain a ‘document from abroad’. Juliana, for example, 
admitted she would not hesitate to start her studies in ‘any university’ and in ‘whatever 
degree possible’ just so she could live in the West. 
Studies on highly educated Polish migrants have yielded similar findings: Rodriguez’s 
(2010) research on aspiring ‘middle-class’ Polish mothers exhibits their visions of the 
UK as a ‘meritocratic paradise’ – a society ensuring equal opportunity for everyone 
despite their ethnic and national origin, which unlike Poland provides multiple 
opportunities for achieving a desired social status. The main emphasis is placed on 
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the high value of education – by investing in theirs and their children’s qualifications, 
Polish mothers expected to be able to take advantage of meritocratic chances for 
economic success and upward social mobility (Rodriguez 2010).  
The recognition that they needed to work twice as hard as the locals in order to break 
away from the stigma cast upon ‘typical’ Bulgarian migrants and demonstrate that, 
unlike those, they were culturally competent and led by a desire of self-realisation did 
not inhibit the moral endorsement my informants granted to equal opportunities. This 
is how Juliana tried to demonstrate her ‘realistic’ evaluation of the life that expected 
her as a foreigner in the UK: 
I am far from the utopia that you enter the country and someone spreads a red 
carpet in front of you and tells you: “you are a foreigner but you have education 
so here is a job for you, here is some cash”. I am well aware that there, I need 
to prove myself as deserving of all of this. After all, they don’t know me; for them 
I am a stranger. When they hear “Bulgarian” they think [I am] low-skilled and 
uneducated.  
As I have already indicated above (both in Chapter Two and Chapter Three), ‘Bulgarian 
Westerners’ have internalised the postulates of the neoliberal discourse on self-
actualisation and autonomy and believed to have invested significant efforts into 
cultivating the traits that were said to ensure personal fulfilment and professional 
realisation in a market society. Their frustration with the fact that they had not managed 
to become the new ‘heroes of free market ideology’ (Walkowitz 1995: 165) were 
compounded by the fact that they also had to struggle with diminishing living standards 
and restricted paths to social and economic success. Their conviction that Bulgaria 
would never be able to implement ‘properly’ functioning meritocratic principles had 
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made them not only unable but often unwilling to pursue existing possibilities. 
Naturally, it was in the West and the UK in particular, where my informants hoped to 
have their neoliberal ‘enterprising’ subjecthoods rewarded with plentiful opportunities 
for achieving meritocratic privilege.  
Success 
Gaining success was important part of the ‘imaginary West’ even for those of my 
informants who had already achieved certain degree of professional realisation in 
Bulgaria. This was the case with thirty-year-old Steve, who worked as a journalist in 
one of the two largest private national media companies in Bulgaria. I was interested 
in meeting him after I learned that he was part of the team behind a short documentary 
about ‘successful’ Bulgarian yuppies in the City of London. The movie presented the 
story of two friends in their thirties, who, after graduating from a prestigious private 
college in Sofia, got admitted to two Russell group universities in London and, 
subsequently, found jobs as business analysts in top British companies. The 
documentary stirred much talk among my ‘middle-class’ informants who took it as a 
demonstration of the feasibility of hard-earned success for the talented and ambitious.  
Similar reports, focusing on success stories of Bulgarians who had ‘made it in the West’ 
were part of local media’s undying interest towards the so-called Bulgarian ‘brain drain’ 
(see Ghodsee 2002). While popular and political discourses continued to lament the 
exodus of highly qualified young people – the ‘best and brightest’ representatives of 
the nation – representations like the above documentary had the opposite effect of 
enticing the hopes of young people by constructing an often exaggerated and 
unrealistic image of success. I was keen to know more about what Steve, as an insider, 
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had to say about this apparent paradox. In the beginning, he told me how proud he 
was with the documentary and wanted me to understand why sustaining a positive 
image of the West in the public discourse was so important for the development of 
Bulgaria:  
For a country like Bulgaria, which is bogged down in the swamp, every other 
country is a good example. It is understandable that in such a negative context 
each media focuses its attention on something positive. I would never report the 
UK in a negative light and tell people not to come here because this is not a nice 
country, and I won’t tell them that all is perfect there either. It is only logical that 
independent and objective Bulgarian journalism presents other countries as 
well-developing and offering a better lifestyle because this is what Bulgarians 
miss. This should be the normal reaction of each Bulgarian institution. This is 
how we import a good example. This image is a bit tricky but it is important for 
it to be such.  
Steve’s documentary was directed towards those young and well-educated Bulgarians 
who like the men depicted in his movie went abroad in order to ‘develop themselves’, 
‘learn something new’ and be the ones to one day ‘drag the country out of the swamp’. 
Based on what he said, it looked as if for them the West was really a place where 
‘dreams come true’, unlike for those ‘typical’ Bulgarians who believed they could make 
‘easy’ money without having anything to offer in return. 
In fact, during his recent stay in London, Steve himself had fallen for the promise of 
meritocratic success. At the time of our first meeting he was preparing his departure to 
the UK where he planned to pursue a career in movie-making. Despite considering 
himself rather successful for Bulgarian standards he felt as if he had ‘hit the ceiling’ 
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with nothing further left to strive for. ‘True success’ for Steve was only possible in the 
West and this was how he defined it: 
Success is a complex thing, it does not only mean a job that earns enough 
money, it also requires one to feel satisfied with what one is doing. Bulgarians 
are ready to sell their kidneys just so they have money but they don’t understand 
that this alone cannot make them happy. There are numerous examples of 
extremely rich and unhappy individuals. Many people in the West quit their jobs 
just because they feel out of place, they are not happy with themselves. I think 
I am in a similar situation myself at the moment.  
For Steve, as for many of my aspiring middle-class informants, success stood for a 
sense of advancement and self-improvement through the pursuit of ever more exciting 
professional challenges. ‘Bulgarian Westerners’ were careful not to equate success 
solely to the fulfilment of economic ambitions, but instead tried to underline the 
existence of a deeper and multidimensional personality, which possessed not only 
material but also spiritual and affective needs.  
The UK, according to my informants, would provide each of them with the possibility to 
– in Adam’s words – ‘grow to fullest development as man and woman’ and ‘attain to 
the fullest stature of which they are innately capable’ (2012: ix). Steve’s encounter with 
the two Bulgarian yuppies made him realise that unlike himself they were able to enjoy 
‘real’ success: they felt as if the ‘sky was the limit’, they were constantly challenged by 
multiple opportunities for growth, and they seemed happy and satisfied with their lives. 
In contrast, despite his spectacular career advancement in the past few years, Steve 
felt that he had achieved all that was possible for Bulgarian standards and was 
currently ‘stuck at the top’ – a situation which evoked more frustration that satisfaction. 
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Ignoring the fact that both of these young men came from highly privileged family 
backgrounds, he praised their success as ‘genuine’; firstly, because it was achieved in 
the West and thus of higher value, and secondly because it represented the perfect 
example of a self-made social advancement, one obtained through ambition and self-
determination.  
There was an interesting twist to his story which he only shared at our second meeting 
and which granted his vision of success an unexpected magical aura. Back in London 
the film crew for the documentary, together with the two protagonists, went for a pint 
in a pub close to the City. A middle-aged man pushed himself in front of Steve in the 
queue to the bar and a ‘bit like a typical Balkaner’ (tipichen Balkanets) Steve – told him 
off. It turned out that the queue-jumper was Michael Kennedy – one of the directors of 
the Harry Potter sequel. Over the course of the evening it became clear that Kennedy 
was teaching filmmaking at Kingston University and, upon learning that Steve was 
keen on becoming a movie director, he invited him for a chat at his office on the next 
day. Steve immediately became fascinated with Kennedy’s movie directing philosophy 
and professional passion and decided to apply for a place in his MA programme. His 
friends and colleagues were stunned by his readiness to quit his position at the TV 
channel and invest all his savings into pursuing further education in the UK. According 
to him, they failed to recognise the significance of this ‘accidental’ encounter, which for 
him was a ‘sign’ of a forthcoming success that was not to be ignored.  
Commonly evoked references to Hollywood movies and other largely mediated 
products of American popular culture in the narratives of my informants, as well as 
numerous miraculous success stories circulating in public discourse, demonstrate a 
ubiquitous belief that ‘in the West dreams really come true’, sometimes in an almost 
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mystical way.  This observation is confirmed by Jim Cullen’s (2003) conclusion that 
what made the ‘American dream’ ever more compelling and at the same time 
dangerously misleading has been its intensive exploitation in the Hollywood movie 
industry. Having strayed away from its relation to virtue and morality, the ‘American 
dream’, he claims, started carrying the idea that the realisation of personal fulfillment 
was to come about without visible and conscious efforts (Cullen 2003).  
Mentionings of success were largely absent in ‘ordinary people’s’ imaginations of the 
West. As already discussed, they expressed strong scepticism towards promises for 
substantial enrichment and instead demonstrated ambitions for a ‘modest’ materiality 
and lifestyle. ‘Bulgarian Westerners’, on the other hand were much more inclined to 
see success, in the form of professional realisation and economic independence, as a 
realistic future outcome. It appears that these anticipations have been taken for 
granted because of this group’s perceptions of middle-class superiority and sense of 
entitlement. 
Freedom from social norms, freedom of self-expression 
The individualism that my informants expected to practice in the West was related not 
only to the autonomy and empowerment they hoped to experience as ‘enterprising 
selves’ but also to freedom of individual expression and creativity. Thus, for ‘Bulgarian 
Westerners’, migration was a quest for achieving individual success through self-
reliance as well as a possibility of liberation from restricting societal expectations 
related to gender roles, behavioural models, and value orientations. My informants 
often shared with me how burdening they found challenging traditional gender 
expectation in reference to appearances, marriage, and household roles. Thirty-one-
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year-old Tanya, an English language student and office assistant in a building 
company, complained of the societal pressure she faced for not being married. The 
fact that she did not have a long-term boyfriend to introduce to family and friends was 
raising disapproving comments in the middle-sized town where she lived. She was 
annoyed by the fact that most Bulgarians, especially those in smaller localities, felt 
compelled to ‘stick their noses’ in other people’s private business. She felt that in a 
society still greatly dominated by patriarchal values it was women who were mostly 
affected by this form of intrusive moral policing:  
In Bulgaria feminism is a dirty word. I am not even sure most people understand 
what this is all about; at least I haven’t met many who see as problematic the 
way in which Bulgarian women are still treated. All my married girlfriends, for 
example, have resigned themselves to the role of perfect housewives and 
mothers, in many cases combining this with paid employment. The most horrible 
thing is that not only their husbands require such total subjugation but that the 
women themselves are not even able to realise and question the repercussions 
of such a twisted model for their emotional, physical, and mental health.  
One common occurrence that in her eyes confirmed this problematic was the case of 
everyday sexual harassment. On one occasion, the two of us were taking an early 
evening stroll along the main town street when we got catcalled by a group of young 
men drinking beer outside a pub. After giving them a reprimanded look Tanya told me 
this was exactly what she meant when she talked about the constant mistreatment 
faced by women. She believed this type of behaviour was characteristic of the Balkan 
region; an expression of people’s savage emotionality and objectifying ideas of 
women’s value. This was one of the reasons why Tanya found Bulgarian guys to be 
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unfit marriage partners and believed she could only be happy with a westerner who 
would respect and appreciate her for her personal qualities and individuality. This belief 
was partly based on her two months’ student exchange stay in Wolverhampton in 2012 
and the encounters, conversation and impressions gathered in the course of it. Tanya 
told me how there she found herself immersed in a ‘completely different world’ where 
people were understanding, tolerant and respectful of others’ choices, ideas and 
sentiments up to the point of appearing cold and ‘too preoccupied with their own 
selves’. This seeming indifference, however, she thought was a result of the value they 
ascribed to individual freedom, expression, and self-determination.  
Some of my male informants put forward similar concerns about existing gender norms 
and expectations constraining their individuality. Those who refused to conform to 
traditional ideas of masculinity associated with alpha male behavior, aggressive 
demeanour and physical strength were often an object of ridicule by peers. Nikolay 
complained how his care for the patients and his polite attitude was often interpreted 
by his colleagues as lack of masculinity: ‘In Bulgaria there is one accepted model of 
behavior; if you are kind and non-conflictual you are being called a faggot’.  
Imaginaries of the UK as a place offering more freedom and opportunities for self-
expression were on some occasions based on selective and geographically specific 
perception. Almost all ‘Bulgarian Westerners’, even those who had never travelled to 
the UK or who like Tanya had only visited for a couple of days or weeks, were 
convinced that London, more than any other place offered the diverse and open-
minded environment that they considered most conducive for the realisation of their 
future plans. The different portrayals of London as ‘beautiful’, ‘vibrant’, ‘dynamic’, and 
‘colourful’ gave it the magical aura of a ‘promised land’ that was otherwise only to be 
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found in the movies. Gloria, for example, had already visited London twice and 
compared the excitement she felt when there with the feeling of ‘being a small child 
eating big pink candy floss on a fun fair’. Most of the people I spoke to were able to 
imagine themselves as merging successfully with the ‘big and noisy current’ of city life 
and expected to enjoy the lifestyles of real Londoners – taking full advantage of 
everything the city had to offer. It should be said that London was not idealised solely 
by my ‘middle-class’ informants, ‘ordinary people’ considered it an epitome of Western 
splendor. Other reasons why they found it so attractive were the fact that it was home 
to the biggest Bulgarian diaspora in the UK (which meant that they could manage with 
little English and have an easier time finding accommodation and employment), and 
one of the biggest in Europe, and the city offering the most well-paid job opportunities. 
Those who departed on pre-arranged jobs in villages, small towns and bigger cities 
projected such locations as provincial – dull, economically stagnated or a ‘rural idyll’ 
that lacked the buzz, glamour and abundance that London could offer. Their ultimate 
goal was to eventually save enough and re-settle in the capital.139 
American dreaming 
‘Bulgarian Westerners’’ imaginations of life in the West were to a great extent built on 
firsthand information gathered on short-term tourist, business and education-related 
visits to western Europe, as well as personal interaction with west Europeans in 
Bulgaria and abroad. In addition, many of those I talked to were involved in day-to-day 
                                            
139 The same held true for the prospective students in my sample. For example, I was once present at 
a conversation where one of my informants - Kate (fifteen) who was about to start her studies in the very 
prestigious Loretto Boarding School in Edinburgh felt intimidated by her friends’ comments that she was 




online exchange of imagery and communication with friends and relatives living in a 
western country. The image of the West that they put forward was also created out of 
diverse material from movies, TV series, reality TV programmes, music videos and 
other products of western popular culture.  
Their conscious intention to arrange their everyday in a way which required minimum 
contact with the surrounding Bulgarian reality meant that they had virtually immersed 
themselves in the West while still living in Bulgaria – a choice stemming out of their 
inability to ‘fit in’. A similar state of being has been described by Maria Stoilkova (2005) 
in relation to the reasons behind the large-scale migration of Bulgarian ‘intelligentsia’ 
in the early 1990s. Feeling morally and culturally alienated from the new social order 
and demonstrating high admiration for perceived Western cultural and moral values, 
her informants came to experience themselves as ‘exiles within’.   
It was on the basis of this constant exposure to and engagement with western culture, 
as well as the embracing of pertinent norms and modes of personhood, that ‘Bulgarian 
Westerners’ constructed a sense of familiarity and proximity to the West. The 
confidence with which they narrated their expectations often served to emphasise their 
awareness of the ‘true’ nature of the western world which they juxtaposed to the 
naiveté of ‘ordinary people’s’ associations of the West with a place where ‘money 
grows on trees’. Indeed, ‘ordinary people’s’ imaginations did not provide the same 
amount of detail and to a great extent presented an impression of a ‘distant’ and 
‘remote’ albeit still highly desirable place. This is not to say, however, that the above-
discussed mental images of meritocracy, success, and individual freedom, outlined a 
more realistic version of western life. On the contrary, they came very close to popular 
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mythological evocations of the so-called ‘American dream’140. I draw attention to the 
main themes within the literature on the ‘American dream’ which are worth revisiting 
when thinking about would-be migrants’ imaginations of life in the UK.  
First popularised in the novels of Horatio Alger in the late nineteenth century, the 
‘American dream’ imaginary served the purpose of encouraging those most destitute 
and impoverished members of American society into believing that success, fortune, 
and wealth were available to everyone ready to invest ‘energy, ambition and honest 
purpose’ (Alger 1868: 7-8 cited in Weiss 1988: 54). Jennifer Hochschild (1996) is one 
of those who warned against the mythical seductive attraction that the ‘American 
dream’ has assumed with time. She saw this as resulting from its ability to speak to 
anyone – the notion has become so porous and stretchable that it could easily 
accommodate different individual or group longings and still retain its unifying meaning 
(Hochschild 1996). The interpretation of the ‘American dream’ that my informants 
evoked in their imaginations of the West resonated closely to the capitalist promise of 
material fulfilment, freedom and opportunity for upward mobility that was allegedly in 
stock for everyone willing to put in enough ambition and work, in disregard of their 
origins, gender, race, age and so on. The obvious inequalities in the distribution of this 
‘universal’ fulfilment, its transitory nature and the fact that the successful ones in 
society will always be a minority have not diminished the fervour with which individuals 
from around the world continue to sustain this powerful utopia (Schielke 2015).  
The so-called ‘American Dream’ has by now become part of popular parlance, it has 
been used as a colloquial expression that does not require a precise definition as its 
                                            
140 The notion of the ‘American dream’ is not emic but I use it as a tool that helps me distinguish between 
the two different versions of the West presented by my two categories of informants.  
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widely-shared meaning appears self-explanatory. There have been scholarly attempts, 
however, to define and systematise the different historical uses and meanings that the 
notion has assumed not only for Americans but for all of those wishing to take a stake 
in the ‘American Dream’. Firstly, according to the inclusive rhetoric of the ‘American 
dream’, everyone has the chance of leaving the past behind and designing one’s life 
anew. The idea that on the meritocratic marketplace individuals are rewarded 
‘according to their talents and accomplishments rather than their needs, efforts, or 
simple existence’ (Hochschild 1996: 21) was one of the main encouragements behind 
‘Bulgarian Westerners’’ migrations. The betrayed ambitions of these ‘Western-
oriented’ and educated Bulgarians had led them to the conclusion that the market 
economy established throughout the ‘transitional years’ was a local product marred by 
the inherited deficiencies of Oriental backwardness and Socialist rigidity. The 
realisation that this corrupt social model, which decisively lacked meritocratic virtues, 
would never be able to offer opportunities for individual, intellectual and economic 
progress to the presumably most deserving part of Bulgarian society was why my 
informants nurtured the idea of a meritocratic western paradise.  
A second main tenet constituting the ideology of the ‘American dream’ that was 
assigned great significance in the narratives of those I spoke to was related to the idea 
of success (Hochschild 1996). It was the ‘reasonable anticipation’ that if you ‘go for it’ 
you might as well ‘get it’ that encouraged individual visions of successful trajectories in 
the UK. This was set in contrast to the success on offer in Bulgarian society, one seen 
as dependant on speculation, nepotism and often demonstration of physical violence. 
This understanding echoes Hochschild’s (1996) claim that a well-embedded belief 
contained in the ‘American dream’ postulated that ‘true’ success was based on honesty 
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and hard labour, an expectation that implied differentiation between the ‘worthy’ and 
the ‘unworthy rich’ or the ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ poor. Gaining success in the 
West was assigned higher worth by my informants firstly because it implied self-
reliance and determination and secondly because it comprised not only economic 
wellbeing but a sense of inner fulfilment and satisfaction. This confirms Clark’s 
observation that the quest for personal advancement had attracted to American shores 
‘middle-class’ migrants who held ‘noble’ hopes of realising spiritual and not solely 
material aspirations (2003). I argue that visions of success which side-lined ideas of 
economic affluence do not suggest that such concerns were missing from the 
imaginations of ‘Bulgarian Westerners’ but that they were strategically silenced in an 
effort of self-distancing from the ‘petty dreams’ of ‘ordinary people’ (see previous 
chapter). 
Finally, the general desire of freedom, which Cullen considers the ‘bedrock premise 
upon which all else depends’ (2003:10) figured prominently in my informants’ 
imaginations. This referred to their ability to exercise control over their lives and to re-
assert their preferences in negotiations of gender identities and opportunities, as well 
as in practicing desired modes of personhood.  
Thus, the aspiring middle-class respondents that I met on the eve of their west-bound 
journeys shared a more or less homogenous positive vision of the West which, 
although cast in a different geographic location (the UK), represented a search for the 
ideal embodied in the so-called ‘American dream’. Their imaginaries are to be 
understood against the backdrop of stagnation and despair characteristic of their 
Bulgarian realities and the lack of worthwhile possibilities for personal and professional 
development. The UK was where my ‘middle-class’ informants expected to find 
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liberation from the omnipresent ‘Balkan mentality’ that allegedly hampered their life 
courses. Migration for them was a long-awaited ‘going back home’, where they 
believed they naturally belonged and where their transformed subjecthoods could fully 
flourish. 
 
Global hierarchy of places and migration as international existential 
advancement  
When talking about their migration plans and aspirations, and particularly when 
explaining their choice of destination, would-be migrants drew constant comparisons 
between Bulgaria and the UK. The value attributed to each of the two countries as 
suitable for migration was a function of its geographical proximity to western Europe 
and the possibilities it offered for fulfilling migrants’ desires. Prospective migrants were 
able to assign each country a particular position in an imagined international hierarchy 
of places. The UK was proclaimed as the ‘best country of all’ and the one to offer the 
kind of life that came closest to the way life ‘should be’, and was thus positioned at the 
top of this global hierarchy. The most important reason for this was its historical 
significance as an industrial revolution centre, global colonial power, and a cradle of 
progress and economic prosperity.  
This fact is not to be taken as an evidence of an ever-present special significance held 
by the UK in collective Bulgarian imaginary.141 In many cases, the UK was constructed 
as ‘core West’ or ‘true West’ only after the choice of destination was already made – 
                                            
141 In Chapter One and in my historical account in this chapter I discuss the unpopularity of the UK, the 
suspicion and negativity that the country provoked in Bulgarians in the distant and more recent past.  
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this one was most often underlined by a combination of different pragmatic 
considerations like familiarity with the English language, the high exchange rate of the 
British pound (as of 2013-2015) and already existent social networks. Informants were 
often keen to persuade me of the Western qualities of the country as a way of easing 
their own apprehensions of starting a life in a place that had an aura of remoteness 
and coldness.  
In this mental hierarchy of places there were countries which were said to be ‘below’ 
Bulgaria, as Bulgaria was at least in Europe and not part of the Third World. Still, the 
country was seen as inferior to all other EU states because of its status as ‘the poorest 
of all’ and its relative underdevelopment. Thus, Bulgaria and the UK, different in all 
possible regards, were believed to occupy the two opposing poles of the 
developmental civilisational axis between East and West.  
The structure of the mental world map presented by my informants denoted a stratified 
order in which people and places appeared as ‘situated along a continuum between a 
premodern tradition on one hand and Eurocentrically conceived modernity on the 
other’ (Ferguson 2006: 30). Such visions reflect a linear modernist worldview in which 
global inequalities are naturalised as resulting from the fact that some nations are 
further than others on the path towards a universally recognised western telos of 
modernity (ibid, Baysha 2014).  
From the perspective of such an ‘awareness from below’, migration can be interpreted 
as undertaken out of desire for achieving an international advancement from a place 
of low to a place of high status in the global hierarchy. Being physically and socially 
present in the UK, a country of the highest possible standing, was a way of escaping 
the existential immobility and stuckedness characterising life in Bulgaria. In this sense, 
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my informants were not simply migrating from a ‘poor’ to a ‘wealthy’ place but from a 
place offering restricted possibilities for meaningful existence to one promising ample 
scope for existential becoming. I have already explained how prevalent feelings of 
existential standstill shared by all would-be migrants were conditioned by a ‘post-
transitional’ collective entrapment outside of modernist progressive template. For those 
I spoke to migration had become an individualised strategy for overcoming globally-
structured inferiority and in fact the only possible way for claiming a stake in the project 
of European capitalism. As already discussed, in the eyes of my informants Bulgaria’s 
EU membership did little to attenuate concerns with ‘lagging behind’ and 
developmental disadvantage that had long produced feelings of inferiority and 
incompleteness. This resonates with Ferguson’s observation that formal inclusion in a 
First World order, which fails to bring about promised economic development, 
prosperity and welfare, leads to the re-assertion of demands about ‘connection, a 
relationship and aspirational equality’ (2006: 22). Thus, would-be migrants understood 
physical mobility to the UK as a ‘claim of worldly connection and membership’ 
(Ferguson 2006: 22) in a western modernity, the benefits of which were never 
experienced in Bulgaria. Migration towards the ‘centre’ of development and possibility 
was a chance for experiencing a ‘truly Western’ life that was believed to (re-) establish 
a feeling of meaningful movement forward. 
The analysis of would-be migrants’ imaginations about their destination and the so-
outlined imagined international order appear to reflect an understanding of the West 
as a telos of individual and collective longing that could only be achieved through 
physical mobility. As the narratives in this chapter demonstrated the painful realisation 
that Bulgaria would never become a ‘truly’ Western country did not put an end to 
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teleological reasoning. In the narratives of my informants, the West formed a telos in a 
relation to which individual migration strategies and future vistas were conceived. De 
Vries (2007) contends that the gap between developmental promises and their actual 
realisation structures individuals’ capacity to desire with even greater zeal a 
mythological Western modernity. As ‘desiring subjects’, my informants, similar to the 
Third World people de Vries focuses on, appeared as eager to do whatever it took in 
order to enter a utopian world of ‘real’ Western modernity. Their migration motivations 
were underpinned by persistent teleological drive to attain the Western future that had 
been promised to them but had never materialised.142  
 
Conclusion 
My engagement with prospective migrants’ expectations of life following migration has 
demonstrated the great significance that imaginaries held in informing individual 
motivations behind migration. This underlines the argument that an analysis of the 
important connection between imaginaries and migration allows us to better grasp the 
complexity of contemporary international movements which goes far beyond the 
simple economistic logic put forward in most migration research. In contrast to much 
of the existing literature on the link between imagination and migration (see Appadurai 
1996), I have conceived of individual imagination as conditioned by ‘historically-laden 
and socioculturally constructed imaginaries’ (Salazar 2011: 576). This 
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demonstrating how migrants clung on to it and deferred its realisation to the future to come, in the face 




interdependence between subjective imaginations and more widely circulating 
imaginaries is grasped through the concept of the ‘imaginary West’. I have 
demonstrated the cultural and historical process through which the West came to 
symbolise the supremacy of western-centric modernity and its developmental promise 
in Bulgarian collective consciousness. The two different visions of the West – as 
‘normality’ and ‘American dream’ – have highlighted how imaginaries are not merely 
enforced upon individuals but are appropriated and made meaningful in ways reflecting 
their own class-based experiences and identities (see Benson 2012). 
Furthermore, I have shown that, despite of the different kinds and amounts of capital 
at their disposal and their differing migration motivations, there has been a more 
fundamental reason underlying my informants’ desire to migrate. ‘Ordinary people’ and 
‘Bulgarian Westerners’ alike saw migration as one, if not the only way of attaining a 
much longed-for sense of existential advancement and escape from the entrenched 
individual and collective ‘stuckedness’ they experienced in Bulgaria. This finding sheds 
critical light on currently dominant analyses of Bulgarian and east European migrations 
which differentiate between unskilled people’s ‘economic’ migrations and highly-skilled 
professionals’ ‘transnational mobility’ (cf. Chavdarova 2006, Ditchev 2008, Liakova 
2008). In this sense, for all Bulgarians I met, migration was a means to empower and 
elevate themselves from an inferior and peripheral ‘second-class’ belonging to a full 
participation in First Order western capitalism. In the next chapter, I follow my 
informants on their migration journeys to the UK and demonstrate how the realities 




Realities of Migrant Life  
It was on a chilly January morning in 2014 when Mitko (twenty seven) first set foot in 
the UK. Arriving on his own and without any pre-arrangements, he started calling 
Bulgarian landlords who advertised on an online forum for Bulgarians living in London. 
All but one of them refused to do viewings after learning that he was a newcomer with 
little savings and no secured employment. Dragging his heavy red suitcase through 
the crowds of early morning commuters, Mitko made his way to the nearest 
underground station. It all looked strange to him, it was much bigger and busier than 
he expected it to be, but he was filled with excitement. Two hours later he found himself 
in front of a shabby-looking house in west London. A young Bulgarian opened the door 
and right upon entering Mitko was hit by a smell of marihuana and alcohol. Passing a 
dirty-looking kitchen, he saw a man sleeping under a table. The room next door, a 
storage for old furniture and carton boxes, was the one on offer. Disappointed, he made 
his way back to Victoria station where the online search resumed. The next 
accommodation on his list was located in the eastern part of the city. Upon exiting the 
underground in East Ham, Mitko had the feeling of having entered a different continent: 
a thick and intense odour engulfed him, wherever he looked there were men with dark 
beards and veiled women, everyone was speaking Arabic, and he had the feeling they 
were all giving him bad looks. The next house he viewed had six bedrooms which 
seemed to accommodate at least twenty adults and children – in each room there were 
three to five people ‘lined up like sardines’, as he later explained to me. The living 
conditions were slum-like: dirty mattresses on the floors, broken furniture, and mould 
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stains on the walls. Not willing to rent, Mitko asked if he could stay overnight – it was 
getting dark and he had nowhere to go. The landlord asked for a 150 GBP security 
deposit and another 50 GBP for the night, he claimed the price was fair but Mitko did 
not trust him. Eventually, he managed to find a hotel room for much less. Later that 
night he was woken up by gunshots and sirens – ‘just like in a gangster movie’. 
Terrified, he barricaded himself in the room and did not manage to get any rest until 
the morning. 
On the following day, after an exhausting four-hour walk Mitko reached the place that 
became his home for the next few weeks – another ‘Bulgarian’ house in north London. 
Next on his list was finding a full-time job that would allow him to cover his rent and 
repay his debts to family and friends. All the staffing agencies he approached turned 
him down because he had no National Insurance Number (NINo). Not quite certain 
how to obtain such documentation and in desperate need of quick cash, Mitko spent 
the next two weeks giving away CVs to bars, hotels, and restaurants in the centre of 
London. All job interviews were called off once the prospective employers realised he 
did not speak much English and had no documents. 
Just three weeks after he first came to London, Mitko made his way back to Victoria 
station. With the help of relatives back home, he had managed to scramble together 
enough money for a bus ticket back to Bulgaria. He was reluctant to qualify his first 
migrant experience as a failure. He admitted to having underestimated the high cost 
of living in the UK and the importance of legal documentation for starting employment, 
but did not feel disappointment with the opportunities that the city had to offer. The 
impressions he gathered throughout his eventful stay not only came close to but far 
surpassed the UK of his dreams. His eyes sparkled with excitement when he was 
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telling me how on his unfortunate first day in east London he managed to take a 
glimpse of West Ham United football stadium and walked the famous Green street that 
gave the name of his most favourite movie – ‘Green street hooligans’. On another 
occasion, he passed by the famous Michelin-starred restaurant owned by his idol 
Gordon Ramsey in Chelsea. ‘The first day was rough’, he concluded, but in the 
following days it was like the London of his dreams came to life:  
It was exactly as I imagined it: big, dark, rainy and the underground, oh the 
underground [...] the first days I spent hours there, trying to find my way. Don’t 
get me wrong, I am not complaining. I love this country, I love the football, I love 
their cinema. In all honesty, I think I have a good chance of achieving my dreams 
here. 
Before embarking on his bus Mitko reassured me that he would be back in no time; as 
soon as he managed to save up a couple of hundred pounds.  
*** 
This chapter focuses on the experiences of my informants in the UK. Almost 
immediately after making their way to Britain many, just like Mitko, encountered a 
reality that presented them with obstacles they were unprepared to navigate. A wide 
range of institutionalised and informal exclusionary mechanisms (Standing 2011) 
worked against their incorporation into British society and diverted them from their 
plans for achieving a ‘normal’ life or ‘American dream’ kind of success. Guy Standing 
claims that migrants are denizens assuming the status of a ‘resident alien’ – granted 
certain rights while denied others (2011: 93). Even if people have ‘de jure rights’ 
allowing them to reside and work in a particular destination, they may face difficulty 
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integrating because they are often ‘excluded from [making use of] them de facto’ 
(Standing 2011: 95). These ‘outsider-inhabitants’ as Standing calls them, are more 
likely to fall into precarious forms of (self-)employment, debt, and homelessness (2011: 
95). The aftermath of the 2008 global economic crisis has further increased migrants’ 
vulnerability and the intensity with which they are turned into ‘low-cost malleable 
labour’ (Standing 2011: 103).  
This chapter aims to reveal how structural limitations such as inability to obtain 
documentation, unrecognised educational and professional qualifications, limited 
knowledge of the English language, legal rights, and entitlements, are experienced by 
migrants themselves. By exposing the effects of little-researched bureaucratic 
mechanisms, I outline the process through which Bulgarian migrants, who theoretically 
enjoy the status of EU ‘free-movers’, are turned into a precarious super-mobile labour 
force. The stories in this chapter follow the post-migration realities of life of my 
informants and their growing disappointment with their failed hopes for betterment and 
fulfilment.  
In an effort to provide a detailed and longitudinal engagement with migrants’ 
experiences in the UK, I have divided this chapter into two different parts. The first one 
focuses on the early settlement, which would-be migrants envisioned as a ‘transitional 
period’ of migration. This initial adaptation was believed to take up to six months; a 
period which my informants saw as necessary for setting their new lives on track and 
starting to work towards the realisation of their ‘normality’ and ‘American dream’ visions 
of the West. The second part follows each group of informants – ‘ordinary people’ and 
‘Bulgarian Westerners’ in their mid-run experiences, which they expected to last up till 
the end of the first year. Many believed that by this time they would start reaping the 
201 
 
fruits of their hard labour and determination. As I will show, however, the experiences 
of ‘ordinary people’ and ‘Bulgarian Westerners’ alike continued to defy their pre-
migration visions of the West. I also discuss the increased class-based hostility and 
antagonism between the two groups, which resulted from the forceful blurring of class 
boundaries in the marginalised migrant milieu. The chapter concludes by indicating 
people’s slow but certain realisation that their initial imaginations and hopes about life 
in the West were too optimistic at best and outright naïve at worst. 
 
Early struggles: from EU citizens to ‘illegal’ immigrants  
All those I spoke to came to the UK with the intention of long-term settlement. Although 
rarely put into words, their anticipation of a bumpy start was evident in their migration 
strategies. Those like Mitko, determined to brave their way to the UK without using 
personal networks or having secured any sort of accommodation and employment, 
were a minority. The majority preferred to play it safe and leave only after having found 
a job through a formal migration channel like a recruitment agency and subcontractor, 
or available social networks. My informants believed that the 2014 lifting of work 
restrictions would make the attainment of a NINo, a bank account and other 
documentation needed for settling a life in the UK a bureaucratic nuisance.143 Finding 
accommodation was another immediate post-migration concern. Staying with friends 
or relatives for the first couple of weeks/months was a common arrangement, while 
those who had no close contacts tried to find an affordable hostel or, like Mitko, relied 
                                            
143 A lot of my informants have intentionally postponed their journeys to the beginning of 2014 assuming 
that the end of transitional immigrant controls for Bulgarian workers would remove all institutional 
obstacles to stable and well-paid employment.  
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on the numerous online ads offering shared accommodation in ‘Bulgarian’ houses. My 
informants had a very vague conception of the bottlenecks of early immigrant 
experiences. They shared the general anxiety affecting anyone who is about to start a 
life in a new place and faces the challenges of learning a new language, getting used 
to new surroundings, acquiring local knowledge, and going through the pain of leaving 
behind meaningful relationships.  
There were, however, different factors that made migration a particularly risky 
endeavour; a leap into the unknown absorbing considerable financial and emotional 
resources. Without exception, all of those I spoke to were alarmed by the possibility of 
encountering hostility and stigmatisation by virtue of their nationality. At the same time, 
they underlined their individual responsibility for dispersing negative misconceptions 
supposedly instilled upon an overall tolerant population by media and politicians. Many 
expressed confidence that they would quickly manage to prove their ‘properness’ 
through demonstrations of strong work ethic, ambition or ‘Western mind-set’. The 
stakes were high for my informants also because migration journeys necessitated 
investment that was often beyond the means of most families. Travel-related loans 
were obtained through moneylenders, consumer credits and in some cases with the 
help of friends and family. Last minute selloffs of movables like cars, laptops and 
mobile phones were a common occurrence. These investments, coupled with the fact 
that before departure many chose to quit full-time employment or close down 
businesses, made migration a risky endeavour and often a point of no return. 
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A bureaucratic cul-de-sac  
Twenty-four-year-old Emil from Plovdiv arrived in the UK to reunite with his mother - 
Lora (forty four) who had been working abroad for the past seven years, spending the 
past three of them as a part-time nanny and cleaner in London. Lora had managed to 
persuade one of her British employers (also her landlord) to hire her son in his 
construction company, even though he was yet to supply all necessary documents. 
Lora had recently stopped subletting the sofa in her one bedroom flat so that she could 
make space for Emil. As a single ‘migrant’ salary could not cover Lora’s rent in the 
costly south London neighbourhood it was vital that her son started employment as 
soon as possible. This meant that they had no time to waste in obtaining the needed 
documentation. On the morning before his arrival Lora called and asked me to pick up 
Emil from the airport and take him to her flat, as she had received an emergency call 
from one of her employers. She was adamant that straight upon our return to the house 
I should help Emil schedule a NINo interview. He carefully read the words that Lora 
had spelled out for him in phonetic Cyrillic transcription – he did not speak any English 
– while talking to the Jobcentre clerk. Emil was told to wait for a letter confirming his 
appointment scheduled for a month later. This delay made Lora furious. She wondered 
why institutions created so many problems for ‘people like herself’, who had ‘everything 
clean’ – legally employed, honest tax payers, and diligently keeping one’s accounts in 
order.  
In the meantime, she decided to focus on ‘sorting out’ her son’s bank account. Two 
days later the three of us, armed with a thick folder of different documents and 
certificates, ventured into central London in search of a bank that would agree to file 
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Emil’s application. In one of the branches we were told that the tenancy agreement144 
was not a sufficient proof of address and we had to supply a NINo confirmation letter. 
Not able to hide her disappointment Lora erupted in front of the stone-faced employee: 
‘This is complete non-sense! He has just applied for a NINo, we are still waiting for 
their letter. Why can’t you accept this tenancy agreement, don’t you see it is completely 
legit?’. The next few branches we approached also asked for additional documents we 
could simply not produce: a letter from the employer, a utility bill in Emil’s name, a 
British driving license. 
By now, chasing Emil’s documents had turned into a full-time occupation and Lora was 
forced to reduce her workload by half for the next weeks, which put her under additional 
mental strain and financial anxiety. On one occasion, a bank employee told Lora that 
Emil had to demonstrate a visa confirming his right to stay in the country. Her 
contestations that Bulgaria was part of the EU and visas were a thing of the past fell 
on deaf ears. Her last resort was a branch of Barclay’s145 in East London, much-talked 
about in immigrant online forums for the Bulgarian employee working there, whose 
benevolence towards compatriots supposedly made the procedure much less painful. 
When learning that the lady in question had just gone on maternity leave, Lora decided 
she had suffered enough humiliation and that she would use the paid services of fellow-
Bulgarian ‘accountants’146 who offered assistance in bureaucratic, accounting, and 
                                            
144 In order to open a bank account most banks required two main types of documents: one proof of the 
applicant’s identity (ID card, passport, a driving licence) and a proof of address. Most commonly, the 
latter included one or more of the following: a tenancy agreement, a mortgage statement, a recent utility 
bill, a current council tax bill, or a letter confirming the issuing of a NINo. However, each bank had its 
own list of documents acceptable as proof of address and often the number and type of those, as many 
attested, depended upon the applicant’s appearance and nationality. 
145 A British bank.  
146 My research indicated that most of the so-called ‘accountants’ were in fact long term migrants without 
relevant qualifications who spoke English and have acquired a good degree of ‘immigrant capital’ in the 
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other legal matters. It was few days later that the cherished bank account in Emil’s 
name arrived147 in the post.  
The night before Emil’s insurance number interview we gathered in Lora’s tiny kitchen 
for a celebration of what looked like the end of a bureaucratic nightmare. Lora was 
eager to express her frustration: 
The British don’t want us here, immigration is a big problem for them, especially 
those migrants who don’t speak the language. This is why they don’t want to 
give documents. Did you see how they threw us around like rags? Go here, go 
there, and for what? You have no rights here, only obligations.  
She wondered what would have happened to Emil if it was not for her: ‘He cannot do 
anything without documents, he is like a ghost, he cannot live like a normal person. He 
would have been forced into the mud like the rest of them [Bulgarian immigrants], those 
who turn to drugs or become criminals’. On the next day, Lora was told by an employee 
in the local Jobcentre that people who do not speak the language should not be allowed 
to come to Britain in the first place. ‘Of course, he will learn the language, but he also 
needs to eat and to do so he needs a job.’, Lora told me while on the verge of crying. 
That same day she received a phone call from her landlord saying she would have to 
vacate the flat in case of another week’s rent arrear.  
Throughout my fieldwork, I witnessed numerous occasions on which people 
desperately struggled to acquire basic documents that they were at least formally 
entitled to. Many ‘old’ Bulgarian immigrants had the feeling that after January 2014 the 
                                            
form of knowledge of the local legislation, existing loopholes and contacts to ‘cooperative’ individuals in 
the respective institutions. 
147 Lora paid 85 GBP for it. 
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issuing of those had in fact become even harder. The unexpected requests for 
additional papers, the arbitrary delays and the increased rates of application rejections 
struck them as ‘informal filtering mechanisms’ (neformalni mehanismi za filtrirane) 
operated by the British state for the purpose of curbing immigration numbers and at 
the same time cherry-picking the type of people that would best suit the needs of the 
economy. Contrary to what many informants seemed to believe, the low-skilled and 
non-English-speaking Bulgarians were not the only ones deemed undesirable. ‘Highly-
skilled migrants’ faced quite similar stumbling blocks. Miro, for example, was told that 
the only way for him to obtain a bank account would be to exchange his Bulgarian 
driving licence for a British one. Trying to avoid the additional costs and administrative 
hassle related to this procedure, he ended up signing up for an online paid package 
account. In many instances, the weeks – in some cases months – after the NINo 
interview were marked by apprehension and insecurity. Sometimes the number was 
granted only after months of unjustified rejections and painstaking re-applications. 
Tanya, for example, received a rejection after her first NINo interview and had to wait 
a total of two and a half months before obtaining her number. Another informant, 
Assen, likened the anticipation of his insurance number with the apprehension one 
feels before receiving a death sentence.  
Cheap and exploitable labour 
Such ‘filtering mechanisms’ were the foremost reason why many of my informants were 
‘pushed’ into precarious and informal work arrangements shortly upon arrival. As 
newcomers without documents and little immigrant ‘know-how’, they were an easy prey 
for migrants with longer experience and local employers in need of cheap and easily 
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exploitable labour. According to the law, Bulgarians, as all other EU nationals, could 
be employed for a period of up to two months prior to obtaining their insurance number. 
Most of those I spoke to were unaware of or fearful to make use of this right. 
Additionally, recruitment agencies and local companies used the absence of a NINo 
as a pretext for not hiring newcomers.  
Both London and Birmingham where most of my participant observation took place are 
former industrial centres that as a result of global neoliberalisation policies and market 
deregulation have experienced a swift transition from manufacturing to a service sector 
economy. This has led to the increased differentiation of their labour markets into 
highly-skilled, highly-paid and specialised employment on the one hand and low-
skilled, low-salary and low-security, one on the other. This polarisation has been more 
extreme in London where the rapid growth of finance, banking, insurance and other 
professional sectors have created a demand for low-waged, casualised workers – 
cleaners, nannies, porters, waiters and others – who service the needs of business 
and financial elites.148 Birmingham, on the other hand, had demonstrated relatively low 
economic growth in the recent past, at the same time sustaining relatively high levels 
of deprivation in relation to employment, income, health and crime. As opposed to 
London’s labour market structure Birmingham and the surrounding area offers more 
jobs in food production and processing which is the largest sub-sector of 
                                            
148 The highest proportion of workforce jobs (the number of filled jobs) in London in 2015 were service 
sector jobs-91.7% 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/employmentandemployeetypes/bu




manufacturing.149 The first destination for many migrants (Bulgarians included) in both 
cities are the so-called 3D jobs – dirty, difficult and dangerous, characterised by long 
working hours, irregular shifts, minimum or below minimum pay and zero-hour 
contracts, great part of which are concentrated in the grey sector of the British 
economy.150 The average earnings in Birmingham remain lower (479 GBP a week) 
than regional and national averages. 
The first entry point into the labour market for the newly-arrived were Bulgarian and 
other immigrant gang masters and subcontractors recruiting people for cash-in-hand 
jobs mostly in construction, car washing, cleaning, and leaflet distribution. Such jobs 
were given on a short-notice basis with no guaranteed minimum workload and usually 
paid between 3.5 – 5 GBP per hour151. They often required long and expensive travel 
throughout the city and in some cases investment in different job-related materials and 
equipment. The work was not only physically exhausting and humiliating, but often 
presented migrants with serious health hazards. One illustration is the case of Assen 
who came to London in the late summer of 2014 to take on a ‘secured job’ (osigurena 
rabota) promised by an old university colleague – a long-term migrant and a 
‘successful’ cleaning company owner. In the days following his arrival it turned out that 
the carpet cleaning job was ‘no longer available’. On top of this Assen was told that the 
rent for the shared room in his friend’s house was higher than previously negotiated. 
Left to his own devices, he had little choice but to spend half of his money for a month’s 
                                            
149file:///C:/Users/polin/Downloads/Local_Economic_Assessment_for_Birmingham_December_2014.p
df 
150 Although there is no official data on the size and structure of the grey labour market in the UK, it 
could be argued that in this case it is again London that offers more irregular jobs than Birmingham by 
virtue of its larger population and higher demand for such services. 
151 The national minimum wage for 2014 was 6.50 GBP and increased to 6.70 GBP in 2015. 
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rent and do his best to quickly ‘sort out’ his documents and find a job. In the first two 
months, while waiting for his NINo, he alternated between days of painful waiting and 
short spells of underpaid short-term employment. Once, a Bulgarian took him into his 
construction crew to work as a painter with two other Bulgarians for a week’s time. 
Already on the second day a conflict arose between Assen and the other workers. He 
claimed that as ‘old’ migrants they took him for a greenhorn and started bossing him 
around. On the third day, he decided to quit the job. His employer refused to pay him, 
claiming that he had failed to complete the assignment.  
Another one of his jobs was in a car wash next to his place where he worked between 
three and four days a week. A day shift lasted twelve or more hours and paid £35. He 
combined this with cash-in-hand jobs for which he got picked up from a common 
migrant ‘hotspot’ in a south London high street junction. According to his calculations, 
he had earned a total of 850 GBP in two months while his monthly expenses amounted 
to approximately 600 GBP (350 GBP for rent, 45 GBP for transport, and between 80 
and 100 GBP for food). This meant that he could not repay the loan he took from a 
friend in Bulgaria, nor save for bringing his family over – which was his ultimate goal 
(see Introduction vignette), but instead accumulated more debt. With the coming of 
autumn, the available jobs became scarce and Assen was forced to go back to Bulgaria 
where he planned to spend the winter.  
Tanya had left for the UK with the hope of finding well-paid employment matching her 
university degree and English language proficiency. A British friend whom she met 
during her Erasmus stay in Wolverhampton had agreed to host her in his London flat 
for a month. The arrangement was that she would share the flat for free as long as she 
contributed to the house chores and utility bills. Every time I would visit, I would find 
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her sitting in front of her laptop, frantically checking job portals for new openings. She 
told me she had set a goal of submitting no less than twenty applications a day, making 
me wonder how this was possible given the fact she applied for highly-skilled positions 
which usually required a well-tailored motivation letter and the filling of lengthy online 
application forms. Part of the answer was that she often compromised on her sleep as 
she was anyways too nervous to rest most of the time, as she explained. For three 
weeks of job hunting Tanya had been invited to only two interviews, with the 
prospective employers clearly taken aback when realising she was yet to obtain her 
insurance number and bank account. Anticipating this, she brought print-outs from the 
Home Office website proving her work eligibility to her following job interviews.  
A month and a half after her arrival Tanya’s savings had been used up; she was still 
unemployed and constantly pondering the reasons why. She acknowledged that the 
competition for ‘good’ jobs in London was in fact a lot fiercer than she had initially 
imagined. She considered her lack of documents to be a factor putting employers off, 
but also wondered if this did not serve as an excuse for concealing their prejudice 
against Bulgarians. On an interview for a job as primary teacher, the interviewer 
remarked jokingly on her strong east European accent. Distressed by what had 
happened she told me: ‘Who would want their children to be taught by a foreigner with 
a peculiar accent, Polina? Getting rid of it will take me ages, does this mean I will not 
get a proper job till then?’ A week later, desperate and running out of options, Tanya 
acquiesced to the job she dreaded most before her arrival and became cleaner for a 
Bulgarian ‘agency’.152 She started serving an average of three to four private houses 
                                            
152 In many cases, Bulgarian ‘agencies’ were unregistered companies, represented by an ‘agent’ who 
mediated between private clients and migrants in search of a job. 
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a day, all across central London, often with less than an hour’s notice. She earned 6.50 
GBP an hour and was required to cover her transport costs and buy her own cleaning 
materials. Cleaning was something Tanya never thought she would end up doing. 
Before her departure, she had often told me that this was a job for women who had no 
self-esteem and ambitions for professional and self-improvement.  
Stuck among one’s own  
‘When abroad, stay away from Bulgarians’ was the most frequent statement would-be 
migrants produced when asked whether they planned to engage with other Bulgarians 
in the UK. This was related to popularly-held beliefs about the nature of the ‘Bulgarian 
(or Balkan) mentality’ (mantalitet, or narodopsihologia) characterised by a ‘typical’ 
propensity for constant comparison with the achievements of others, behind the back 
talk, spite, and desire to inflict harm on others or use them to one’s own advantage.153 
My informants were determined to rely entirely on themselves when in the UK in order 
to prove their strength, perseverance, and ability to adapt to new environments. On the 
other hand, often in contradiction to their own words, they sought assistance from 
friends, family and online Bulgarian forums when looking for a place to stay, legal 
advice, job recommendations or general information on life in the UK. ‘Ordinary 
people’, who did not speak English and deemed themselves culturally too distant from 
the locals remained hopeful about forging friendships with compatriots, because, 
according to one informant, ‘after all, we are Bulgarians and we would prefer each 
other’s company than that of British, Polish, Romanian and so on’. ‘Bulgarian 
                                            
153 See Maeva (2017) for similar findings reflecting the lack of cohesion and solidarity in the Bulgarian 
community in the UK and its split into subgroups according to length of stay and class principles. 
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Westerners’, on the other hand were adamant about avoiding all contact with 
‘Bulgarian migrants’ – their low-skilled and ‘culturally impoverished’ compatriots whom 
they believed to have come to the UK with the sole purpose of making money 
(pechelbarstvo). As I have already argued in Chapter Three, it was through such 
processes of boundary building that they carved out their ‘middle-class’ subjectivities, 
fulfilled their desire to escape from a social reality dominated by ‘backwards masses’ 
and hoped to fully immerse themselves into a British society composed of like-minded 
‘Westerners’.  
Almost immediately upon arrival, both groups of informants were drawn into the 
confines of the Bulgarian immigrant community, whether or not this had been their 
initial intention. Newly arrived migrants’ dependence on their compatriots was 
conditioned by several factors that caught them completely off-guard, such as the high 
cost of living, which literally ‘ate away’ savings; the long and painful scramble for 
documents; the missing opportunities for well-paid and stable employment; and the 
unfamiliarity with the particularities of the British real estate renting market.  
For instance, when Tanya felt she had worn out her welcome in the flat of her British 
friend, she started searching for a house share in the same area – Camden – she liked 
the place for its multicultural flair, hipsterish vibe, proximity to the city centre and, most 
of all, for the lack of a visible Bulgarian presence. After a quick online search, she 
realised that the cheapest single bedroom in the area came at the cost of 600 GBP a 
month, a minimum six-month contract, and a security deposit of 900 GBP. Her monthly 
earnings of less than 1000 GBP and depleted savings made the area completely off-
limits and Tanya decided to orientate her search further away from the city centre. She 
was despaired at the fact that any accommodation she was ready to consider was 
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beyond her budget and came with lengthy contracts and agency fees she was not sure 
she could commit to. One day she told me how after sharing her concerns with her 
family her mother had contacted the daughter of an ex-colleague of hers who rented 
her own house to Bulgarians in east London. ‘Can you imagine me living with those 
people? God knows what villages they have crawled out of, they are most probably 
some primitively thinking people who see an inside bathroom for the first time in their 
lives.’ A week later Tanya decided to give the place a try; it was the cheapest 
arrangement she had seen so far (350 GBP a month), there was no contract and it 
required only a one-week deposit. 
 A month later, curious to learn more about her new living arrangements and the 
relationship with her flatmates, I asked to visit her. She proposed that we meet for a 
coffee in a popular shopping centre next to her place. Later, she explained she felt 
embarrassed having me in the house as the neighbourhood was poor and filthy and 
one could see Bulgarians shop and hear Bulgarian speech almost everywhere. She 
described the place as a ‘typical’ Bulgarian house – loud music, constant quarrels, 
despicable hygiene, and frequent alcohol feasts. It was a mixture of anger and despair 
that I sensed in what she told me that day: 
I feel like I am in Bulgaria here. See there, a group of Bulgarian gypsies are 
crossing the street, there on the next table two Bulgarians are having coffee. Do 
you see any British around us? There isn’t a single person, maybe only some 
passers-by. I came to London to get rid of it all and now I am surrounded by 
those people I would not even speak to in Bulgaria. 
The immigrant housing market was largely run through highly exploitive relationships 
between newer and older migrants. A lot of the ‘older’ migrants I met had figured out 
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that buying a house, keeping a room for themselves and renting out the rest was highly 
beneficial as it allowed them to cover the costs of home owning and to faster repay 
their mortgages. Drawing on their newly arrived compatriots’ needs to economise and 
their complete lack of knowledge and experience with the housing market, Bulgarian 
landlords were, at a minimum, able to cover theirs and their families’ renting and utility 
costs and in some cases even turn this into a profitable business. The points of tension 
between landlords and tenants (as well as among tenants themselves) were multiple 
and I can hardly think of a case of problem-free renting or lending experience. 
Still, solidarity and mutual help between friends and strangers alike were not 
uncommon. I witnessed multiple occasions on which genuine care, advice, and 
generosity were offered to the newly arrived. Such stories often provoked wonder and 
admiration and were presented as out of the ordinary experiences and a confirmation 
that even in such competitive and aggressive environment there existed people who 
had managed to preserve their empathy and kindness. Through its informal economic 
structures and practices, the Bulgarian immigrant community allowed newcomers to 
persist through the toughest first weeks and months in the UK by offering them cheaper 
services and a sense of familiarity and security amidst general hostility and 
discrimination. The immigrant community can thus be said to exist in a symbiotic, yet 
also exploitative interdependence between incoming and settled migrants. By filling in 
the crevices left by the mainstream economy, settled migrants set up structures that 
provided for accommodation, employment, legal, transport and other needs of 
incoming immigrants who had no way of entering mainstream society. At the same 
time, informal enterprises offered opportunities for ‘older’ migrants to generate extra 
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income and achieve socioeconomic mobility, routes to which were to a great extent 
blocked for them in the larger society.154  
Intra-community exploitation and migrant hostility towards new arrivals is well-reported 
in research carried out among east European migrant communities in Britain (Garapich 
2005, Maeva 2017, Spenser et al. 2007). Such tensions have been explained as a 
result of the high competition for jobs and other scarce resources. While such 
explanations hold true for the experiences of my informants, the pre-existent class-
based conflicts I have outlined in Chapter Three fuelled such antagonisms. As in the 
case of Tanya, many ‘Bulgarian Westerners’ felt humiliated by the need to cohabitate, 
work with and in many cases even depend on the benevolence of those whom they 
deemed not even worth ‘talking to’ back home. I further develop this class-based 
tension in the next part of this chapter.  
On the other hand, the many examples of solidarity and mutual assistance that I 
witnessed throughout my fieldwork have been explained as a reaction to migrants’ 
exclusion from the structures of the host society. Alejandro Portes and Min Zhou (1992) 
have argued that ethnic solidarity, which they denote as ‘bounded solidarity’, emerges 
out of a uniting feeling of ‘foreignness’ and prejudicial reception from the dominant 
society. The symbiotic relationships within immigrant communities that researchers 
alluded to were clearly observable in the relations of my informants and long-term 
migrants: new migrants provided cheap and exploitable labour for migrant businesses 
while they themselves benefited from the possibility of immediately starting jobs. Such 
                                            
154 For a more detailed discussion of the functions of the parallel migrant economy in the context of the 
US see Sarah Mahler (1995). 
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arrangements, as I have shown, did not just apply to the sphere of employment but 
also to living arrangements, legal and other forms of assistance.  
Informality, illegality, and precarious beginnings 
My informants came to the UK eager to make a fresh start and fulfil the yearnings 
related to their imaginaries of the West. Almost immediately upon arrival, their 
fascination with the ‘colourful’, ‘shiny’ and ‘magnificent’ Britain of their dreams gave 
way to experiences of ‘grim’ and ‘hostile’ realities that had little to do with their idealised 
pre-migratory expectations. I have discussed how most prospective migrants did not 
anticipate an open-armed welcome and foresaw the existence of a ‘transitional’ period 
in which they would be challenged to disprove prejudice towards east European 
migrants and prove their worth for the local economy through hard labour and 
perseverance. In no way, however, were they prepared for the uncertainty and 
vulnerability that they were confronted with in their early weeks and months. I have 
focused on three key factors which made my informants’ lives insecure and precarious 
to an extent often surpassing the circumstances they left behind. Firstly, the pains of 
procuring documentation that would grant them the status of legal workers revealed 
the functioning of a powerful informal (‘hidden’) bureaucracy that created feelings of 
going around in circles. Secondly, the combination of such ‘legal discrimination’ (see 
Fox, Morosanu and Szilassy 2015: 729) with a de-regulated and saturated labour 
market155 pushed many into highly precarious and exploitative jobs. Following from 
these was the entrapment of the newly arrived into the confines of the Bulgarian 
immigrant community that on one hand increased their vulnerability and segregation 
                                            
155 See Mezzadra and Nelson (2013), Anderson (2010). 
217 
 
and on the other offered a refuge that enabled their survival in a discriminatory and 
hostile British society.  
In contrast to my informants’ initial expectations the rights of free movement and labour 
across Europe had little to no meaning in the reality of the UK labour market. The 
above-described bureaucratic conundrum and the discriminatory labour market 
practices of local employers pushed many into a state of de facto ‘illegality’ which was 
in complete contradiction to their formal status of ‘free moving Europeans’. The civil, 
economic, social, and political rights they were formally entitled to were in practice 
denied to them by systemically functioning formal and informal structural limitations. 
Thus, newly arrived Bulgarian migrants were put in a position of what Standing calls 
precarious ‘denizenry’ (2011: 14) and pulled into the casualised and informal economy 
which made them easy targets for dependency and exploitation (Portes et al. 1989). 
My informants’ experiences bear clear resemblance with the effects of ‘illegality’ on the 
lives of undocumented migrants in the UK, which are well-documented by Nando 
Sigona (2012).156 Social isolation resulting from restricted time and opportunities for 
interaction, humiliation, low-paid employment and reliance on co-nationals are the 
most pertinent characteristics defining ‘illegality’ that held particular relevance for my 
informants (Sigona 2012).  
Since Bulgarians and Romanians gained equal rights to work and live in the UK in 
2014, academic researchers’ attention towards their experiences in destination 
societies have decreased. The structural mechanism of economic and social exclusion 
that I have outlined here remains largely uncovered with the exception of few important 
                                            




recent contributions.157 Raia Apostolova (2017), for example, points to the 
implementation of repressive measures by local municipal authorities in Munich aiming 
at humiliating and chasing away Bulgarian and Romanian undocumented workers 
gathering at central street corners. Migrants and their practices were deemed 
undesirable by local businesses and a threat to the civilised way of life of the locals.158 
She points out how the brutal policing which had turned into a daily practice of 
disciplining migrants had exacerbated their fear and vulnerability to a point when many 
of them decided to leave the city and search work elsewhere (Apostolova 2017).  
When juxtaposed to pre-2014 studies on Bulgarian migration to the UK, my 
ethnographic data reveals that little if anything had changed for Bulgarian immigrants 
since the lifting of work restrictions in January 2014. Their entrapment in low-skilled, 
low-paid informal sectors (Markova and Black 2007) continued to persist and diminish 
opportunities for integration into the host society. Ethic ‘ghettoization’ (Markova and 
Black 2008:20), lack of solidarity and fragmentation within the Bulgarian community 
(Maeva 2017) were other previously – observed factors that still impacted on the 
conditions of Bulgarian migrants.  
The cases of Mitko and Assen exemplified a commonly observed migrant trajectory of 
enforced temporariness, which Mezzadra and Nielson (2013) see as a main feature of 
contemporary international migration, one institutionalised through different formal and 
informal control mechanisms (see Chapter Two). The inability to legalise their status 
and produce surplus income, in combination with unexpectedly high costs of living, 
                                            
157 See Apostolova (2017); Macarie (2017); Vicol (2017). 
158 See also Manolova (2016), (2017). 
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positioned many of my informants on the brink of survival. Initial plans for long-term 
settlement turned out to be unfeasible and many had to return home already in the first 
weeks/month after their arrival. ‘Ordinary people’ were more vulnerable to such an 
outcome as they often had no economic cushion to fall back on and no significant 
social networks to mobilise. ‘Bulgarian Westerners’ were also not completely immune 
to such ‘involuntary temporariness’ and they often realised that keeping one’s head 
above the water in this turbulent early period was possible only at the price of 
unforeseen hardship, deprivation and further indebtedness. 
My evidence in support of enforced temporariness contests widely-accepted 
assumptions in east European migration research which consider the so-called 
‘incomplete’ migration (Okolski 2001: 105) a conscious quick money-making strategy 
of low-skilled migrants. Others point to the lack of ‘strong’ ties (White and Ryan 2008), 
locally-bound identities, inadequate skills (Ditchev 2008), or migrants’ lack of ambition 
(Eade, Garapich and Drinkwater 2006) as reasons for oft-observed short-term 
horizons. In the next chapter, I discuss in more detail how many of these involuntary 
returnees did not abandon their migration plans but embarked on circular short-term 
labour migration between Bulgaria and the UK that further precluded them from 
accumulating enough capital for permanent settlement. 
The decent into precarity that marked the early days and months of my informants’ 
stay in the UK was not taken as indicative of the general path their new lives were to 
take in the UK, nor did it necessitate a re-evaluation of the Western imaginaries guiding 
their journeys. Such hardships were most often dismissed as a temporary nuisance 
and part of a process of ‘settling down’ (ustanoviavane) in which one’s determination 
and stamina were put to a test. Many believed that by successfully overcoming this 
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initial precarious threshold they would complete their transformation into stronger and 
more deserving individuals and, most importantly, get a taste of the life that they had 
come to experience. Their sustained belief in fulfilling their pre-migration expectations 
was evident in the perseverance and courage with which they endured everything that 
their new lives threw at them and in the determination with which many returned for a 
‘second chance’.  
 
Parallel lives and yearnings for inclusion: mid-term perspectives  
The end of the initial period of ‘settling down’ did not bring the changes that my 
informants hoped for and many continued to grapple with the instability and insecurity 
that had hit them upon arrival. They often had the feeling that their lives developed in 
a reality parallel to that of the locals. They still lived and worked amongst Bulgarians 
and other immigrants, listened to Bulgarian speech, watched Bulgarian television and 
shopped from Bulgarian and east European shops. The outsider position they 
occupied in relation to the dominant society was not just a product of cultural and ethnic 
segregation but was to a great extent preconditioned by their economic marginalisation 
at the bottom rung of the social hierarchy, where they struggled to find and keep jobs 
undesirable for the locals. The intersections between these two parallel realities were 
limited to patron-client relationships in work life, interactions with authorities and daily 
observations gathered when commuting to and from work. These brief encounters 
were often a source of disappointment, fear and humiliation. They also offered a 
glimpse into British people’s realities of life and thus exposed the drastic gap that 
divided the existence of my informants from that of the larger society. They filled 
Bulgarians with frustration and jealousy but at the same time provided hope that the 
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lives they had imagined for themselves had an actual existence and, although they 
were unattainable at present, they could become a reality in the future. The hope of 
bringing to fruition their imaginations of life in the West provided the motivation and 
inner drive to tackle the challenges head on and follow their dream of becoming part 
of British society with utmost perseverance.  
In this sense, while they were ‘living off borrowed time’ (Ahmad 2008:309) and with no 
clear future perspective, Bulgarian migrants did not always confine themselves to a 
short-term mind-set. On the contrary, very often their perseverance through daily 
experiences of insecurity and socio-economic vulnerability was made possible by their 
effort to sustain a positive future-oriented vision and hope for achieving their long-term 
settlement aspirations. In the following, I will demonstrate how this determination 
despite disappointed hopes could be observed both among ‘ordinary people’ and 
‘Bulgarian Westerners’. 
 
‘Ordinary People’s’ mid-term trajectories 
Caught in the ‘migrant matrix’   
Before coming to the UK ‘ordinary people’ had drawn pictures of day-to-day routines 
which they hoped would allow them to imbue their lives with much longed-for stability 
and sense of control. Instead, they found themselves immersed in an anxious and 
alienating everyday existence which they metaphorically described as ‘living in a 
matrix’. After obtaining their documents, a process that took anything between one to 
six months, they did their best to find legal employment, preferably for British 
employers, as they were expected to pay well and provide better treatment than 
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Bulgarian ones. Male immigrants quickly realised that the only way for accessing better 
paid opportunities was through obtaining specialised training and becoming skilled 
labourers. This often proved an arduous task, however, as it required a good level of 
English, investment in qualification courses159 and expensive equipment. In the 
meantime, many became agency workers, constantly shifting between different 
assignments and occasionally suffering spells of unemployment.  
With time, women stopped being dependent on Bulgarian ‘agencies’ and started 
recruiting their own clients for cleaning and child caring. Men and women alike needed 
to obtain a self-employed status which meant additional bureaucracy, costs for 
accountant services, agency fees and payroll contributions.160 The widely used bogus 
self-employment status precluded any social, health and labour protection, which left 
my informants highly vulnerable to economic fluctuations (see Anderson 2010). Many 
of those I spoke to had begun to recognise that ‘decent’ work remained out of bounds 
even after the procurement of all legal authorisations. As minimum wage workers, it 
was important for ‘ordinary people’ to take on as many working hours as possible – 
this was the only way they could make a living and repay debts or save for bringing 
over their families. This was how their entire existence revolved around and depended 
on finding and keeping employment, leaving little time for social interaction, recreation, 
and rest.  
                                            
159 This applied even to those who had relevant training and qualification, which, however, often 
remained unrecognised. 
160 Many payroll providers charged temporary workers a weekly fee for covering administrative costs. 
On top of this, the national insurance and pension contributions of the employer were deducted from the 
worker’s remuneration.    
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Six months after her arrival, Eleonora had managed to quit her au pair job and start 
working for a Bulgarian cleaning agency. After recruiting a few regular clients, she 
decided to quit the agency and start working on her own. Every day she serviced a 
number of houses spread throughout London, doing cleaning jobs in the morning and 
caring for school-aged children in the afternoon. She worked six days a week around 
eight hours a day and spent another three hours commuting. Saturday was her day off 
and she usually dedicated it to domestic chores and talking to her son on Skype. 
Eleonora’s husband Georgi, who managed to join her six months later, worked six days 
a week as a labourer, with a day off on Sunday. Although Eleonora considered her 
current circumstances an improvement – she was earning more than before and she 
was finally reunited with her husband – she felt that they were still at a stage in which 
they were solely preoccupied with ensuring their daily survival.  
Each day is the same here - from work to home and from home back to work. I 
come back at half past nine in the evening, my husband is already in bed, I eat 
and go to sleep, I am so tired. I think, when my husband was in Bulgaria we 
talked more than we do now, we simply don’t have the time anymore. We only 
think about how to pay the rent, our Oyster cards161, and fill the fridge.  
This day-to-day existence, in which one did nothing else but ‘work as a robot’, brought 
up a great sense of alienation and loneliness especially for those who had migrated on 
their own. Many such individuals led a lifestyle described by Piore (1979: 63-64) as 
‘ascetic’: in their efforts to save money, they cut back on expenses that were not 
directly related to their subsistence, condemning themselves to material privation and 
                                            
161 London travel card. 
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social isolation. With time, such asceticism took its toll and I witnessed many cases in 
which my informants’ physical and psychological well-being was gravely affected.162 
This observation confirms Standing’s (2011) claim that the precarious employment that 
migrant labourers are more likely to undertake jeopardises different aspects of their 
individual life – health and wellbeing, family and friendship ties and personal 
aspirations.  
Migrants were not sure how to step out of this state of ‘working, counting coins and not 
having time for anything’. They feared that if they invested time and finances into 
obtaining a better and more stable employment they ran the risk of losing the little that 
they had managed to achieve. Thus, the imagined idyllic boredom that they had come 
for was something that they glimpsed in the lives of their employers, the families taking 
a Sunday stroll in the local park or the well-clad early morning commuters. What they 
got instead, was a tedious day-to-day predicament marked by exhaustion, fear and 
seclusion.  
While this was the predicament of most people working both in and outside of London, 
I found that the latter group managed to much quicker escape illegal and self-
employment and enter contracted forms of labour. Thus, for example, when he first 
arrived to Birmingham Boncho took on a pre-arranged job as a night-shift milk driver 
for 7 GBP per hour. Despite the reassurance of his employer he was never provided 
with a full-time contract which meant that he kept a self-employed status – covering 
his own tax obligations and unable to use paid leave and statutory benefits. After half 
                                            
162 For example, one of my informants suffered a major heart problem which required several operations 
and months spent in hospital care. Several other informants suffered with depression, panic attacks and 
social anxiety.   
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a year Boncho was told by a British driver he met on one of his deliveries about a 
transport company in the region which was hiring experienced drivers. Despite his poor 
language skills Boncho passed the recruitment tests and was given a full-time six- 
month contract with a pay of 9, 45 GBP per hour, 3 rest days a week and 20 days of 
paid holiday. Similarly to him, his eldest son – Dani managed to fairly quickly leave 
behind his job in a local car repair shop that paid him less than 5 GBP per hour for a 
minimum-waged employment in a chocolate factory. He soon managed to arrange 
temporary contract for his mother in the same factory despite the fact that she did not 
speak any English.  
Double subordination and internalisation of inferiority 
‘Ordinary people’ often repeated with unconcealed complacency that in the UK one’s 
education and other previous achievements did not count as here everyone had to 
‘start from zero’. They welcomed this enforced sameness as levelling out the class and 
status inequalities that they had been particularly perceptive of while in Bulgaria. Their 
habituation to labour-intensive occupations was expected to ease their adaptation and 
put them in an advantageous position in relation to their better educated compatriots 
and work-shy locals. In the mid-run of their migrant trajectories, however, they had 
gathered enough negative experiences to realise that their hard and dedicated labour 
would not bring them the just reward and moral recognition that would allow them to 
become respectable members of British society. As discussed in the previous 
subsection, the pay they received was perhaps higher than their earnings in Bulgaria 
in absolute terms but was barely enough to cover their sub-standard existence in the 
UK. Even more disappointingly, ‘ordinary people’ were subjected to considerable 
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denigration, exploitation, and discrimination from local employers and Bulgarian 
immigrants (long-term immigrants as well as ‘Bulgarian Westerners’). Therefore, the 
feelings of inferiority they hoped to address through migration deepened further as they 
were often in a position of double subordination – a state that made them experience 
themselves as standing below many others in the British social hierarchy.  
‘Ordinary people’ came to realise that they were preferred by British employers not so 
much for their good work ethic but for their cheap labour. In this regard, they saw their 
hard work and efficiency as abused rather than rewarded. The discrimination they were 
subjected to was most often explained as rooted in ethnic prejudice. They 
complemented this impression with examples of the better treatment that other 
nationalities received in the UK. To many, it seemed that no matter how hard they tried 
they were still deemed less-deserving and less-capable by virtue of their nationality. 
Once when contemplating his job-related calamities in London, Assen told me the 
following: 
Bulgarians are the ones employed for doing the shitty jobs; you can never see 
a Pole, or another east European in a car wash or on a construction site. If you 
do, they would be supervisors, but definitely not labourers. We are the worst 
paid ones as well, only a Bulgarian can agree to work for 35 GBP a day. A 
Lithuanian, for example, would not get off the couch for less than 150!  
They were even more puzzled by their observations of Indian and black British 
occupying prestigious positions in banks, companies and local administration, which 
seemed unreachable for Bulgarians. The unexpected and confusing realisation that 
white British people have ‘allowed’ the successful integration of such racial others while 
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at the same time excluding white Bulgarians from such opportunities increased the 
sense of subordination that my informants shared.163 
The everyday discrimination faced by migrants took on various forms and was 
encountered in diverse social settings. Krassi and Boncho, a couple trying to settle 
down in Birmingham with their two children explained how hard it was for Bulgarians 
to rent legal accommodation: 
We would check the website and call the agency to ask for viewing a specific 
property. They would immediately realise we are foreigners; it is not hard with 
our bad English and thick accents. When we tell them we are from Bulgaria they 
would say something like “The property is taken.”, “We have nothing in the 
area.”, or “Call another time.”.  
When they finally managed to arrange a couple of viewings and expressed readiness 
to rent a particular property, they were told that the owner, who was a former British 
doctor, had the explicit requirement of renting out only to fellow medical doctors.  
Experiences of discrimination produced emotional suffering and were often 
compounded with personal insecurities related to the lack of English language skills 
and insufficient cultural and institutional knowledge. The men and women I spoke to 
often feared socialising beyond their national group and admitted to feeling helpless, 
ignorant and out of place, incapable of resolving even the simplest tasks. Before 
making their way to the UK, many ‘ordinary people’ did not see their lack of English 
                                            
163 This also shows that after coming to the UK my informants started to understand the West in racial 
terms. It reveals original expectations of the West as populated by white and middle-class British which 
clashed with a reality of multicultural and tolerant coexistence of different races and ethnicities. They 
started to imagine British society as structured according to a racial matrix in which Bulgarians stood 
below most ethnic and religious minorities.  
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proficiency as an obstacle to their migrant success. They believed that once in the UK, 
they would be able to quickly pick up the language in their daily interaction with locals. 
As they quickly learned upon arrival this was hardly possible given their complete 
immersion in an immigrant economy where English was hardly if ever spoken.164  They 
came to see this as their main deficiency and the biggest obstacle limiting their 
employment prospects, as it resulted in daily inconveniences and their inability to 
defend their case in front of authorities and employers. For instance, Krassi, who was 
a temporary worker in a chocolate factory in Birmingham, claimed that her supervisors 
were taking advantage of her and her co-workers’ lack of English and treating them in 
an even more exploitative manner. She was often asked to sign documents she could 
not read, was penalised or asked to do unpaid overtime work without being able to 
express her protest.  
Communication with locals remained challenging even after efforts were invested into 
studying the language. After spending half of her salary for a three-month intensive 
language course in a local college, Krassi was still unable to communicate, although 
she claimed she could understand ‘almost ninety per cent’ of what people were saying. 
Learning some English raised her confidence but did not bring significant change to 
her situation as she still felt unfit for applying for better jobs. The better language skills 
even brought her more sorrow as she became more aware of the demeaning talk of 
her supervisors. Another one of my informants, Eleonora, who spent enormous efforts 
to dust off her high school English while working as a nanny in London, was deeply 
hurt by the insulting remarks of the children she was caring for who often corrected her 
                                            
164 The language could be mastered through courses and self-preparation, but this required time and 
finances that only few could spare. 
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strong accent and told her she needed to ‘eat more boiled potatoes’ if she was to ever 
speak ‘proper’ English.  
This ‘lack of language’ was one of the factors responsible for a commonly felt ‘internal 
barrier’ (vutreshna bariera) that justified my informants’ self-doubt and isolation. Long 
after their first arrival, many of those I met suffered insecurities that prevented them 
from taking advantage of opportunities for better employment. Moreover, they were 
unwilling to make use of different public services and entitlements and even fearful to 
perform everyday tasks. For example, although being aware of the existing free public 
healthcare in the UK, many did not feel comfortable registering with a local medical 
practice and instead relied on their GPs back in Bulgaria, who regularly administered 
treatment over the phone. Others refused to apply for child care benefits and other 
state support which further stripped them of any safety net to mitigate their situation. 
As a reason, they often pointed to their poor command of English but also their fear of 
being seen as abusers of social services. In some drastic cases, the inability to 
overcome such self-erected psychological barriers led to fears and avoidance 
techniques. Anguel, for example, was determined not to leave his accommodation in 
south London except when absolutely necessary. Firstly, because he feared being 
thrust into an awkward social situation in which he would be required to speak English, 
and secondly, because he found the sheer size and crowdedness of the city 
intimidating. What he dreaded most was getting lost in a hostile area or suffering a 
heart attack in the underground.165  
                                            
165 As a proof for the health hazards of the mega polis, my informants often pointed to the large number 
of people with disabilities to be seen on the streets – a sight that was fairly uncommon in Bulgaria, albeit 




In sum, ‘ordinary people’s’ inability to progress towards the ‘normal’ lives they had 
imagined for themselves before departure was to a great extent due to their 
internalised sense of inferiority or what Erind Pajo, in his research on Albanian migrants 
in Greece, identifies as a sense of ‘personal lowering’ (2007: 143). This debilitating 
feeling can be attributed to several different factors: migrants’ structural positioning at 
the bottom rung of British society, xenophobic public discourses directed towards 
them, daily experiences of discrimination and their own skill deficiencies. On a more 
fundamental level, however, I believe this self-abasement to be also a manifestation 
of deeply entrenched perceptions of Bulgaria’s inferiority to the UK which I have 
already explained when discussing my informants’ subjective visions of a global 
hierarchy of places. Just the fact that they were Bulgarians, and not British, was 
enough for my informants to naturalise their subordinate position in society.  
In order to put these sentiments into perspective, it is useful to consider Frantz Fanon’s 
(2008) examination of the psychology of colonialism, which describes the emergence 
of an inferiority complex in the colonised as a result of economic processes and 
psychological ‘epidermalisation’ of the cultural and intellectual supremacy of the 
coloniser. Bulgarian immigrants’ practices and the meanings invested in them exhibit 
similar processes of internalisation in the adoption of self-blame narratives that 
attribute their inferior positions to their own cultural inadequacies; fear of humiliation 
and ridicule made them avoid social contact with locals they deemed intellectually and 
culturally superior.  
Furthermore, some who condemned exploitation and mistreatment by immigrant 
employers were less likely to oppose similar treatment by British. Krassi, for example, 
spent endless nights crying because of the humiliation her British manager inflicted on 
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her and her colleagues but at the same time tried to justify it as ‘normal’: ‘After all he is 
British, so it is understandable he acts in this way.’ Additionally, it should be noted that 
the inferiority complex that ‘ordinary people’ struggled with was further entrenched by 
the negative attitudes and unfair treatment they received from their better educated co-
nationals – those I have called ‘Bulgarian Westerners’.166 Thus, ‘ordinary people’ who 
came to the UK with the hope of overcoming their social and symbolic marginalisation 
in Bulgarian society, found themselves trapped in an even more degrading position of 
‘double subordination’ – on the one hand conferred a marginal status of undeserving 
Europeans by British employers, public employees, and colleagues, and, on the other, 
being targeted by the class hatred of their fellow compatriots.  
The migrant normal 
Caught in the daily grind of the migrant existence, ‘ordinary people’ had little time to 
reflect on the direction that their lives had taken in the grand picture of their goals and 
expectations. It looked as if the Western imaginaries that had brought them to the UK 
had little relevance for their everyday which was filled with worries over acute questions 
of reproducing one’s physical existence. Migrants would rarely talk about how their 
present lives scored in relation to their pre-migratory expectations on their own 
initiative. When prompted to do so, they would usually demonstrate annoyance with 
the inadequacy of my questions and quickly dismiss them by saying that they were 
actually ‘not too surprised’ with what they came to discover. At the same time, they 
would talk for hours about how hard it was for them to adapt to the environment and 
                                            
166 In the next part I discuss ‘Bulgarian Westerners’’ perspectives towards their compatriots which often 
reproduced the class prejudice prevalent in Bulgaria and endorsed negative stereotypes targeting 
Bulgarians and east Europeans as a migrant group.  
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how despaired they felt with the inability to bridge the gap that divided theirs and the 
lives of locals. Their narratives of life in the UK were filled with comparisons with the 
lives they had led in Bulgaria, with aspects of the latter being cast in a new, more 
positive light and ‘basic things’ that had been taken for granted receiving more 
appreciation. It looked as if the disjuncture between the imagined ‘normality’ of life and 
the reality of migration was so significant that, if explicitly recognised, it would cast bad 
light on my informants’ judgment capacities and put them in an extremely awkward 
position. 
  
Figure 2. An informant posing with 
Jack Daniel’s whiskey bottles in his 




Adjusting themselves to and making the best out of their situation was usually the only 
way through which ‘ordinary people’ could persevere with their migratory paths. Their 
enhanced capacity to engage in different consumption practices was what facilitated 
this process and incentivised them to sustain their projects for a longer period of time. 
Those I met reported a sense of economic betterment as the only positive outcome of 
migration. This conviction was usually contained in the common phrase – ‘The only 
good thing about the UK is the British pound’. This achieved economic fulfilment was 
a far cry from the standard of life that migrants expected to obtain but still offered a 
sense of material wellbeing which was unattainable in Bulgaria. Their economic 
‘success’ they measured by their ability to cover their monthly utility bills, keep their 
fridge full and the occasional consumption of luxury items.167 It was again those of my 
informants living outside London that most often experienced a sense of material 
wellbeing. They reported lower living costs such as food, transportation, rent and utility 
bills while the payment they received for the kind of jobs they did was comparative to 
the one in London.168  
Krassi and Boncho would often tell me that despite all the unforeseen drawbacks and 
hardship that their lives in the UK had caused them, one thing was for sure: they could 
now afford to ‘loosen up’ (otpuskam) and spend ‘without thinking’. They provided 
                                            
167 According to my informants’ understandings those were commodities that exceed one’s basic 
necessities and were generally seen as unaffordable in Bulgaria. Such items had the ability to denote 
status both within the immigrant community and back home, for example, mobile phones, branded 
clothes, household appliances, and branded alcohol.  
168 For example, estimations demonstrate that the consumer prices in Birmingham in 2015 were 19 per 
cents lower than in London: rent – 61% lower, groceries – 15% lower and utility bills – 30% lower. The 
purchasing power in Birmingham is also estimated to be 14% higher than in London 
(https://www.numbeo.com/cost-of-
living/compare_cities.jsp?country1=United+Kingdom&country2=United+Kingdom&city1=London&city2
=Birmingham&tracking=getDispatchComparison) [Accessed 20 January 2018]. 
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numerous examples of their improved consumption capacity: when going outside 
Birmingham for a Sunday walk, they would regularly drop at McDonalds for drinks and 
sandwiches; each day Krassi would get three to five scratch-up lottery tickets; they 
would do their weekly shopping in the nearby Tesco instead of travelling further to Lidl. 
Each time I visited them for dinner, the table would be piled up with a variety of side 
dishes and salads and at least two kinds of meat. On my initial visit in their newly rented 
home, they were eager to give me a full house tour in order to demonstrate all the new 
furniture and appliances they had purchased in the making of their home. The living 
room contained two old-looking leather sofas which they got from a neighbour, a huge 
plasma TV and a dining table. Different appliances were lined up on the two kitchen 
counters: an electric kettle, a toaster, a microwave, and a juice maker.  
Krassi and Boncho wanted to draw my attention to their newest acquisition – an 
expensive coffee maker which they claimed made the best coffee one could ever try. 
A high-quality machine like this, Krassi informed me, cost around 200 GBP. It turned 
out that Boncho found the machine on the sidewalk and managed to get it fixed back 
in Bulgaria for 20 GBP. They often used it for impressing their guests (while concealing 
the second-hand origins of this and other items). The coffee maker regularly aroused 
envy among their Bulgarian acquaintances who took it as a demonstration of the 




         
Each of their three bedrooms contained a double bed, a wardrobe and a smaller flat 
screen TV. Incongruous with the furniture, all of the rooms were covered with flower-
patterned wallpaper. The wallpaper was a ‘bargain’ purchased from the home zone of 
Sainsbury’s for 0.20 GBP a roll. While demonstrating the sturdiness of the newly-
bought furniture, Krassi commented: ‘We just went to IKEA and bought stuff for 500 
GBP. We had no second thoughts; we took everything on a zero-interest instalment 
plan. We pay 10 GBP a month, can you imagine? Let me tell you Polina, in Bulgaria 
we could never afford to replace our old furniture and here it is possible!’.  
Through consumption, my informants were able to acquire different objects with 
meaning, which helped them recuperate their personal devaluation by raising their 
standing within the immigrant community. To them, the value of the things that they 
managed to procure did not necessarily lie in their being new but in their affordability 
and good quality. Collecting used goods was seen as legitimate as those were thought 
to come from rich local families, which attested to their good quality and my informants’ 
good taste and ability to spot good value for money. Providing comfort and satisfaction, 
Figure 3. Krassi and Boncho's kitchen, Birmingham 2015. 
Source: the author. 
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commodities were a way of conferring meaning to my informants’ efforts and 
compensating for alienating experiences of exploitation and discrimination.  
In her research on central and east European migrants in London, Barbara Samaluk 
(2016) similarly notes that consumption often becomes a strategy for overcoming 
subordinate class positions in the British labour market and a way for reclaiming value. 
She argues that her informant’s ability to engage, however modestly, in transnational 
consumption in a western market – seen as offering more choice and diversity – 
granted them more prestige and value in their communities back home (Samaluk 
2016). Likewise, having regular access to western goods which were deemed of better 
quality gave my informants a sense of social advancement vis-à-vis some members of 
their social milieu and even more so family and friends in their home communities. 
On the other hand, ‘ordinary people’ were well-aware that their consumption capacity 
and lifestyles were not comparable to the ones enjoyed by members of the mainstream 
British society. I have already explained how the intersections between the two parallel 
worlds that immigrants and locals inhabited were not too many, although few 
occurrences gave my informants painful reality checks. Once, Krassi and Boncho 
asked me to fill in some documents for them and I proposed that we meet in a pub next 
to my flat. On the way there they were nervously asking me questions – ‘What is this 
place like?’, ‘Is it a place where only locals go?’, ‘What do they serve there?’. Before 
entering, they stopped and told me that this was their first time in a ‘real’ British pub 
and they were nervous for not speaking the language but also excited to see what the 
locals did on a Sunday afternoon. When we were sitting at the table over coffees, the 
two of them did not stop commenting on those around: ‘Look at them, they came for 
Sunday lunch, the whole family eating out! This must cost a lot. We never do this. We 
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always eat in.’ Another time, when Blagovest came to visit me in Birmingham, I took 
him out for a coffee in a central canal side café. He was so fascinated with the nice 
environment that he asked me to snap a few pictures of him sipping his drink in front 
of the fireplace.  
The money that migrants spent was earned through backbreaking labour and personal 
devaluation, for this reason they were spent with care and thought for the future. Many 
admitted that given the high price they had paid for improving their lifestyle and the 
huge sacrifices made they did not feel comfortable indulging in frivolous whims and 
wasting money on ‘unimportant’ things. They made sure to put aside a portion of their 
earnings as a form of insurance in case ‘something bad happened’ and their regular 
income stream stopped. Thus, consumption – a strategy migrants used for reconciling 
their precarious and marginal existence and for bringing some sort of ‘normality’ into 
their lives – also had the potential of increasing vulnerability. For example, eating out 
which denoted ‘normality’ was not regularly practiced as it incurred high expenses. 
This made migrants conclude that even if economically more fulfilling, the lives they 
had in the UK were lives they could not ‘live to the full’ and which were, in this respect, 
less satisfying than the ones they had left behind.  
As I have shown in this subsection, ‘ordinary’ Bulgarians were able to secure modest 
levels of consumption and wellbeing, which gave them a taste of the difference 
between life in the UK and the life they had led back home. Overall, however, the 
dream of experiencing ‘normality’ characterised by dignified existence, fair 
remuneration and stability which were expected to confer a sense of meaning to their 
pursuits, largely eluded them; and many believed that it was denied to them by virtue 
of their nationality. Precluded from experiencing the Western kind of ‘normality’ 
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enjoyed by most of the locals, they realised that the only ‘normality’ they could get 
access to, was of a lower order - a ‘migrant’ kind of normality.    
 
‘Bulgarian Westerners’’ mid-term trajectories 
Advancing within the immigrant community  
As already noted, the early migrant trajectories of those who self-identified as ‘middle-
class’ Bulgarians developed in a way very similar to the experiences of the rest of my 
informants. When taking into account the conviction with which they foresaw their 
smooth immersion into a British society welcoming their educational and cultural 
credentials, it is not hard to imagine that upon arrival their shock and humiliation was 
even greater than the one suffered by the rest of migrants. At the same time, they were 
better equipped to manoeuvre this bumpy start by making use of their language skills, 
cultural competences and in some cases the economic resources they were able to 
mobilise through family and friends back home.           
The forceful blurring of class boundaries that migration often leads to (see Hilfinger 
Messias 2001) was painfully experienced by ‘Bulgarian Westerners’ whose journeys 
had often been sparked by a quest for recognition of their middle-class aspiration. 
Since day one they exhibited fervent determination to ‘pull themselves out’ of the 
bottom ranks of the immigrant community and join the British mainstream to which they 
believed they belonged. In most cases, however, such efforts did not yield the results 
my informants expected and their skilled employment in the immigrant economy, 
instead of being a stepping stone, proved to be an enduring attachment.  
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Tanya kept her cleaning job for a little over six months. During that time, she continued 
searching for employment that better matched her qualification and abilities. For a 
month and a half, she worked part time in a call centre interviewing Bulgarian 
households on their energy consumption as part of an EU project on saving energy. 
The hourly wage was less than what she made from cleaning but she fully dedicated 
herself to the job as she hoped this could give her the access to the British labour 
market. After the end of the project, her supervisors refused to relocate her to English-
speaking assignments as she was not a native speaker. A month later, one of her 
Bulgarian acquaintances approached her with a job offer for an office assistant position 
in a Bulgarian building company. Tanya accepted the job as more prestigious than her 
full-time cleaning occupation and as offering her an opportunity for professional 
advancement. A few months later, she told me that she was having some troubles and 
she was already thinking about quitting. We arranged to meet at a busy underground 
station in east London that was close to her work place. Upon my arrival, she called to 
say she was held at work and invited me to her office. After a short walk, I found myself 
in front of a not very welcoming semi-detached house in a small residential street away 
from the hustle and bustle. The ‘office’ into which Tanya ushered me resembled the 
‘home’ office arrangements that were common for many Bulgarian businesses – a 
bedroom in rented accommodation furnished with three desks, and equipped with 
computers and a printer. I sat on the other side of Tanya’s desk, and listened to her 
phone conversation with a British client. She demonstrated professional phone 
etiquette and clearly wanted to present the company in the best possible light. After 
hanging up the phone, she turned to her boss and explained that the client required 
some further information on the quotes she had given him. Seemingly not bothered by 
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my presence (I was introduced as a Bulgarian friend), the owner aired his annoyance 
with the ‘fussy’ client in a dismissive commentary peppered with swear words.  
As Tanya told me later, the main reason why she wanted to find another employment 
was the ‘double life’ (dvoynstven zhivot) which she found hard to reconcile on a daily 
basis. She explained how while at work she had to play two different roles: she 
performed her Westernness while communicating with mostly British clients and she 
switched to her Bulgarian persona while interacting with colleagues and employers. 
Living and working with Bulgarians gave her the feeling she was back in Bulgaria, 
although back home, she added, ‘you can at least surround yourself with like-minded 
people and avoid all the others’. In London, however, one was compelled to closely 
interact with all sorts of Bulgarians: ‘We are in the UK but at the same time some people 
want to live and behave like they are back home. It is like living in two different 
universes. It is so strange.’ Such existence presented a serious moral pressure as she 
was constantly asked by her employer to mislead customers and give false promises 
to fellow employees. She herself suffered the fraudulent practices of her employer169 
who despite his constant reassurance had not provided her with a regular contract. 
Miro’s professional trajectory took on a very similar direction. After labouring for a 
Bulgarian brigade for several months, he met an old acquaintance who offered him a 
managerial position in a Bulgarian cleaning company. Initially, Miro was excited about 
doing what he did best – managing a team, albeit in a different business sector. Three 
months later he was already having second thoughts about his role in the company 
                                            
169 What made matters even worse for my informants was the fact that the Bulgarian employers hey 
worked for were often long-term migrants who had arrived at the time when the competition for jobs in 
the UK was less intense (mid-1990s or early 2000) and who had managed to advance despite their lack 
of education and ‘Balkan mentality’.  
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and his chances of ever finding ‘proper’ employment in the UK. To Miro, the way 
Bulgarian immigrants did business seemed to be exactly the same as in Bulgaria – no 
organisation, very bad treatment of employees, always in the ‘shadows of the law’. In 
his employers’ understanding, a ‘manager’ was a man-of-all-work and someone who 
could fill in for others on all sorts of occasions. In Miro’s eyes, this completely negated 
the nature and prestige of the position in its ‘original’ Western meaning. As a ‘manager’, 
he was required to be on duty around the clock, serve as a driver, a warehouseman 
and a telephonist. He worked without a contract, for a little over the minimum wage 
and, as he later admitted, even without a NINo. It was for this reason that when his 
back was injured on the job one day, his employer was quick to call in a Bulgarian 
doctor for some pain relief injections.  
Thanks to their English language skills and office experience many ‘Bulgarian 
Westerners’, like Miro, were able to move up to white collar positions in the Bulgarian 
immigrant economy in their mid-term period in the UK. Such development was clearly 
interpreted as improvement to the low-skilled jobs my informants held in the early 
migration period, yet it was still miles away from the career ladder advancement they 
imagined for themselves. In fact, professional realisation in the informal immigrant 
economy was often interpreted as further cementing their embeddedness in a reality 
parallel to British society and as depreciating their Western capital. Tanya, for instance, 
worried that her English had gotten much worse since she started working in a 
Bulgarian company, she also often caught herself engaging in behaviour that was 
‘typical’ for the Bulgarian ‘masses’ – raising her voice, engaging in gossip, and going 
to work in a tracksuit like her colleagues, as after all she was working in a ‘bedroom’ 
and not an actual office.  
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Rather than being a step in the right direction, ‘Bulgarian Westerners’ feared that their 
employment in Bulgarian companies would restrict their chances of ever accessing 
highly-skilled jobs on the British labour market. Many believed that local recruiters 
would be put off by their work experience and would doubt their professional qualities. 
Despite their qualifications, work experience and English language proficiency, I did 
not come across a single ‘Bulgarian Westerner’ who had managed to find skilled 
employment outside of the immigrant labour market. This confirms findings from 
research carried out among highly-educated Bulgarian, Romanian, and other east 
European migrants in the UK, which attributes their long-term entrapment in a low-
skilled ethnic labour market to the dual structure of the British labour market and the 
growing demand for low-skilled jobs in consumer and service sectors, as well as the 
expansion of the informal economy. Rising levels of anti-immigrant prejudice, 
discriminatory policies and lack of recognition of professional qualifications have been 
recognised as structural factors limiting upward professional mobility.170 
In explaining the difficulties related to finding and maintaining ‘decent’ employment, 
many concluded that Bulgarians were not well-accepted in the British labour market 
and successful integration into society remained a challenge even for those willingly 
investing major efforts and determination. At the same time, in a paradoxical manner, 
my informants denied the existence of structural or other forms of discrimination and 
continued to sustain their belief in the meritocratic virtues of a society that ‘rewarded 
everyone with what they deserved’. Fox, Morosanu and Szilassy (2015) argue that 
such ‘discrimination denial’ is widespread among east European migrants in the UK 
                                            
170 See Anderson et al. (2006), Briggs and Dobre (2014), Demireva and Kesler (2011), Pollard, Latorre 
and Srikandarajah (2008), Markova and Black (2007).  
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and serves as discursive strategy of mitigating the loss of status deriving from 
professional downgrading. Their informants’ claims for improving their position in the 
British status hierarchy were based on the meritocratic values sustained in their middle-
class ideas of success.171 My informants would in many cases go even further by 
claiming that discrimination was justified in certain cases and for certain types of 
migrants. The bad name that Bulgarians had in the UK, they concluded, was to be 
blamed on the practices and behaviour of ‘typical’ Bulgarian labour migrants. 
‘Bulgarian Westerners’ directed the bitterness of their failed advancement towards their 
fellow compatriots. Sarah Mahler explains a similar practice among Latin American 
immigrants, who blamed fellow compatriots for their misfortunes and exploitation with 
the fact that ‘macrostructural forces are too faceless, while immigrant faces (and 
actions) are all too familiar’ (1995: 218). 
Drawing boundaries  
I have already explained how ‘Bulgarian Westerners’ saw migration as a way of coping 
with personal dislocation produced by the dissonance between their subjectively 
perceived ‘middle-class’ belonging and the inadequate material and symbolic position 
conferred to them within the Bulgarian social hierarchy. The pre-migratory articulations 
of their motives for leaving the country and the construction of their expectations of 
Western futures were articulated along class-tinted divisions between ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
which indicated their perceived cultural and moral superiority via-a-vis ‘incomplete’ 
others. By and large, however, striving for a sense of middle-class distinction or 
advancement to a more privileged status proved fruitless in the UK. Given the high 
                                            
171 See also Eade, Garapich and Drinkwater (2006) on the powerful migrant belief in British meritocracy. 
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levels of de-skilling they experienced in the UK and their homogenisation within the 
Bulgarian immigrant community, they found themselves caught in a steep downward 
spiral which threatened to strip them off their original or desired status and spoil their 
Western credentials. Thus, in the post-migration context class identities not only 
retained their significance in the way people evaluated their situation, made sense of 
their predicament, and engaged in different practices, but were reinforced and cast into 
sharper distinction. Through the drawing of new and more powerful socio-economic, 
cultural and moral boundaries, ‘Bulgarian Westerners’ compensated class frustrations 
and disappointed aspirations in a highly competitive environment of fierce identification 
battles (Lamont 2000). The fact that they were homogenised as part of a ‘Bulgarian’ or 
‘east European minority’ and subjected to the corresponding prejudice and 
discrimination made them determined to reject and resist such classification. It was 
again through the use of Orientalising discourse (Buchowski 2006) that ‘Bulgarian 
Westerners’ tried to ‘codify’ (Wieninger 2005) their difference from compatriots with 
lower levels of cultural and symbolic capital (based on their class or ethnic belonging) 
– those they perceived as cultural Others.  
Shortly after his arrival, Steve had started to make short documentaries on Bulgarians 
living in the UK. The protagonists were usually his acquaintances, people he admired 
for their efforts to give a more favourable image of Bulgarians, or in his words, ‘those 
brave enough to be the political and intellectual class – writers, academics, directors’. 
‘My work is for them, Polina, it will be appreciated by them and not by the Bulgarian 
majority living here’, he told me one day while we were people-watching next to the 
southern entrance of Hyde Park. Then he insisted that we cross the park and go to 
Marble Arch so that he could demonstrate better what he meant. There, in the heavy 
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rush hour traffic of people and cars he spotted a group of roughly-dressed, dark-
skinned people who he claimed were most likely Bulgarian gypsies.  
Look at them! This is what they do all day long – begging and stealing. A ‘Sun’ 
reporter has probably already taken a picture of them and tomorrow we will be 
on front page again – ‘Bulgarians beg in the centre of London!’. Because on 
their ID it says “Bulgarian”, not “gypsy”, right? This is how a bad name is created. 
No need to wonder why on my first interview in a British company they asked 
me – “But wait a minute, you are very white, how come you are Bulgarian?”. 
Steve as many of my informants (‘ordinary people’ included) tried to delineate himself 
from Bulgarian Roma who he defined as criminal, culturally backwards and unwilling 
to integrate. Bulgarianness same as Britishness was for him not about nationality but 
about ethnicity. By lying claims on their Bulgarian nationality Bulgarian Roma were 
seen as the main reason for Bulgarians’ inferior positioning in the British racial matrix.  
However, Steve claimed that such negative representations could not stop him from 
proclaiming his Bulgarian identity. He felt even more encouraged to consciously 
demonstrate it as through his positive example he could prove to the British that 
‘Bulgarians like [him] also exist’172.  
‘Bulgarian Westerners’ blamed the majority of Bulgarian workers in the UK for their 
greed and selfishness, their unwillingness to integrate in the host society and their lack 
of initiative and unclear visions of the future. Demarcation lines between ambitious 
cosmopolitans and undeserving Bulgarians were sometimes drawn between members 
                                            
172 See Genova (2016b) for similar strategies used by educated Bulgarians in the UK for proving one’s 
difference from other co-nationals.  
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of the same kin. Nasko, an electrician and creator of the largest online immigrant forum 
told me how there was very little interaction between his and his brother’s family which 
was also living in London. The conflict between the two had started few years back 
when Nasko grew tired of helping his brother with his settlement and realised that he 
was the kind of migrant who always lived ‘on other’s back’, never willing to stand on 
his own two feet. According to him, ‘around 80 per cent of the Bulgarians living in the 
UK’ shared the same ‘sponger’ mind-set:  
These people are happy to live day by day. They come to suck up as much as 
they can, they are not here to develop their personalities, they will always remain 
cleaners and labourers, and this is as far as their ambition goes. They don’t 
want to become part to this society - their favourite food is not fish and chips but 
lutenitza and lukanka.173 
When asked about how they cooperated with others within the Bulgarian community, 
‘Bulgarian Westerners’ claimed that such a community did and should not exist in the 
first place. Instead, there were different groups, clubs and organisations that united 
like-minded individuals around cultural, social and professional interests: ‘Bulgarian 
business club’, ‘BG kids charity’, Bulgarian student societies, ‘Bulgarian filmmakers 
association’, and so on. This diversification was also structured around a classed 
differentiation reflective of the stratified structure of British society, as my informants 
explained: ‘Britain, as opposed to Bulgaria is a class-based society. It is normal for 
Bulgarians to organise according to their class belonging. After living here for some 
                                            
173 Lutenitza is a traditional Bulgarian dip made out of boiled tomatoes and peppers. Lukanka is a 
traditional kind of salami.  
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time, people start to think ‘why should I go to a chalga174 party with the labourers when 
I am a businessman?’   
Classed distinctions were regularly maintained through the organisation of different 
events. On some rare occasions, however, the rigid lines separating different 
categories of migrants were blurred and led to a ‘clash of classes’ as some called it. I 
witnessed this myself during the visit of the Bulgarian prime minister in the Bulgarian 
embassy in London in the beginning of 2016. The press conference hall was packed 
with around two hundred people, including suit-wearing representatives of the 
business and intellectual ‘elite’, students and Bulgarians labourers who had taken time 
off work in order to come.  
The premier’s speech started with an enlistment of the achievements of his 
government, and at some point, he reassured the public that an abundance of jobs 
awaited all those willing to return back home. This claim was met with the loud derision 
of ‘ordinary’ Bulgarians who called him a ‘demagogue’ and blamed his politics for the 
‘mass exodus’ of Bulgarians in the last few years. A heated confrontation ensued 
between the discontented migrants and the members of the Bulgarian ‘elite’, with the 
latter pleading the former to stop disturbing the official meeting with their undignified 
behaviour. Steve, who was there to report the event for a leading Bulgarian media, 
took the microphone and addressed the public: ‘Let’s please not turn this meeting into 
a provincial quarrel (mahlenski spor) and allow for a civilised dialogue’. His call for 
                                            
174 A popular musical genre in Bulgaria with proclaimed Orientalist motifs, related to the low-brow taste 
of the ‘working masses’. 
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order was followed by approving voices and demands to remove all those who could 
not ‘behave in a well-mannered European way’. 
Figure 4. Bulgarian Prime Minister's meeting in the Bulgarian Embassy. A security guard is trying 
to quench the turmoil among the public, London 2016. Source: http://delo.bg/positions/ogledaltse-
ogledaltse-ya-kazhi-video/attachment /boyko-12/#prettyPhoto 
 
In later conversations with Steve and several of his friends, everyone expressed 
their shame and anger with the uncivilised, non-European behaviour of their 
countrymen who did not allow for a normal and constructive debate. They 
believed their voices should have been silenced and they should not have been 
even admitted to the meeting as they did not provide a legitimate political 
representation of the Bulgarian community in the UK. What irritated ‘Bulgarian 
Westerners’ most was their fellow-immigrants’ unwillingness to recognise their 
subordinate position and cultural remoteness and the impudence with which they 
dared to get involved in social events addressed to their more deserving 
compatriots. ‘Unfortunately, newcomers don’t have the capacity to understand 
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the class organisation of this society. They still don’t know their place’, Steve told 
me. 
Discursive boundary construction and avoidance techniques have been reported from 
a variety of migrant groups and contexts.175 ‘Bulgarian Westerners’’ attempts to 
minimise social interaction with those seen as class-inferior compatriots have been 
documented by Genova (2016b) who observes the delineation strategies of Bulgarian 
students and young professionals in London. She explains everyday hostility and lack 
of engagement as a way of counteracting the dominant stereotypes that homogenise 
all migrants as ‘Bulgarian’ or ‘East European’, as well as negative discourses in 
Bulgaria constructing educated migrants as national traitors (Genova 2016b). Along 
similar lines, Mihal Garapich (2005) discusses the representational struggles in the 
Polish diaspora in the UK, where old time political émigrés try to protect the image of 
the community in the eyes of host and home institutions from the damaging practices 
of recent ‘labour’ migrants.  
Existing xenophobic and culturally racist public discourses in the UK (see Fox, 
Morosanu and Szilassy 2012) and stereotypical understandings of an exceptionally 
class-conscious British society came to compliment and strengthen the Orientalising 
rhetoric appropriated by my aspiring middle-class informants in relation to their less 
Westernised compatriots. In her discussion of Romanian migrants’ discriminatory 
attitudes towards co-nationals Alexandra Bulat (2017) notes how better educated and 
professionally advanced Romanians accept and justify dominant stereotypes for a 
particular sub-group of ‘Romanian Others’ whom her informants claimed to have 
                                            
175 See Bulat (2017), Eade et al. (2007), Garapich (2005), Genova (2016b), Stoilkova (2006). 
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nothing in common with. Such intra-group class tensions are often narrowly interpreted 
by scholars as a migration phenomenon (see Bulat 2017, Genova 2016b). My analysis 
demonstrates how these are reflective of deeply-rooted class and cultural divisions 
within Bulgarian society. When ‘Bulgarian Westerners’ came to the UK they started 
claiming that instead of being able to realise their potential and gain the status and 
respect they believed they had been deprived of back home, their opportunities were 
spoilt by fellow Bulgarians. ‘Ordinary people’, on the other hand, who were treated 
according to a ‘lower mode of valuation’ (Saltynbaeva 2017) in Bulgaria, were 
relegated to an even more marginal status within British society and had to deal with 
the familiar class prejudice of their more-educated compatriots. As I have shown, this 
class conflict was intensified and at times escalated because of the confinement of 
these two groups within the immigrant community and their impossible integration into 
the host society.  
Fake it till you make it – practicing ‘self-realisation’ 
‘Bulgarian Westerners’’ migrations brought up different conflicts that impinged upon 
their class identities and perceptions. The downward mobility brought about by their 
low-skilled employment and their failed attempts to step out of the confines of the 
immigrant community resulted in dislocations they had trouble reconciling with. Their 
occupations and living arrangements in the UK were not only in complete opposition 
to the middle-class lifestyles and success they expected to yield but in many cases 
resulted in a standard of living worse than the one they had in Bulgaria. The ‘status 
inconsistency’ (Lenski 1954: 144) – ‘a state affecting those whose status or rank in one 
domain is inconsistent with how they are perceived in another’ (Olszewska 2013:8) – 
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that my informants experienced in the UK compounded the already experienced 
mismatch between subjective perceptions of class belonging and their objective 
recognition in Bulgarian society (see Chapter Three). In their efforts to deal with such 
ruptures, people did not only employ the above-discussed discursive and practical 
boundary building strategies, but also mobilised available resources to attain 
recognition of their professional qualifications or obtain new ones through short 
courses and trainings in local institutions. Very often, however, such endeavours did 
not bring expected professional advancement and resulted in more despair and 
disappointment.  
One of the most common practices oriented towards recuperation of lost social status 
and temporary soothing of class dislocations that I encountered during my fieldwork 
consisted in the conscious concealment of unpleasant facts of migrant existence and 
positive self-portrayal through identification with desired or previously experienced 
roles and identities.  
The story of Maria (forty two) is a good case in point. She left her retail business 
in Plovdiv, Bulgaria and came to London in search of a new beginning and better 
entrepreneurial opportunities. At her insistence, Maria and I usually met at the top 
floor café of a busy shopping centre close to her flat in east London. I would often 
find her sitting on a table in one of the quieter corners with a tablet, a notebook 
and a mobile phone carefully arranged on the table in front of her. She would 
always wear a set of white shirt and black pencil skirt and sip from her cappuccino 
while telling me about her busy week. It was in this ‘office’, as Maria called it, that 
she made phone calls, organised meetings and did planning for her journalist job 
in an online Bulgarian TV channel in London. She did reporting on all major 
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events taking place in the Bulgarian community and hosted her own weekly TV 
show from her small kitchen. Additionally, she worked as a sales representative 
for two British companies where her earnings depended on the number of 
successful door-to-door sales she could pull.  
Figure 5. Maria and the president of Bulgaria on the event organised by the Bulgarian embassy 
in London, London 2015. Source: Maria 
Our conversations always revolved around the different events she had attended, her 
encounters with Bulgarian politicians and artists, and the romantic country escapes 
that she undertook with her new British boyfriend. 176 Maria prided herself with the fact 
that, as opposed to many other Bulgarians who came to the UK to ‘suffer’ as cleaners 
and labourers, she had managed to almost instantaneously shift back into her familiar 
role of a businesswoman and even discover a new professional devotion. After 
                                            
176 Although she didn’t explicitly mention it, Maria was very proud of having a British boyfriend. Their 
regular weekend escapes to the countryside and dinners in fancy restaurants (photos of which she 
regularly published on Facebook) increased her symbolic capital. It did not, however, improve her 




meeting several of her colleagues from the TV channel, however, I found out that the 
main ‘business’ Maria derived her income from was much less glamorous. It turned out 
all those working in the Bulgarian TV did so on a voluntary basis; in fact, they often had 
to subsidise their travel expenses and technical equipment. Maria, like her other female 
colleagues, was a self-employed cleaner for a Bulgarian company during the week and 
a waitress in a popular Bulgarian pub during the weekends. 
Very similar coping strategies were used by Steve, who enrolled in a Master’s degree 
in filmmaking. Throughout his studies and after graduating, Steve was doing small 
pieces of reporting that were sporadically broadcast on a Bulgarian television channel. 
Additionally, he was working on a few documentary projects that he published on his 
YouTube channel, a music video clip of a Bulgarian pop singer and a short video ad 
for a Turkish café. Like Maria, he was also present at most Bulgarian events taking 
place in London. Although he often emphasised how happy he was with his experience 
at Kingston University, it looked as if the benefits he expected to derive from it did not 
quite materialise. He would dismiss my observation by saying that although he was 
one of Michael Kennedy’s favourite students the competition in the field was so strong 
that he could not do much to help him. Moreover, Steve always emphasised that he 
would anyways prefer to ‘pave his own path to success’. In fact, he claimed, he already 
felt successful because he was in the best place in the world for getting ahead with his 
career. All my attempts at finding out more about the financial parameters of his 
existence were delicately diverted. Eventually, on one occasion later on in my 
fieldwork, after I noticed his dyed fingers, he admitted he made a living as a handyman 
in a printing company but dismissed any of my further inquiries on the topic. 
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Figure 6. Steve’s professional profile description on his website. Source: Steve’s website. 
‘Bulgarian Westerners’ were even more reluctant than ‘ordinary’ migrants to talk 
about their disappointed aspirations. Moreover, as these two stories show, they 
 were often ready to conceal facts that posed a contradiction to their self-assigned 
‘middle-class’ status and to re-invent other personas and identities that were in line 
with their idealised visions of success. By constructing alternative narratives of their 
occupations and experiences, my informants were able to save face in front of friends 
and family back home, but also acquaintances in the UK, and frequently myself. They 
derived their status entirely from their hobbies and side activities which allowed them 
to maintain a positive self-image and future outlook.177 
 
                                            
177The contradiction and hypocrisy of Westerners’ self-portrayal was made even more obvious when 
compared to their accusations against their ‘ordinary’ compatriots who were often said to be ‘living in a 
lie’. Dismissal of other people’s struggles and success appears to be a compensatory mechanism for 





This chapter explored the experiences of my informants once they made their way to 
the UK by providing a longitudinal depiction of their new lives there. The first days and 
weeks shocked the newly arrived and presented them with obstacles which they had 
not anticipated. I have shown how the procuring of basic documents was hampered by 
‘hidden’ bureaucratic mechanisms which delayed or made impossible the legalisation 
of my informants’ status on the labour market. Structural violence and discrimination 
pushed many into a state of de facto illegality and employment in the shadow economy. 
British and Bulgarian employers and gang leaders tricked new migrants into 
exploitative cash-in-hand jobs in construction, cleaning and car washing, which often 
paid too little to cover basic subsistence costs. Their exclusion from the formal 
structures and institutions of the host society made them dependent on the services 
and resources provided by established co-immigrants. A place of antagonism, 
competition and ruthless exploitation, the immigrant community was also a safe haven 
where cooperation, assistance and solidarity between migrants took place. I have 
argued that immigrants’ reliance on each other has engendered a symbiotic 
dependence that was difficult to terminate even beyond this early period of migration.  
The end of the first six months did not bring the positive change that migrants 
anticipated. Their marginalisation to the bottom layer of the host society increased a 
feeling of existence parallel to the mainstream, the meaningful contact points with 
which were few and far between. ‘Ordinary people’s’ lack of English language 
proficiency and economic capital disabled their transition into more stable and better-
paid jobs. Their anxiety-filled and alienating existence revolved around their efforts to 
find and keep employment. This brought fear and insecurity of an extent surpassing 
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what they had experienced back home. Thanks to their language skills and 
professional qualifications, ‘Bulgarian Westerners’ were able to capitalise on 
opportunities for advancement within the Bulgarian immigrant economy in the mid-term 
of their migration experience. The white-collar employment they obtained, however, 
was not evaluated as a genuine success; on the contrary, it was believed to further 
entrench their association with compatriots they had little respect for. Working and 
living with Bulgarians was not what my informants came for – it was their desire to 
escape ‘Bulgarian realities’ and fully immerse themselves into a ‘genuinely Western’ 
society that propelled their moves. Such integration, however, was difficult to achieve, 
as their qualifications and work experience were not recognised in the formal labour 
market. 
At the end of their self-defined mid-term migration trajectories, none of my informants 
managed to succeed in their quest for a better and more fulfilling life as projected in 
their ‘normality’ and ‘American dream’ visions of the West. They devised discursive 
and material practices that helped them cope with the disillusionment that migration 
brought and gave them strength to continue their search for an idealised Western 
future. The next chapter demonstrates how in their long-term strategies migrants 
sustained a positive future outlook and continued to hope for the realisation of their 







‘In Any Case, There Is Hope’: The Persistence and Reproduction of the 
‘Imaginary West’ 
One day I received a phone call from Eleonora – with a quivering voice, she explained 
how that morning on her way to work, as she was exiting the underground, she was 
followed by two young black British who started insulting and laughing at her for no 
reason. At some point, they began throwing empty sandwich boxes and plastic bottles 
at her. With none of the passers-by coming to her support she started running till she 
made sure there was no trace of the two offenders. ‘It is so humiliating, Polina. Why 
would they do this to me? I haven’t done anything wrong; I was just going to work as 
usual. I cannot stand it anymore, my family and I have to endure humiliation and stress 
on a daily basis, and what for? What is the purpose of us even being here?’ A few 
months later, on our last meeting in London, Eleonora demonstrated high spirits and, 
although she still referred to her migrant life as a ‘really though one’, she was able to 
see a future for her family and herself in the UK. She reflected on her situation with a 
wanly smile: ‘Life is a canvas painted by our hopes and whipped out by reality. 
However, if we never lose our hope we will always have a colourful painting in front of 
us.’ 
Eleonora and her husband were among the few who continued to believe that despite 
different setbacks, they were on the right path for realising their dreams of ‘normal’ 
existence. A year after her husband’s arrival, Eleonora’s mother passed away and they 
were forced to bring their fourteen-year-old son to the UK, even though they still lacked 
the financial means to cover the related expenses. The coming together of the whole 
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family was a happy moment but also one of great hardship. For a long time, her son 
had to live in conditions which Eleonora defined as ‘unsuitable for children’ – the three 
were constantly on the move from one overcrowded ‘immigrant’ accommodation to 
another in the effort to find better value for money. Despite all this and the fact that 
Eleonora and her husband were still labouring on jobs that had little relevance to their 
qualifications, she claimed that their life was ‘very messed up’, but in a ‘positive way’. 
Starting their own furniture restoration business – their pre-migration plan, still 
appeared feasible in their eyes. ‘Good things happen to those who wait’, concluded 
Eleonora, and assured me that in Britain the patience of those who take ‘one step at a 
time’ is always rewarded.  
*** 
In the previous chapters I have explained that, regardless of their class-based identities 
and backgrounds, my informants related their migration to the UK to the desire for 
existential advancement in a hierarchically structured order of nations. They 
considered the UK as standing at the top of this imaginary ranking. The country was 
seen as highly desirable migration destination because it was the closest 
approximation to an idealised West. Accordingly, I have argued that future migrants’ 
motivations were significantly influenced by their search for the ‘imaginary West’ – a 
benchmark of western modernity and development – that took on different variations 
reflecting migrants’ respective perceptions of class belonging. Soon after they made 
their way to the UK, my informants were rushed into a reality that was drastically 
incompatible with their pre-conceived dreams and aspirations. However, as explained, 
their shock and disillusionment did not result in immediate return, nor did it lead to 
acknowledgment of the illusionary nature of their imaginings and expectations.  
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In this chapter, I will present the different future orientation strategies through which 
my informants hoped to overcome a new state of international stuckedness that 
migration has positioned them into. I demonstrate how the different trajectories 
migrants conceived as meaningful were all inspired by a sustained desire to pursue 
and realise the ‘imaginary West’. I turn back to this central concept of my research and 
reflect on its teleological nature – a characteristic that became fully apparent only in 
the post-migratory negotiations of future possibilities. I further substantiate the 
argument about the significance of the ‘imaginary West’ in explaining the paradoxical 
persistence of Bulgarian migration to the UK by revealing the reproduction of the West 
in a ‘cycle of deception’ (Mahler 1995: 88). 
By tracing how migrants’ lives developed after the completion of my fieldwork I provide 
a closure to some of the personal stories told in this thesis. The period depicted here 
concerns the second year after their initial arrival in the UK. Restricting the regular 
contact with people who had by that time become my friends seemed impossible. As 
the ethnographic examples in this thesis have demonstrated, migrants’ lives are often 
imbued by isolation and heartache. In our efforts to alleviate such feelings, both my 
informants and I insisted on talking to each other as often as we did before. And while 
with time some people disappeared from my radar, my connection with others became 
more personal and they accepted me as part of their families. In this sense, leaving 
the field proved to be harder than entering it, but staying in touch also allowed me to 
gather more data and indicate how some informants’ lives developed after the formal 
end of my fieldwork.  
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The chapter returns to elaborate on the following questions: Where are my informants 
now?178 How do they evaluate their present lives (the future that they hoped for) in 
respect to the goals they had set for themselves prior to their migrations? How do they 
imagine the future from now on?  
In the first part of this chapter I outline a condition I call ‘international stuckedness’, 
which most accurately describes the condition of my informants. I see this state as 
resulting from the structural limitations inhibiting migrants’ successful integration into 
British society and the virtual impossibility of return. The second part of the chapter is 
dedicated to the different future-oriented scenarios that migrants devised in an effort 
to overcome this unexpected stagnation, and which often stood in contradiction to their 
pre-migratory plans for long-term settlement. Finally, I explain the persistence with 
which my informants held on their dreams with the positive function that these served 
in alleviating inner conflicts, external hardship and, most importantly, sustaining an 
optimistic outlook.  
 
Internationally stuck  
Through migration, my informants had expected to gain access to an imaginary 
Western world which would offer possibilities to attain a way of life which was always 
desired but never attainable in Bulgaria. The previous chapter gave an insight of how 
the dreams and aspirations at the heart of the migration projects were crushed by 
unforeseen negative experiences. While Bulgarians readily confirmed the existence of 
ample possibilities in the UK, the structural obstacles posed by ‘hidden immigration 
                                            
178 This ‘now’ coincides with the time after the end of their first year in the UK. 
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controls’ and an exploitative labour market, together with different forms of 
discrimination, kept them from seizing upon any of these. Therefore, instead of bringing 
them closer to the fulfilment of their dreams of meaningful movement forward, 
migration positioned them in an existential stalemate that was even more painful and 
disempowering than the one they had struggled with in Bulgaria. This state, which can 
be suitably denoted as ‘international stuckedness’ (cf. Hage 2005), impacted the lives 
of all my informants, albeit in different ways and to varying degrees. The return to a 
familiar, yet unexpected, feeling of stagnation that often took on a new depth was first 
of all a result of the drastic mismatch between my informants’ anticipations of idealised 
Western futures and the actually available opportunities they encountered.  At the 
same time, the realisation that even the UK could be a place where one could get 
stuck, in some cases in degrees far exceeding prior experiences of existential 
immobilisation, was prompted by my informants’ lack of time, social isolation, and 
limited physical mobility and opportunities for recreation.  
Time became a precious resource migrants struggled to procure in the face of 
uncomfortable trade-offs: more opportunities for interaction with family and friends 
often required time off work, which in turn reduced earnings and incurred the risk of 
losing one’s job. Not having enough time to sleep, rest, eat, think, and enjoy – which 
had never been an issue in Bulgaria – created a feeling of lack of mastery over the 
pace and direction their lives were taking.  
The lack of time was one of the reasons leading to oft-reported feelings of social 
isolation. My informants, especially those who made the journey on their own, were 
caught off guard by loneliness and alienation. They admitted to having underestimated 
their ability to cope with even short-term separation from their loved ones. Online 
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interaction often did not have the power to mitigate such emotional deficiencies and 
instead increased feelings of helplessness and vulnerability. For example, Miro had a 
hard time Skyping with his six-year-old daughter who could not stop crying and blaming 
him for leaving her behind: ‘It is so hard, when I hear her asking “Daddy, who will take 
me to school now that you are not here?”, my heart sinks. What to answer? She cannot 
understand why I am doing this. Who knows, maybe she is right and I should go back 
home.’ The importance of maintaining social and kin networks for the physical and 
psychological wellbeing of migrants is reflective of the distrust and suspicion prevailing 
in the immigrant community, as well as of the cultural and physical displacement of 
Bulgarian migrants to the fringes of society. It also became obvious that restricted daily 
sociability and lack of trustful relationships made my informants share their lives with 
me more readily, something that had proven a challenge in my earlier fieldwork in 
Bulgaria.  
Unfamiliar surroundings and unfriendly faces limited the physical movement of 
Bulgarians to the bounds of their own homes and neighbourhoods. I have explained 
how in some cases this was a voluntary seclusion induced by anxiety and feelings of 
inferiority. In other instances, however, migrants’ spatially constrained existence was 
a clear result of economic limitations, the organisation of British urban life and the lack 
of familiarity with leisure opportunities in a country that remained still largely unknown 
to them. Those who commuted by car were stunned to find out that keeping a vehicle 
in the UK was a privilege that only people with stable and well-paid employment could 
afford. The cost of public transportation was found to be off-putting, especially when 




Having to do without a car is not easy. In Bulgaria, each weekend you can jump 
in your car and go to the countryside, no problem. Here, even when you manage 
to find a day off you must spend it in the city, most probably not further than the 
local park. 
By contrast, those living outside London complained that they felt like in the ‘middle of 
nowhere’, stuck in provincial localities that did not offer any pastime entertainment. In 
truth, however, there existed plentiful opportunities for leisure, entertainment, and 
consumption and all my informants were obviously aware of this. Those I spoke to 
always mentioned how in the UK ‘there was anything one could think of’, and how 
‘British just had it all – bars, cafes, shopping malls’ all of a size and quality that 
‘Bulgarians could only dream of’. This was communicated most unequivocally to me 
by a Bulgarian stranger I met in a busy shopping mall in east London. Miro and I were 
in one of the seating areas on an early Sunday evening, contemplating the recent 
upheavals in his work and his growing desire to go back to Bulgaria, when he spotted 
a familiar face on the other side of the sofa. It was a young Bulgarian man with whom 
Miro had worked for a short while and who was currently employed as a carpet cleaner. 
Taken by his own doubts and disillusionments, Miro immediately asked the guy if he 
enjoyed living in London. ‘Yes, of course’, he replied ‘Who doesn’t?’ Evidently annoyed 
by this answer, Miro continued: ‘And what is it that you so much enjoy?’ The guy 
shrugged his shoulders and gestured to the surroundings: ’All of this! What more can 
one wish for?’  
Most of my informants, however, claimed that observing was not like participating and 
that, while a paradise for those with enough cash, for those without it, the city could 
easily turn into a nightmare. Gloria described this state of being as living under a ‘glass 
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lid’ (pohlupak): ‘On my way to school I look at the people dining in chic street 
restaurants, they are laughing, they look so happy and content. I am wondering: How 
can they be so happy, what is there to be happy about?’ She added that for many of 
her fellow students London, was like a ‘sea of pleasures’ and they took every 
opportunity to explore its dynamic art scene, night life and multiple other perks. For 
her, as for many others, regular glimpses of sparkle and abundance they were 
precluded from enjoying provided a new scale for measuring their own marginality and 
privation.  
If the lives led in the UK continued experiences of existential impasse and in some 
cases even augmented them, the logical question arises: Why did migrants not return 
to Bulgaria? The prospect of returning to Bulgaria became particularly salient in 
moments of extreme hardship and in light of the drastic gap between imagined 
opportunities and what was realistically achievable in the UK. Moving back to Bulgaria, 
however, was rarely seen as a real alternative. Memories of their lives back home were 
still too fresh not to be taken into account and migrants feared that if they were to return 
they would have to encounter the same limitations that had initiated their journeys. 
Bulgaria continued to be imagined as a place where it was impossible to earn a ‘normal’ 
living or achieve professional realisation and success. Every time I met him, Miro, for 
instance, told me that he carried his plane ticket back to Bulgaria in his pocket. On 
several occasions, he admitted to regretting leaving his family behind and coming to 
the UK. He was unhappy with his achievements and with his ‘weakness’ for not being 
able to ‘brace himself’ and ‘endure’ better the frustration and suffering. He would often 
call me in late evenings when feeling particularly despaired and ask me if going back 
home was the right thing to do. This question never left him at peace and he was 
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constantly asking advice from other Bulgarians he met. Some encouraged him to go 
back with the arguments that ‘there is no place like home’ and ‘being with one’s family 
is the only thing that matters’; others tried to stop him, pleading that all returnees 
eventually regret their decisions after realising that in Bulgaria ‘everything is as it used 
to be’.  
At some point in their ‘migrant careers’, upon re-assessing pre-migratory expectations 
against opportunities on offer, my informants’ started to re-consider their migratory 
projects and initial visions of permanent settlement. For almost all of them migration 
became conceptualised as a temporary endeavor for reaching certain tangible goals 
or fulfilling moral responsibilities towards family members in the UK and in Bulgaria. 
Half a year after their arrival, Krassi and Boncho, for example, assured me they would 
stay in the UK until their sons completed their education and took on their own path. 
Others announced plans of staying no more than ten years as this was the minimum 
period required for obtaining a British state pension. Assen concluded that he would 
not go back before repaying his travel debt and maybe saving some extra pounds in 
order to eventually start a business in Bulgaria. Whether such re-configured strategies 
reflected realistic future developments or were used by migrants for opening up 
avenues for reconciling and coming to terms with their predicament is hard to judge. 
In articulating their visions, however, they all constructed Bulgaria as a place to which 
return was possible only after some financial security or other important achievement 
was realised. In this sense, Bulgaria was mostly seen as offering a slow-paced life and 
a space for rest, consumption, and enjoyment and not as a place where dreams came 
true or any grand accomplishments could be achieved.  
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Return, even when seriously contemplated and desired, was often impossible for a 
number of other reasons which migrants found hard to resolve. These included the 
fear and shame of being seen as a failure, the burden of incurred debts and the 
financial and moral promises made to family members. Even though by going back 
home migrants could have resolved a great deal of their present hardship, return was 
not preferred as it was taken as a move backwards. Their ability to sustain themselves 
for a long period of time in the UK was taken as a proof of their stamina and 
perseverance. This thinking was rooted in visions of a hierarchically structured world 
in which one’s movement to a country of a higher order, no matter how unsuccessful, 
still denoted a sense of upward mobility; if not for migrants themselves, then at least in 
th eyes of external observers. This conviction was often conveyed to me with the 
saying: ‘better to suffer in the UK than back in Bulgaria’ (po-dobre da se machish v 
Anglia otkolkoto v Bulgaria). 
In this sense, my informants found themselves in a position of international 
stuckedness within a hierarchy of places, unable to seize any meaningful opportunities 
for existential advancement in the UK and at the same time unwilling to incur regress 
by going back home. Rigid interrelations between individuals, countries, and national 
belonging made existential movement forward through physical mobility across 
national borders largely impossible. Migration led to the realisation that departure from 
a place of low ranking and physical presence in a place of top standing could not 
eradicate the inferiority that one carried by virtue of one’s nationality. Regardless of 
their individual qualities, skills and experience, migrants were allocated to a certain 
standing in the host society that corresponded to their belonging to a certain country 
in the hierarchical world order. Through their experiences in the UK, they learnt that 
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one’s national belonging determined one’s position within an existent country-specific 
hierarchy of nations179. They started believing that their perseverance and struggle to 
escape prejudice and prove their worth would never serve to transcend the 
disadvantaged status that Bulgaria held in the local and international order of nations.  
To paraphrase Henrink Vigh’s (2009:105) conclusion with regards to the failed hopes 
of west African migrants in Europe, once in the UK, my informants reached the 
‘realisation that they do not just come from a disadvantaged place but belong to a 
disadvantaged nation’.180 Thus, the existential advancement through the crossing of 
international borders between places of different rank remained impossible for my 
informants. On the contrary, this movement brought about an even more acute sense 
of entrenchment in their social and existential immobility. This finding, questions the 
salience of transnational approaches to international mobility which often focus on the 
way in which unrestricted flows of people successfully navigate their paths within an 
interconnected globe. In contrast, the examples presented here draw the picture of a 
fixed global hierarchy in which ‘places have their place’ (Ferguson 2006) and the place 
one assumes is determined by one’s nationality and country of origin. My findings 
suggest that ‘methodological nationalism’ and national belonging continue to dominate 
the way in which people construct their perceptions of others and the social worlds 
which they inhabit. My informants’ experiences in the UK demonstrate how nationality 
also has the power of determining how far one gets with regards to one’s dreams and 
ambitions and one’s chances for obtaining a membership in a first-class order of 
                                            
179 Erind Pajo has called this ‘domestic hierarchy of places’ (2007: 277) 
180 In his words ‘race’ instead of a ‘nation’. The understanding that they come from a disadvantaged 
nation was cast in yet stronger relief by their observation that people from what they considered inferior 
racial and ethnic belonging fared better in the British labour market and society as a whole.  
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nations (Ferguson 2006). Assen captured this existential impasse when in a time of 
great despair, he said to me: ‘We Bulgarians are wanted nowhere, neither here nor in 
our own country, where should we go then?’ In turn, I examine the ways in which my 
informants tried to deal with this stuckedness and the paths their migration projects 
took in the long run.  
 
Future scenarios and long-term experiences of migration  
This section presents the four most common future scenarios that my informants 
developed in an attempt to mitigate the state of international stuckedness. It also offers 
a glimpse of how their lives were developing in the long run and what happened to the 
imaginaries that had drawn them to the UK. Class remained an important aspect of 
migrant’s self-representations, either in the form of self-ascribed identity, objectively 
allocated position or as a result of newly-gained (or lost) material and symbolic 
attributions. While such dependencies will be articulated where important, I chose not 
to differentiate their experiences according to this variable as the main goal is to 
elucidate the different patterns that migration took and the way in which visions of life 
in the West persisted despite their apparently illusionary nature.  
Staying against the odds 
As I already made clear, the majority of my informants chose to stay in the UK despite 
their dissatisfaction with their present achievements, either because they were able to 
imagine the opening up of future possibilities for advancement or as an outcome of the 
deadlock they were caught up in. Many continued to endure the hardships and 
constant insecurities of life in the name of their children’s future wellbeing. After being 
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in the UK for little more than two years, Krassi and Boncho still lived in their rented 
three-bedroom house – their new ‘British home’ – in the outskirts of Birmingham. The 
family of four depended mostly on the salary of Boncho, who had secured contracted 
employment as a night shift delivery driver with a British transport company, and that 
of the older son Dani, who worked for a local staffing agency. After working for a year 
as agency staff herself and suffering what she described as ‘constant humiliation and 
harassment’ by employers and supervisors, Krassi decided to take a break and invest 
time and money into improving her English. She believed this to be her only chance of 
finding ‘decent’ employment in a British company. Although she had made good 
progress and even managed to help other Bulgarians with document translations, she 
was still very anxious when communicating in English. Every time we met she would 
express her frustration with her inability to finally let go of her inhibitions and start 
‘speaking like a normal person’. She would jokingly add that it seemed more likely for 
the British around her to start speaking Bulgarian than for her to ever master English.  
Krassi and Boncho agreed that the UK was not where they wanted to be in the long 
run and they eagerly used each chance to go back to Bulgaria and spend time with 
their friends and relatives. Despite being confident that they would never be able to get 
used to British habits, people and culture, their stay in the UK was necessitated by 
their parental obligations towards their two sons. They believed that by bringing their 
children to the UK they had provided them with an opportunity to follow their ambitions 
and shape significantly different lives than the ones available back home. ‘We do 
everything for our children, we live for them, we would give anything so that they have 
it better than us.’ These were the words with which Krassi often explained her staying 
in the UK despite her strong urge to ‘ditch it all and dash off to Bulgaria’.  
270 
 
With such hopes in mind, they encouraged their sons to pursue their desired careers 
and, despite their modest income, spared no resources in ensuring that they received 
the right education and qualifications. Their youngest – Slavi dreamt of becoming a 
commercial pilot, a prospect that Krassi and Boncho found very appealing for the 
prestige and economic security such job brought. Dani, who was already twenty-one 
and held no ambitions for pursuing a degree, was encouraged by his parents to 
develop his hobby and train to be a fitness instructor. Krassi would often seek my help 
and advice when searching for the colleges, university programs and training courses 
that would best suit her sons’ ambitions. In my conversations with the two boys it 
became clear that they did not quite share the enthusiasm of their parents and had 
serious doubts they could realise the expectations directed at them. This is not to say 
that they did not have their future aspirations; they were simply not confident that the 
UK would give them the chance of living the lives their parents envisioned for them.  
Krassi and Boncho were clearly disappointed with many aspects of their migrant lives. 
They were certain that they would not be able to reach the kind of ‘normality’ they had 
hoped for when first coming to the country. The economic security, professional 
realisation and dignified living they envisioned for their children, however, indicated 
their sustained belief in the possibility for ensuring a ‘normal’ life for their sons. It 
appears that they tried to compensate their own frustration by transferring the dream 
of ‘normality’ to their children.  
The paths of Lora and Emil, the mother and son who managed to reunite in south 
London after years of separation had parted again after Emil’s decision to move in with 
friends at the end of their second year living together. After obtaining several 
certificates, Emil had managed to advance to the position of forklift driver in the same 
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company he started working in after his arrival. He was happy with the lifestyle he was 
able to afford and with finally managing to surround himself with good friends. Lora, 
still toiling as a babysitter and cleaner, was deeply hurt by her son’s move, although 
she understood his motives. She said to me she would stay in London up until she was 
fully confident that Emil was able to stand on his two feet and did not require her 
emotional and financial support. While realistic about her own restricted chances of 
ever getting out of low-skilled employment, Lora continued to claim that London was a 
place offering unlimited opportunities for growth and advancement to all willing to 
invest the required efforts. She hoped that one day she would see Emil enjoying the 
life she was no longer expecting for herself. 
The best of both worlds  
For others, the future was associated with regular mobility between Britain and 
Bulgaria. For Steve and other ‘Bulgarian Westerners’, turning mobility into a way of life 
expressed a cosmopolitan mind-set and an opportunity to devise a dynamic existence 
of their own choosing. After being in London for little more than two years, Steve was 
still working hard on short films, documentaries and other projects related to his 
filmmaking career aspirations. Such pursuits served to build up his portfolio and 
promote his work but were unable to secure him a living. This meant that he could not 
afford letting go of his low-skilled full-time employment. With the passing of time, 
sustaining the identity of a successful professional in front of friends and acquaintances 
in Britain and Bulgaria became harder, especially given his limited financial resources. 
Surprisingly, Steve started claiming that he had never held intentions to stay long in 
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the UK and had only come to draw on the ‘positive sides’ that the country had to offer, 
and to later make use of them in Bulgaria. 
I noticed that at some point of their migration journeys, after realising the infeasibility 
of their ‘American dream’ aspirations for success and recognition, my self-appointed 
‘middle-class’ informants started reiterating a popular discourse related to the historical 
migration of Bulgarian intelligentsia to western Europe. They started seeing 
themselves as continuers of the missionary deeds of nineteenth century Bulgarian 
revivalists (vazrozhdentsi), whose patriotic mission of unifying and consolidating the 
Bulgarian people in their liberation struggles against the Ottoman empire involved the 
promotion of Enlightenment ideas ‘as a path to self-awareness’ (Daskalov 1998). This 
is how they explained their desire to build up a transnational existence between East 
and West. Their return, they claimed, was necessitated by their patriotic calling for 
‘ennobling’ the nation by promoting ‘completely different visions’ of how to make 
business, how to think about the economy, how to build a healthcare system, and most 
of all how to adopt a different ‘mentality’. 
Steve knew that he could use his stay in the UK for enhancing his professional status 
back home by telling about his prestigious education, his filmmaking experience, and 
his international networks. This way, he managed to not only get back his old job at 
the TV channel but also secured an instant promotion and a much better pay. By 
successfully exploiting his western capital and his real or invented achievements in the 
UK, Steve managed to land prestigious employment and avoid the stigmatisation of 
his return as a ‘failure’. Sustaining such a cosmopolitan identity in the long run, 
however, required the maintenance of regular contacts with the West, indicated in 
Steve’s statement that he could never imagine himself not coming back to western 
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Europe and not collaborating with his London contacts, either by working for them in 
the UK or inviting them to Bulgaria for projects. This back-and-forth mobility sustained 
a transnational existence and served as a constant confirmation of his Westernness 
and international success.  
When under migrants’ control, mobility can become a permanent strategy and be 
empowering (Conradson and Latham 2005). For ‘Bulgarian Westerners’, it meant a 
possibility for negotiating class dislocations through the conversion of western cultural 
and social capital into symbolic and economic capital back home. ‘Ordinary people’, 
however, many of whom were forced into intense back and forth movement, came to 
experience it as a compromise and as entrenching their feelings of precariousness 
(Standing 2011: 14). Since he first came to the UK in the summer of 2014 as a 
temporary worker for a Bulgarian subcontractor, Blagovest made several attempts to 
settle in London and start working towards a British ‘normality’ of life. Friends and long-
term migrants on whom he relied for help let him down, and after a few weeks of drifting 
between odd jobs he returned back to Bulgaria. In the next two years, Blagovest’s time 
was split between the UK where he continued to work for different subcontractors on 
badly paid labour-intensive jobs and Bulgaria, where he spent time recovering and 
securing his next employment. Each time, he left with the hope of ‘getting on his feet’ 
and upon each return he had to face the uncomfortable questions from friends and 
neighbours. Engaging in conspicuous consumption as a practice of enhancing one’s 
status and escaping the stigma of ‘failure’ has been reported as common amongst 
returnees181. In Blagovest’s case, however, the constant insecurity he had to struggle 
                                            
181  See Marcus (2011), King (2000). 
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with and his ambition for permanent settlement forced him to make savings and hence 
limit himself to a thrifty existence both at home and abroad. Similar to Blagovest, the 
other involuntary ‘circular’ migrants amongst my informants continued to pursue their 
Western imaginary of creating a ‘normal’ life for themselves and their families.  
The West is elsewhere 
The disappointment with not being able to realise their pre-migratory aspirations made 
some conclude that the UK was in fact not the Western destination providing the best 
opportunities for the fulfillment of migrants’ dreams. In the same way in which they 
constructed their initial vision of the UK as the West, my informants constantly, 
throughout their migration journeys, picked up on different rumours and impressions 
circulating within the immigrant community in projecting the West further afield. This is 
how other – ‘more advanced’, ‘better organised’, and ‘more open’ countries came to 
represent the ‘real West’ in their visions. For instance, Tanya’s growing embitterment 
with her unsuccessful attempts to start working for a British company made her 
conclude that British society was quite racist and that, similar to Bulgaria, ‘good’ jobs 
were only available to those with ‘strong connections’. She started imagining herself in 
countries with ‘actually functioning’ meritocracy. On our last meeting, she was talking 
about the United States and Australia as desirable destinations for further migration. 
She imagined the US as the place where the creative people would usually go and 
claimed that there, highly profitable occupations existed not to be found anywhere else. 
Australia, on the other hand, besides having the perfect climate was also believed to 
be a place with the highest demand for highly-skilled international professionals. As a 
proof, Katya pointed to the fact that the ‘British themselves’ often admitted that life in 
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Australia was much more fulfilling that the one in the UK. To her, the fact that the 
biggest British diaspora was living in Australia was not a coincidence. To my surprise, 
only a couple of months after this last meeting I got a message announcing that Katya 
and her Bulgarian boyfriend had left London for good and were now touring the east 
coast of the US. Their plan was to first gather impressions of life in different states 
before deciding on where to settle. In any case, she reassured me, they both felt much 
happier than before and had not missed London, at all. 
Others, especially among my young informants, entertained imaginaries of the ‘good 
life’ to be found in New Zealand, Canada, or Italy. Several of those looking for a 
‘normal’ life expressed regrets that they had not migrated to Germany or France, where 
their friends had managed to advance much faster on their migrant journeys. Nikolay, 
who left to work in a retirement home in the West Midlands when I first met him, grew 
tired of the humiliation that was part and parcel of his daily life as a care assistant. Not 
able to get his nursing qualification recognised he had spent two years changing 
different employers to no avail: everywhere he went he experienced ‘slave-like 
conditions’. East Europeans, he claimed, were treated unfairly especially in 
comparison to other migrants – low wages, little respect and constant exploitation 
made their lives impossible to bear. For Nikolay, the problem lay in the British people’s 
‘mentality’: as opposed to Bulgarians, they were a ‘cold nation’ whose imperial past 
still made them ‘look down’ at foreigners. Spanish had a ‘mentality much closer to the 
Bulgarian one’ – they were warm and welcoming, he thought and asserted that he was 
ready to ‘do wonders’ to make a living there. He defined Spain as the ‘real country’ 
where one could ‘enjoy every second of one’s life’, mostly because of the relaxed way 
of life, the good climate and the warmth of the people. For the time being, however, he 
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realised he had to stay in the UK for as long as it took Spain to overcome its economic 
collapse and become a viable migration option.  
Many of those who for one reason or another remained in London started to see the 
city as the main impediment on their quest for ‘normality’; much in contrast to their pre-
migratory idealisations. London was said to be different from all other places in the UK 
– a ‘universe of its own’ that did not represent the country as a whole.182 ‘London is not 
England’, they would often say and start imagining, often in extremely racialised way, 
what their future could look like outside the capital. If they managed to move out of 
London, my informants believed they could gain the chance of completely changing 
their predicament. Like many other Bulgarians, Georgi was initially confident that 
London was the place offering the best employment opportunities and hence the 
quickest path to settling down. After visiting friends in northern England who had 
migrated around the same time as him, he remarked on how much better their overall 
quality of life was compared to his:183  
It was so beautiful and clean there, I only saw two blacks (dvama cherni). I am 
also not British but when you live with other nations, like in London, they pollute, 
throw trach on the street. I don’t like this. The British live in trust and cooperation 
– you feel like you live in a community. 
One and a half years after his initial arrival, he decided to make a new start in 
Southend-On-Sea – a small seaside town next to London. When I last visited him there, 
                                            
182 They often complained of their inability to save up any money, of not having enough time to spend 
with family and friends, and of having to live in destitute areas of the city where one couldn’t spot a 
single ‘white person’. 
183 Here, we see again the racialised imaginary of the West.  
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he was still adjusting to his new job as a self-employed multi-drop delivery driver and 
to his new house share. Thus, the West was not only re-projected into different 
countries across the globe, but migrants also developed more nuanced pictures of life 
in the UK and the regional differences in ethnic and racial composition, employment 
opportunities and living conditions.   
Returning home  
Very few of my informants chose to return to Bulgaria. One of them was Miro who 
terminated his ‘immigrant career’ only six months after he first came to the UK. He was 
content with the progress he had achieved for half a year, but also disappointed with 
himself for not finding the inner strength to resist the desire to return. The biggest 
problem for him was that his wife and daughter had no desire for joining him in the UK 
and he could not bear the prospect of living away from them any longer. Before leaving, 
he told me that his only regret was that he did not try hard enough to find his way in 
the British car parts trade. He asked me to accompany him to a meeting he had 
organised with some former British business partners whose company was in 
Lancashire. On the long drive there, he explained that if they accepted his idea for a 
car parts trade between the UK and the Balkan region he would have the chance to 
start running a successful business that he could manage from Bulgaria. This was his 
chance of making a living in Bulgaria and at the same time ensuring regular trips to the 
UK that would sustain his connection to the country and break the routine of a fully 
sedentary lifestyle. After brief consideration, the company rejected his business 
proposal because of the ongoing stagnation on the east European market. After his 
return, Miro started developing a small-scale manufacturing business in his hometown. 
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He managed to repair the relationship with his wife and they claimed to be happy and 
content with their life. Although he did not regret his return, he still had the feeling that 
his life in Bulgaria was boring in comparison to the life he could have had if he had 
stayed in London. He was confident that by now, he would have ‘made it’ there. Despite 
not having any concrete migration plans, he started taking lessons to improve his 
English and did not exclude the possibility of trying his luck again – this time armed 
with better language skills and accumulated ‘migrant knowhow’. 
After spending two years as a circular migrant, Assen decided to start a cleaning 
business in Bulgaria so that he could be with his wife and small daughter. This decision 
provoked th discontent of his wife and parents who still hoped that the family could one 
day settle in the UK and have the dream life of many successful Bulgarian migrants. 
His business was slowly picking up, but Assen was still contemplating trying his luck 
again in the UK. He would occasionally call me on the phone to tell that he came across 
a promising job offer and he was unsure if to take on it or not.  
In the course of their migrations many of my informants started softening their highly 
critical evaluations of life in Bulgaria. A few even suggested that Bulgaria held some 
latent opportunities waiting to be seized by entrepreneurial and ambitious returnees. 
Such newly found appreciation of the homeland, which cast Bulgaria as an ‘almost 
West’ was a discursive framing adopted mostly by return migrants who used it as a 
way for compensating the prejudice that awaited them and as a self-persuasion 




The West as telos 
The main version of the ‘elsewhere of late Socialism’, as Alexey Yurchak calls the 
‘imaginary West’, developed and persisted in Soviet people’s imagination for as long 
as the ‘real’ West remained unreachable (2006). When the borders dividing the 
Socialist bloc from the West became more permeable and people gained the 
opportunity to see for themselves the world they so longed for, they were shocked by 
how different the ‘real’ West was from the ‘imagined’. For Yurchak’s informants, this 
first encounter led to the immediate collapse of the imaginary construct and the painful 
realization that, as their Soviet past, the alternative reality that the ‘imaginary West’ 
allowed for was forever gone (2006: 202). For my informants, as for many other 
Bulgarians, however, the illusionary dreams about the West continued to persist long 
after mass-scale travel to western Europe became available in the early 1990s and, 
more importantly, despite the fact that the aspirations and expectations of migrants 
have not materialised. As I have shown, the collision between expectations and reality 
which my informants suffered shortly upon arrival was hard to bear. When compared 
to their post-migratory experiences, the visions of the Western future that brought them 
to the UK seemed at best idealistic and at worst naïve. Throughout my fieldwork, 
however, almost none of my informants openly acknowledged this fallacy. Neither did 
I hear them saying that had they known better what they were to find, they would have 
never chosen to migrate. Even when lamenting the myriad calamities that they had 
been through and denouncing the UK for its hostile welcome, they rarely regretted their 
journeys and they never admitted that the ‘imaginary West’ had eluded them.    
In fact, as these final glimpses into migrants’ lives demonstrate, instead of being 
debunked, the Western dream continued to live on in imaginations of a better future. 
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The majority of my informants decided to stay in the UK either because they found 
return undesirable for a variety of reasons or because they experienced certain 
aspects of their present as more rewarding than what was before. In either case, they 
retained the belief that through determination and perseverance they could overcome 
the adversities and pave a way to the West either for themselves or their children. 
Others strove to shape a transnational existence between Britain and Bulgaria and 
reap the benefits that each of these places could offer. By maintaining a close 
connection with the UK, they enhanced their socio-economic position and symbolic 
status in Bulgarian society and experienced themselves as one step closer to the West. 
The ones caught up in a pattern of a circular mobility continuously confronted the 
insecurities of life that had slipped outside their control amidst their attempts to 
eventually establish themselves in the UK and realise their Western dream. 
Disenchanted with what the UK had to offer, others admitted having unrightfully 
identified the country as the ultimate embodiment of the West. By shifting the 
geographical coordinates of their imaginary, they demonstrated readiness to further 
pursue their dreams by embarking on journeys to destinations which could offer a more 
genuine Western experience.  
Finally, it appeared as the few who decided to take the risk and return home – in most 
cases empty-handed – were the ones who at least implicitly recognised the 
elusiveness of the ‘imaginary West’. In their evaluations of their immigrant careers and 
reflections on their uncertain new beginnings, however, they continued to nourish this 
imaginary by either keeping the option of future westwards mobility open, or by 
constructing Bulgaria as a ‘possible West’.  
281 
 
The positive assurance with which my informants continued to sustain the desire for 
and possibility of a Western life can be explained with the proofs of its existence 
gathered from observing the lives of the locals. The West was glimpsed in the 
comfortable lives of their employers and their beautiful houses; it was in the 
lighthearted banter coming from the populated central cafes and chic restaurants and 
in the corporate demeanor of the men and women rushing their way through the 
morning city jungle. In migrants’ accounts, the UK was indeed invoked as a ‘different 
universe’ – its economy was superior, it allowed a ‘decent’ standard of living for the 
majority, it had a better welfare system, and it was a lawful and orderly society that 
protected its citizens. All those benefits, which in the eyes of my informants clearly 
denoted a Western type of society, nevertheless, remained largely inaccessible to 
them because of their discernable accents, non-Western education, or their foreign 
appearance. Their marginalised existence at the brink of society and their precluded 
integration into the ‘real’ UK, they believed, was conferred to them by virtue of their 
inferior nationality. The West that my informants dreamt of experiencing turned out to 
be not as inclusive as they had imagined. Their encounter with this ‘impossible West’ 
left them with a bittersweet taste – it did not deliver the reality it promised, but it 
perpetuated their longing.  
In his study of Romanian migrants’ aspirations and practices, Todd Hartman refers to 
the ‘Europe’ that his informants long to discover as ‘utopian object of impossible 
fullness’ (Hartman 2007: 187 quoting Zizek 1999: 206). As in the case of my own 
informants, Hartman’s subjects imagined that they could attain a particular, yet 
undefined ‘normality’ through migration to western European countries and through 
(re-) building their homes according to a Western template. Romanians’ imaginations 
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of ‘Western normality’, as in the case of Bulgarian migrants, were never realised but 
continued to be deferred into the future. Hartman analyses the teleological nature of 
such imaginary constructs by tracing how people constantly filtered out moments and 
experiences in which ‘normality’ appeared non-existent or unattainable, thus 
preserving it as an idealised notion. He concludes:  
The utopian object of destination is a vector the direction of which may change 
completely (encompassing and then dissociating with ‘Spain’, ‘Europe’, 
‘America’ and so on), yet its velocity – no less desired, utopian or impossible – 
and the distance between it and its destination – just around the next corner or 
across the next border – remain the same (Hartman 2007: 197). 
In other words, when people realised that they were unable to ever come significantly 
closer to their object of desire, they simply shifted its geographical location, the 
temporal horizons and the conditions under which they expected to find it. 
Consequently, the telos – always expected and never arriving – could never be an 
object of criticism or discontent, as the distorted versions in which it appeared in front 
of my informants’ eyes – like the exclusion and hardship they encountered in the UK – 
were always denounced as not representing the ‘real thing’. My informants’ 
expectations thus needed to be corrected, their strategies re-negotiated and their 
individual deficiencies recognised and addressed in the projection of the West into a 
future that was still to come. For instance, they did not attribute the hostility, 
discrimination and exclusion they were subjected to as inherent characteristics of the 
West. Rather, they concluded that either Britain was not the ‘real West’ or they had to 
work harder to prove that the stereotypes and prejudice afflicting their national identity 
did not apply to them.  
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As I already argued in Chapter Two, this persistent and stubborn pursuit of the Western 
telos presents the adoption and reproduction of the ideology of modern capitalism. 
According to Zizek, ideology is a subject’s reaction to social reality resulting from an 
inner tendency towards fantasy identifications, which serves to compensate states of 
lack, deficiency and meaninglessness (1997). This mechanism is especially 
pronounced in peripheral regions across the globe where, according to de Vreis, the 
ideological discourses and institutional apparatuses of western aid and intervention 
have produced subjects of lack and desire (2007). Thus, people who have never 
experienced development, progress and modernity after a Western template are 
particularly willing to take risks and undertake major social engineering projects in the 
hope of coming closer to a utopian world that continuously remains ‘out of place’ (de 
Vreis 2007: 33). As argued in Chapter Two, the realization that ‘transition’ to a ‘truly’ 
Western capitalist modernity would never materialise in Bulgaria did not make people 
abandon their teleological longing but pushed them into embracing migration as the 
only route towards the West. My informants’ migration journeys in this sense present 
a case of de Vries’ ‘decentred’ and ‘desiring’ subject, who is willing to take risks and 
make cardinal decisions in the hope of coming closer to a utopian world that always 
remains ‘out of place’ (de Vreis 2007:  33). 
The paradox emanating from this attempt to escape their current predicament – by 
embracing the hope to attain ‘normal lives’ in the West – stems from people’s 
unwillingness ‘to recognise their recognition of its falsity’ (The pervert’s guide to 
ideology: n.p.). Inconvenient truths become repudiated, false beliefs and constituting 
practices sustained through the power of denial. Thus, rather than being externally 
imposed and passively received, ideology is self-consciously maintained and 
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perpetuated by people’s attempts to devise alternative social realities that sooth their 
hardships and traumas. Therefore, people’s attachment to ideological fantasies should 
not be interpreted as a naïve form of self-deception (Zizek 2008). It can be argued that 
they possess what Sloterdijk calls ‘enlightened false consciousness’ (1988), which 
allows them to discern the falsity of ideological claims and still accept and reproduce 
them in material practices and discourses. What makes people still behave ‘as if they 
believe’ is the sense of power and control that they gain through acting in accordance 
to an ideological claim (Zizek 2008; Sloterdijk 1984). Of course, the self-inflicted 
blindness with which modern subjects performatively reproduce the ‘ideological 
fantasy’ ultimately results in the greater efficacy of ideology rather than in mastering its 
power. It is along these lines that I interpret my informants’ unwillingness to give up on 
the ‘imaginary West’ and sustain this utopian object of desire even when they were 
certain about its illusionary seduction. Their drive for purposeful existence and 
improvement of their condition – an inherent characteristic of life in modern capitalism 
– made Bulgarian migrants hold on to the promise of the ‘impossible West’. Eleonora 
captured the purpose of this utopian fantasy most pertinently when she explained her 
decision to remain in the UK:  
What choice are we left with than to keep on aspiring? Sometimes one needs 
to close their eyes to the negative and insist on the imagined. Naturally, 
everyone hopes that the future holds better opportunities and prosperity, this is 




The reproduction of the ‘imaginary West’ in the ‘cycle of deception’ 
In the last two sections, I have demonstrated how the West was never abandoned but 
sustained and reproduced as a telos, always deferred into the upcoming future. In this 
sense, the ‘imaginary West’ proves to be a helpful concept in explaining sustained 
migration movements even after people’s expectations and dreams have proven 
illusionary. This trajectory also has implications for the main question guiding this 
research – Why do Bulgarians continue to migrate to western Europe despite the 
hostility and discrimination they will inevitably face? One would think that the known 
stories of discrimination, exploitation, and suffering of Bulgarians in the UK would have 
made it clear to those back home that migration is unlikely to lead to a better life. 
However, the fact that each year new cohorts of Bulgarians embark on this journey 
with the same hopes, expectations, and imaginations suggests that honest accounts 
of migrant life do not reach or are not received by those back home. Thus, 
paradoxically, in today’s age of hyper-connectivity and social media, it is still possible 
for people to maintain idealised and unrealistic visions of life in a faraway place.  
It appears that the ‘imaginary West’ is reproduced and fortified by what Sarah Mahler 
calls ‘a cycle of deception’ (1995: 88). In her ethnography of Central and South 
American migration to Long Island, United States, Mahler follows a group of 
undocumented migrants on their quest for achieving the ‘American Dream’. Quickly 
upon arrival, her informants are shocked and disillusioned by a reality that drastically 
falls short of their dreams. Their disappointed hopes are blamed on the inaccurate 
accounts presented by return and fellow migrants and the rosy images propagated by 
different media outlets. Interestingly, when their own turn comes to inform aspiring 
migrants back home about their bitter experiences in the US, they too, preferred to 
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mislead their audience by downplaying the hardship and boosting often invented 
achievements. According to Mahler, it is in this self-perpetuated ‘cycle of deception’ 
(1995: 88) that the naïve imaginary of the US as a ‘promised land’ continues to be 
reproduced for generations of migrants.  
Reflecting back on my own research, it becomes obvious that it was through the work 
of a similar mechanism that the ‘imaginary West’ sustained its power as a main factor 
fostering migration. My informants entered the ‘cycle of deception’ in Bulgaria when 
they started constructing their visons of the UK by drawing on collected impressions 
and information provided by current or return migrants. This they did either by talking 
to friends, neighbours or other personal connections, or by reading online migrant 
discussion forums, websites and Facebook groups. The information disseminated 
through these channels was largely inaccurate, in some cases admittedly fraudulent. 
There were, however, some matter-of-fact depictions which represented the negative 
sides of migrants’ Western journeys. It was intriguing to observe how would-be 
migrants intentionally shied away from such ‘pure’ facts, or how, when confronted with 
them, they tried to dismiss them as misleading or as not applicable to their own case. 
This was their usual reaction to my own, less positive accounts of life in the UK. Upon 
presenting me with their expectations and imaginations, my informants would often ask 
me to corroborate these with examples of my own migrant journey. I soon noticed that 
the episodes of adversity and the negative evaluations that I wholeheartedly shared 
received a cold and suspicious reception. I was told that my experiences were 
exceptional as there were many others claiming the opposite or it was subtly suggested 
to me that I tended to overemphasise the bad sides of the UK because of my own 
unwillingness or inability to find my place there. When I shared this with a friend who 
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had recently returned after a long stay in France, she laughingly commented that often 
when told that the West was not as miraculous a place as imagined, Bulgarians would 
suspect that something was wrong with the bearer of the message.  
For my informants, media was another important source creating predominantly 
attractive representations of Western life. In Chapter Three, I have discussed their 
imaginings as partly stemming from their exposure to images and information mediated 
through movies and reality TV programs, music video clips and football broadcasting. 
Above all, however, their idealised visions of the UK and the West in general were 
rooted in the centuries-old hegemonic narrative of Western supremacy still dominating 
political and cultural discourses in Bulgaria, the emergence and reproduction of which 
I have traced back from the 19th century onwards in Chapter Four, Section One.  
Shortly after their arrival, migrants were shocked by a sobering reality that had very 
little in common with their pre-migratory idealisations. Although, as explained, they 
never openly acknowledged that their beliefs turned out to be nothing more than 
fantasies, they were bitter and disillusioned. In times of deep despair, they would direct 
their anger against those who had mislead them. For instance, one time Eleonora said 
to me how deeply frustrated she was with her Bulgarian friends – long-term migrants 
in the UK who had concealed from her important information: ‘When you arrive you 
realise that everything is so much more different than what you were told. I have spent 
three years collecting information and preparing for my move and I still found it so hard. 
This is because people lie, they lie about everything’. Eleonora believed that many 
Bulgarians were intentionally hiding important information in an effort to sabotage their 
compatriots’ migrations out of fear of growing competition. Yet, she added, they could 
not help but boost their success – invented or real – upon their returns home.  
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Some of my informants felt deceived after finding out the truth about their friends and 
neighbours’ immigrant ‘success’. This happened to Blagovest who for years had been 
hearing about the good life that one of his neighbours was having in London: ‘He told 
me that he was a businessman. He lived in his own place and had his own car. When 
he came back for the holidays, he would gather the whole neighbourhood for a three 
days’ feast – food, drinks, it was all on him. He never complained, he seemed happy.’ 
When visiting his friend for a couple of days in London, Blagovest found out how little 
of his account was true: he was a self-employed construction worker and he lived in 
conditions that Blagovest described as ‘dismal’.  
I asked my informants what they, in their turn, told people about their lives in the UK. 
All claimed that they always described things as they really were, ‘no fairytales, only 
the truth’. Just like in my case, however, their truth would often fall on deaf ears. Those 
back home were usually not prepared to receive information that questioned the 
veracity of their ‘imaginary West’. When encountering more objective depictions of 
British realities, those back home would often refute them as ill-intentioned or false, 
thus contributing to their own deception. Such realisation was painfully experienced 
especially by those who had had a hard time persuading their own family of their 
migrant suffering. Assen, for example, was pushed to go back home in his second 
month in London because of not being able to find employment. When he explained to 
his wife and parents the hardships he was going through and the impossibility to settle 
down and work towards bringing them over to the UK, they accused him of being 
passive and of not doing what it took to ‘make it’:   
They don’t want me to go back. They are really pushing me to try harder. I tell 
them I don’t have a job; how should I pay my rent? “How come everyone else is 
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managing and only you cannot?” This is what she [his wife] repeats all the time. 
She thinks I am lying to her, she is so mesmerised by her ideas of how easy 
and rosy everything is here that she does not believe her own husband.  
In other instances, my informants contributed to the perpetuation of the unrealistic 
Western image by embellishing their own stories and conspicuously demonstrating 
their material success. In the previous chapter, I explained how ‘middle-class’ migrants 
went as far as constructing alternative versions of their occupations and lifestyles. 
Sarah Mahler (1995) explains such false accounts with migrants’ attempts to 
compensate the devaluation they are confronted with in their migration destination. By 
boosting their status back home, Bulgarians were able to alleviate the pressure for 
success that migration always entailed and to compensate their frustrating 
experiences. The distorted accounts of migration, together with the selective reception 
of information in Bulgaria thus perpetuate the idealised version of the ‘imaginary West’ 
and, furthermore, the ‘cycle of deception’ luring more and more people to embrace 
migration to the UK and elsewhere as a strategy for obtaining a better life.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has advanced the understanding of what propels and sustains Bulgarian 
migration to the UK on three different levels. Firstly, I have shown the profound effect 
that migration had on the lives of my informants by outlining a state of ‘international 
stuckedness’ (adapted from Hage 2009). Driven by an imaginary construct depicting 
distant places and the lives they offered in a highly idealised manner, my informants’ 
migrations did not only lead to disappointment and disillusionment, but in fact 
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entrenchment in a situation which was, in most cases, worse than the one left behind. 
Initially conceived as a ‘vehicle of empowerment’ enabling people to ‘confound the 
established spatial orders’ (Ferguson and Gupta 1992: 17), migration brought them 
into a situation where they could neither realise their hopes of existential advancement 
nor return back to their pre-migration life. Their physical presence in a place of high 
status did not allow them to transform their state of globally structured inferiority and 
gain membership in Western modernity, as their inferior nationality located them at the 
lowest point of the domestic social hierarchy ultimately affecting how far they could get 
in the future. 
Possibilities for meaningful existence in the UK were further precluded, as I have 
shown, by limited time, social isolation and restricted physical movement which made 
migrants feel more stuck in the UK than back in Bulgaria. Furthermore, the existence 
of material and lifestyle opportunities of a superior quality in the UK only augmented 
my informants’ feelings of disadvantage and inferior standing. 
The state of ‘international stuckedness’ turned out to be practically irreversible for my 
informants because the option of return was highly problematic. Going back to Bulgaria 
rarely emerged as a meaningful alternative, as in many cases such a move was 
interpreted as a regress and resulted in loss of status, although mostly in the eyes of 
friends and acquaintances back home.  
By revisiting my informants’ lives after the formal completion of my fieldwork, I have 
been able to identify four different future scenarios which they constructed as a reaction 
to the state of international stuckedness: staying against the odds, constant mobility 
between Bulgaria and the UK, further migration, and returning home. All of them 
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demonstrated ongoing hope for attaining the ‘imaginary West’, which migrants 
observed in the lives of the locals but could never experience despite their best efforts. 
On a second, more analytical level, I have looked at the notion of the ‘imaginary West’ 
and its sustained significance in the post-migratory period. As revealed in discussions 
of migrants’ imaginations and future scenarios, they continued to reproduce the West 
as a powerful dream, the realisation of which was a focal point directing their efforts, 
hopes and expectations. During my fieldwork, I was surprised to find that, rather than 
debunking its illusionary nature, my informants started adapting their 
conceptualisations of the ‘imaginary West’ in accordance to current realities and 
available choices.  
The sustained appeal of the West and the perseverance with which it was reproduced 
in migrants’ future dreams and desires, I have argued, revealed its teleological nature.  
The ‘myth’ of the West lured my informants into a hide-and-seek game, where 
incentives were displayed and promises made, which appeared to be within one’s 
reach only to be deferred ever and ever again. The Western telos, always expected 
and never quite there, could not be an object of criticism and discontent, as the 
distorted versions in which it appeared before my informants’ eyes were always 
denounced as not representing the ‘real deal’. I have argued that the attachment and 
continuous reproduction of this imaginary construct should not be interpreted as 
naiveté or simple delusion. Instead, the power of the imaginary West stems from its 
ability to alleviate internal lacks and sustain a positive future orientation. There was no 
way that my informants and migrants more generally could simply abandon the visions 
of life in the West, because sustaining this notion gave them a sense of purpose in life, 
even if perpetuating the reproduction of modern capitalist ideology at the same time.  
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Finally, on a third, more global level, I have demonstrated the significance of the 
‘imaginary West’ in propelling and sustaining international migration flows. This thesis 
was initiated by the desire to understand the paradoxical zeal with which Bulgarians 
pursue migration to the UK, where they are reluctantly received and usually relegated 
to the lower ranks of society. I have argued that it is the construction of the ‘imaginary 
West’ and its constant reproduction in a cycle of deception that informed the 
expectations of future and current migrants and that sustained the ‘supply’ of new 
arrivals. The ‘cycle of deception’ driving the reproduction of the ‘imaginary West’ also 
helps to explain my informants’ own contribution in fostering, voluntarily or not, the 
unrealistic dream that this imaginary stands for. Studying this cycle, the expectations, 
information exchange and filtering mechanisms underlying it present a pertinent entry 
point for migration research. Furthermore, it substantiates the challenge faced by 
orthodox economistic approaches to migration research and the rational actor and 











The aim of this thesis was to explain contemporary Bulgarian migration to the UK which 
has marked a new peak since the lifting of EU work restrictions in 2014. This study 
aims to disentangle the paradox related to the growing desirability of the UK as a 
migration destination on the one hand, and the widely-noted discriminatory policies, 
negative public perceptions, and dismal working conditions with which the country 
‘greets’ Bulgarian newcomers, on the other. I set out to answer the following three 
questions about Bulgarian migration to the UK arising from this paradox:  
1. Why do Bulgarians choose to migrate, and why do they migrate to the UK in 
particular when they are aware of the hostile public discourse and the 
potential hardships they will encounter upon arrival? 
2. How do Bulgarians’ post-migration experiences correspond to their 
expectations of life in the UK?  
3. How do migrant realities affect the status of the UK as an attractive migration 
destination?  
In answering these questions, I was interested in presenting individuals’ own changing 
perspectives on and experiences of migration, the meanings they attached to their 
strategies and the stories that helped them come into terms with their new realities. In 
order to achieve this, I have adopted an ethnographic multi-sited approach with 
informal conversations and participant observation as main methods of data gathering. 
My efforts to explain migration as perceived and experienced by those who engage in 
it challenges the premises of orthodox migration research that sees economic factors 
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as the main driving force of population mobilities. In the course of my research it 
became clear to me that my informants’ decisions were to a great extent informed by 
specific imaginations, hopes and dreams about the UK (and western Europe in 
general), which they expressed in the emic concept of the West. My engagement with 
the literature on social imaginaries and the decisive role they play in individual lives 
and practices led me to adopt the notion of the ‘imaginary West’ as the one best suited 
to capture the complex interplay between individual imaginations and widely circulating 
cultural and ideological constructs.  
The four empirical chapters have elucidated the diversity of individual motivations for 
migration and their embeddedness in wider historical and socio-economic factors 
affecting both Bulgaria and the UK. By exploring the different stages of the migration 
journey, I have also demonstrated how individuals cope with unexpected hardship and 
contradictions in an effort to bring their pre-migratory plans to fruition and sustain a 
positive future perspective. The different expectations and imaginations that 
foreground migration, the meanings attached to the practice, as well as the diverse 
subjective experiences and paths that migrants’ lives take, exhibit a class dimension 
both in informants’ understandings and in more implicit ways.  
This concluding chapter starts by summarising the empirical findings of this thesis while 
discussing the most important questions they raise in relation to reasons and 
expectations of migration and post-migration realities of life. Subsequently, I return to 
some of the key conceptual debates with which this thesis started and reflect on them 
in the light of the most important theoretical and empirical contributions this thesis has 
made to a number of research fields. Finally, I discuss the possible implications of 
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recent political events on Bulgarian migrations and the Western imaginaries that inform 
them and outline areas for further investigation.  
 
Dreams about the West – dreams about a better life  
In this thesis, I have demonstrated how migration for my informants was informed by 
two factors – first the urgency to leave behind certain aspects of their Bulgarian present 
that they found impossible to bear and second the desire to experience an idealised 
Western future that had long informed their imaginings of a better life.  
In Chapter Three I have focused on the pre-migration narratives of my informants and 
revealed their accumulated disappointment with the directions their lives had taken in 
many cases diverting sharply from the plans and aspirations they held about their 
future. A wide range of experiences, interpreted by would-be migrants as personal 
failures, brought about a sense of debilitating despair – inability to find a job that 
matched one’s qualifications, unsuccessful business endeavours, missed 
opportunities for creating a family and bringing up children, and ‘forced’ pursuit of 
qualification in a field not of one’s own choosing. The resulting feelings of everyday 
insecurity and fear of what the future might hold conditioned a state of lacking or 
inadequate movement forward in life. Drawing on the work of Bourdieu (1993) and 
Hage (2005) I have referred to this subjective experience as ‘existential stuckedness’, 
a state provoked by a variety of factors and diminishing opportunities for meaningful 
agency and control over one’s situation. My informants were able to recognise this 
stagnant existence as an important impetus leading up to the decision to migrate and 
as a condition affecting the majority of Bulgarians, one stemming out of the collective 
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failure of Bulgarian state and society to transition towards ideal model of western 
capitalism and democracy. Remaining in a ‘post-transitional’ country which appeared 
as placed outside a progressive modernist template of development made my 
informants feel entrapped and disconnected from (or at least marginalised within) a 
First World group of countries whose citizens enjoyed the civilisational and economic 
benefits of modernity. As hopes for collective advancement and inclusion began to 
appear increasingly illusory in Bulgaria, migration emerged as the only available 
individualised strategy through which my informants could ‘confound the established 
spatial order’ (Gupta and Ferguson 1992: 17) and claim First World status.   
At the same time, it was future migrants’ ability to imagine the UK as offering a life 
drastically different from the one they had in Bulgaria that made migration an attractive 
and sensible option. In Chapter Four I have explored positive imaginations about 
distant places offering opportunities for progress and prosperity unavailable at home 
that aspiring migrants conveyed in the emic notion of the West (Zapadat).  In their 
perceptions, the West was referred to as both a geographical location – western 
Europe (and the UK in particular) – and an ‘imaginary elsewhere’ (Yurchak 2006) 
where they could overcome the constraints defining their lives back home and tap into 
infinite possibilities for different and better futures. The detailed accounts of the West 
and referrals to its superior standard and civilisational advancement as common-sense 
knowledge, provided even by those who had never travelled abroad, pointed to its 
status of an imaginary and ideological construct. In order to capture the interconnection 
between individual imaginations and globally circulating cultural repertoires making up 
the emic category of the West I have introduced the concept of the ‘imaginary West’. 
This has allowed me to reveal the power of attraction that the imaginary held for would-
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be migrants as determined by the particular political, socio-economic, and cultural 
context of modern Bulgarian history. My historical overview demonstrated that since 
the Bulgarian national revival, the West emerged, was consolidated, and normalised 
as a symbol of the Enlightenment and its ideas of progress, civilisation, and culture. 
Through alignment with and adoption of norms and values, cultural, and political 
templates contained in the western modernity project, Bulgarians had been trying to 
overcome their Oriental legacy and escape their inferior position as Europe’s 
‘incomplete Other’ (Todorova 1997). 
I have argued that during state socialism the ideological confrontation between two 
different paths of modernity – the communist and the capitalist one - has led to the 
further mythologisation and fetishisation of the West as a consumer paradise and place 
offering a ‘good life’ in the collective Bulgarian consciousness (Chapter One and Four). 
After 1989 western liberal capitalism and democracy became the main doctrine 
defining the path of east European societies (Sampson 1998) – the ‘imaginary West’ 
can be argued to have become the hegemonic civilisational standard against which 
the ‘transitions’ of these societies were measured. Throughout the market reforms 
people were led to believe that the adoption of the western developmental model and 
the refashioning of subjectivities and all spheres of life would eventually lead to 
economic development, prosperity and living standards equal to those in western 
Europe. These specificities of the historical context I have taken as an explanation of 
the special attraction that the image of the West holds particularly strong for those living 
in postsocialist eastern Europe. 
Would-be migrants’ narrations about their expectations and imaginations of life in the 
UK drew a world map in which countries were hierarchically ordered according to the 
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degree of success with which they have managed to adopt a western model of 
capitalist development and modernity. The further up in the hierarchy and more 
westwards the country was the more suitable migration destination it appeared in my 
informants’ eyes. In this sense, the UK, which they placed at the top of this symbolic 
order, was said to represent the purest possible embodiment of the West and the 
country to offer the kind of life that came closest to the way in which life ‘should be’. 
The historical significance of the country as the cradle of industrial revolution, its status 
as a former colonial superpower and its historical and present economic independence 
and strength were the specificities that elevated the UK as the epitome West in my 
informants’ imaginaries. Bulgaria, on the other hand, was imagined as the complete 
antithesis of the West because of its underdevelopment and status as the poorest EU 
member state. My informants’ narratives revealed that migration was deployed not 
simply as a strategy for overcoming economic disadvantage and marginality, as 
mainstream migration analysis points out, but as a way for achieving an international 
advancement from a place of low to a place of high status in the global hierarchy. I 
have claimed that for my informants migration was not simply a move from a ‘poor’ to 
a ‘wealthy’ place but from a place offering restricted possibilities for meaningful 
existence to one promising ample scope for existential becoming. The pursuit of 
existential advancement through migration contained the hope for overcoming a 
globally-entrenched inferiority and peripheral ‘second-class’ status and claiming a 
stake and participating in ‘first order’ Western capitalism. 
The ‘imaginary West’ conditioned the way in which my informants viewed their and 
their country’s position in an international hierarchy of places but also normative 
understandings of social difference, authority, and hierarchy. Thus, one’s cultural and 
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symbolic proximity to the West measured by consumption of western cultural products 
and lifestyle but most of all by cultivation of perceived ‘Western mentality’ and 
adherence to its corresponding values came to determine one’s symbolic position in 
society. As I have shown in Chapter Three my informants understood their own identity 
and social belonging according to their perceived degree of Westernness. Based on 
my informants’ own classifications of themselves and others I have differentiated 
between two group identity designations: ‘Bulgarian Westerners’ and ‘ordinary people’.  
Although social and educational capital in the constitution and differentiation of these 
two categories was important, what clearly delineated them was their relation to the 
West: ‘Bulgarian Westerners’ presented themselves as having successfully adopted 
Western values, while ‘ordinary people’ lamented that Western ways of thinking and 
doing things were not compatible with their ‘Balkan mentality’. As I have indicated in 
my theoretical discussion on postsocialist class (Chapter Two) such conflicting self-
identifications can be seen as crystallisation of superimposed class narratives in wide 
circulation throughout the 1990s which tried to attribute the blame for Bulgaria’s 
unsuccessful transition to the uneducated masses, whose retrograde ways of thinking 
were said to have inhibited the transformational efforts of a pro-Western elite (see 
Lavergne 2010). I have argued that these narratives, which were reproduced in the 
protest of 2013-2014 (Chapter Three) served to conceal the actual reasons for social 
inequalities by misrepresenting them as arising from cultural distinctions. Neither group 
was able to recognise the structural forces conditioning their precarious economic and 
symbolic position: ‘Bulgarian Westerners’ looked down upon the ‘simple-minded’ and 
‘uncivilised masses’ while ‘ordinary people’ often succumbed to their own 
Orientalisation by accepting that they were indeed inadequate and incompetent. Thus, 
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when considering ‘Bulgarian Westerners’’ lack of discernible economic privilege and 
insecure future prospects I have concluded that both groups could be subsumed under 
the category of ‘working class’.  
The self-ascribed class belonging of my informants was manifested in the different 
meanings and purposes they attributed to their migration projects, as well as in different 
imaginations and expectations of life in the West (the UK in particular) (Chapter Three 
and Four). For the so-called ‘ordinary people’ who included less-educated, largely 
middle-aged blue-collar workers and small business owners, the West was a place 
where they could finally enjoy a ‘normal’ life. This ‘normality’ was understood to offer a 
predictable day-to-day existence which ensured control over the present and ability to 
make plans for the future. The economic security and general affordability of life that 
my informants considered the main characteristics of ‘normality’ denoted a widespread 
belief in the socially just principles guiding western societies. For my informants it was 
hard and honest labour that entitled individuals to the benefits of Western ‘normality’ 
and constituted them as respectable citizens. ‘Ordinary people’s’ future projections 
were constructed in direct opposition to those aspects of their lives in Bulgaria that they 
found most distressing and which served as the main triggers for migration. I have 
argued how one of their most oft-mentioned complaints prior to migration was related 
to their inability to engage in consumption of electronic appliances and gadgets, 
branded clothing and trips abroad which were expected to raise their life standard and 
bring upward status mobility. A factor that my informants saw as entrenching their 
inferiority was their lack of strategic social capital in the form of ‘connections’ which 
could be mobilised in the search for lucrative economic opportunities. Another 
constraint was their insufficient cultural capital in terms of higher education, knowledge 
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of western language and IT skills that limited their access to well-paid and symbolically 
valued jobs. Furthermore, it was their symbolic denigration in popular social discourses 
that affected their self-esteem and inflicted humiliation in their everyday interactions. I 
have concluded how ‘ordinary people’s’ migration motivations and the significance that 
they attributed to their migration strategies were very much a reflection of their 
unprivileged class position in society and the economic, social and symbolic 
disadvantages pertaining to it, as well as the aspirations that came with such position.  
I have discussed ‘Bulgarian Westerners’’ imaginations of the West under the term 
‘American dream’, as I found their longings to reflect some of the norms and ideas 
popularly associated with that notion despite the fact that their dream land was Europe. 
The meritocratic functioning of western societies was expected to reward hard-working 
and talented individuals and thus provide ample scope for professional realisation. 
Another important promise that the West held for ‘Bulgarian Westerners’ was the 
unlimited opportunities for career development and self-actualisation which they 
understood as key components of personal success. Although the achievement of this 
success was believed to require hard work and perseverance in the narratives of my 
informants, it often acquired a mystical aura as accessible to those who were ‘in the 
right place, at the right time’. Because of the freedom from societal expectations, 
gender norms and behavioural models ‘Bulgarian Westerners’ saw the West as a place 
of unrestrained personal independence where one could practice different forms of 
individuality.  
Much like ‘ordinary people’ ‘Bulgarian Westerners’’ visions of the West were an 
antithesis of the lives they led in Bulgaria. They were constructed in reaction to their 
frustration with the discrepancy between their self-assigned ‘middle-class’ status and 
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their experiences of socio-economic hardships and lacking symbolic recognition for the 
efforts they put in refashioning their personalities. The contradictions between their 
own perceptions of their position in the social hierarchy and the corresponding sense 
of deservingness and their inability to find employment that matched their 
qualifications, or one ensuring enough finances for meeting a middle-class lifestyle 
resulted in personal dislocations they hoped to resolve through migration. Even those 
who were able to enjoy some financial independence and symbolic recognition were 
still unsatisfied with their achievements as they were gained in a society deemed 
underdeveloped and unable to let go of its Oriental legacy. Migration was the way 
through which ‘Bulgarian Westerners’ hoped to resolve such contradictions and 
dislocations, disassociate themselves from a majority of what they called ‘typical 
Bulgarians’ and become fully immersed in a society of like-minded individuals.  
The expectations and imaginations of life in the UK held by all my informants put 
forward rich and detailed accounts of the West, the life it had to offer and the social 
and cultural norms guiding the everyday. They claimed that these descriptions were 
realistic even if not based on experiential knowledge of western Europe. My informants 
provided two different versions of the West, emphasising imagined characteristics of 
Western life that were important counterpoles to the problems they struggled with in 
Bulgaria, which in turn reflected their subjective class experiences and identities. I have 
argued that both of these were idealistic and often illusionary, making the West the 
fictitious ‘elsewhere’ (Yurchak 2006) where a better life was possible. In light of the 
failure of the postsocialist transition and Bulgaria’s inability to become part of the 
western world, my informants wanted to realise their dream of western modernity for 
themselves. Thus, the teleological nature of the West – defining it as something 
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ostensibly attainable but not here and now - already became apparent at this early, 
pre-migration stage.  
 
From disillusionment to (self-)deception  
The questions of how post-migration experiences map onto migrants’ imaginings of life 
in the UK and impact on the country’s desirability as a migration destination have been 
discussed in chapters Five and Six. Chapter Five has explored the early and mid-term 
experiences of migration by tracing newcomers’ efforts to adapt and settle in an 
unexpectedly hostile environment that presented them with almost insurmountable 
everyday challenges and hardship. When embarking on their journeys informants were 
wary of the anti-immigrant prejudice and discrimination they would face when 
disclosing their Bulgarian nationality. They, however, also believed that their hard 
labour and perseverance would demonstrate their deservingness and quickly 
overcome local misconceptions. As they quickly found out, procedural issues (long 
waiting times for NINo, banks’ refusal to issue accounts, etc.) and discriminatory 
practices of local employers precluded their incorporation into the legal labour market. 
Instead they were pushed into precarious and informal jobs in the shadow economy. 
By exposing the effects that ‘hidden’ bureaucratic mechanisms and increasingly de-
regulated labour markets had on migrants’ lives, I have outlined a state of de facto 
‘illegality’ which affected almost all of my informants and which remains unexplored in 
research on Bulgarian (and Romanian) migration to the UK and other EU countries 
since 2014 (see Bauder 2008). These early challenges did not discourage my 
informants - they saw them as transitory adaptation issues and as the price to pay for 
their eventual incorporation into British society.  
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The persistence of marginality and exclusion into and beyond the mid-run period of 
migration, i.e. for a year or longer after arrival, made migrants reconsider the feasibility 
of their plans for long-term settlement and they started realising that their imaginations 
of Western life were ill-founded and in some cases outright naïve. The promise of the 
benefits brought by full EU citizenship had an important role in encouraging positive 
imaginations about life in the UK. Prior to their migration my informants believed that 
free access to the British labour market would enable their unrestricted participation in 
the economic and social life of the country. With time, however, even the greatest 
optimists came to see their EU citizenship as a formal membership which in reality did 
not guarantee many of the civic, social and political rights enjoyed by locals and by 
other EU migrant groups. The Bulgarians I talked to realised that instead of ‘free-
moving’ Europeans they were in fact ‘second-class’ EU citizens, for whom the UK had 
little more in store than illegal employment and a marginal, precarious existence. 
Whereas in the first weeks and months of their migrant ‘careers’, I found both 
categories of informants equally exposed to the above-described structural limitations, 
in the mid-run period of migration the different capitals at their disposal and their class 
identities started to clearly manifest themselves and produce different practices and 
experiences. Throughout this time all migrants continued to feel as if their lives were 
taking place in a reality parallel to that of the British society. They were, however, 
differently equipped in their struggles for escaping segregation. Because of their lack 
of English language skills, professional qualifications and education, as well as their 
restricted economic capital and knowledge of the British legal and institutional context, 
‘ordinary people’ were in a more disadvantaged position than their better-educated 
compatriots. Even after legalising their status, many found that the only way to make 
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ends meet and secure the survival of their families was to take on multiple jobs and 
long hours. With their efforts entirely focused on keeping their employment and saving 
up enough for covering basic costs and previously incurred debts, ‘ordinary people’ 
tried to sustain ‘ascetic’ lifestyles (Piore 1979) confining themselves to social isolation 
and material deprivation. I have shown how often migrants’ inability to progress out of 
exploitative work relations was result of the psychological barriers erected by their fear 
of humiliation and inadequacy. For example, some of my informants refused to use the 
services of local doctors, apply for welfare support or consider job openings because 
they did not want to be seen as ‘benefit tourists’, or mocked for their poor English. Of 
course, such fears were not unfounded. They often originated out of everyday 
experiences of denigration and discrimination inflicted both by local employers and co-
nationals.  
‘Bulgarian Westerners’ on the other hand, managed to achieve some upward social 
mobility through obtaining white-collar employment in the Bulgarian immigrant 
economy. Because of their English language and IT skills, office experience and 
university education with time they started working as office assistants, managers, and 
accountants in cleaning and building companies run by long-term Bulgarian 
immigrants. For my informants, this was perceived as a success, especially when 
compared to their previous dependence on low-skilled and informal employment. On 
the other hand, they came to realise that instead of creating a path to highly-skilled 
jobs in the British labour market, this meant further isolation in the confines of the 
Bulgarian immigrant community. They interpreted such homogenisation as a decline 
in their social status and as spoiling the Western credentials which they took as a main 
marker of their ‘middle-class’ identity. The only way of dealing with their deepening 
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personal dislocations and class frustrations was the drawing of cultural, moral and 
socio-economic boundaries between themselves and the rest of Bulgarian migrants. 
They did so by re-invoking Orientalising narratives (Buchowksi 2006) and subscribing 
to the xenophobic anti-immigrant discourse in the UK. I have, thus, concluded that in 
the post-migration context, class identities not only kept their significance in the way 
people evaluated their situation, made sense of their predicament, and got involved in 
different practices, but it continued to be reinforced and reproduced with even greater 
intensity. The erasure of class boundaries (Hilfiger and Messias 2001) as a result of 
the confinement of people of diverse class backgrounds within a wider immigrant 
community, their marginalisation and systematically limited integration within the host 
society explain the intensified class tensions within the Bulgarian community well.  
Despite their best efforts ‘ordinary people’ and ‘Bulgarian Westerners’ did not manage 
to achieve the lives that matched their ‘normality’ and the ‘American dream’ 
imaginaries of the West. In order to come to terms with an existence that was in many 
respects worse than the one they left behind, my informants devised ways to help them 
cope with the disillusionment and which enabled them to continue their search for the 
West of their dreams. ‘Ordinary people’, for example, found comfort in their improved 
consumption capacity and material level of well-being. Their ability to cover monthly 
utility bills, food and transport costs and at the same time afford the occasional 
consumption of clothes, electrical appliances, and furniture helped them to 
compensate feelings of inferiority and devaluation, and raised their status. ‘Bulgarian 
Westerners’ often preferred to conceal unpleasant facts of their migrant realities and 
advance a positive self-portrayal through identification with previously-held or desired 
professional identities. For example, they would be silent about their low-skilled full-
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time occupations or present them in a more positive light. By constructing alternative 
narratives of their occupations and experiences my informants were able to save face 
among friends and family back home but also with acquaintances in the UK. 
In Chapter Six I have explained how even after spending a year or more in the UK my 
informants did not manage to attain the existential mobility that they had hoped would 
help them transcend their inferior position in the global hierarchy of places. They 
reached the painful realisation that it was their national identity that prevented them 
from getting desired employment and access to the level playing field in the UK, and 
did not allow them to lead a meaningful and dignified existence. It thus turned out that 
physical mobility in the global order could not help to overcome one’s inferior national 
origin. Therefore, many found themselves in a new and unexpected condition that I 
have called ‘international stuckedness’. This state resulted, on the one hand from their 
failed integration and marginalisation in British society and, on the other, from the 
stigma and shame associated with returning back home and admitting failure. The 
discontent and disillusionment with the obvious mismatch between expectations and 
realities of migration was rarely if at all explicitly voiced. At the same time, however, it 
led to re-evaluation of initial plans and ambitions and search for new ways of keeping 
alive the dream of a better life. Seeing other people around them enjoy the normality, 
dignity and success they had come for made my informants feel that their expectations 
about life in the West were not altogether misconceived, but that their realisation was 
a matter of time and the right circumstances. Accordingly, my informants started to 
adapt and re-project the time horizons and plans of when and how they would be able 
to come closer or achieve a Western life. This re-imagination took four distinct forms. 
A first set of people took the decision to stay in the UK despite their dissatisfaction 
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because they were able to imagine a better future for themselves or their children. A 
second group embraced regular mobility between Bulgaria and the UK. This enabled 
‘Bulgarian Westerners’ to capitalise on their western experience, enhance their socio-
economic position in Bulgaria and sustain a cosmopolitan identity. The same scenario 
adopted by ‘ordinary people’, however, translated into involuntary circular labour 
mobility which, despite entrenching their precariousness, they continued to perform 
with the hope to eventually settle in the UK and realise their Western dream. A third 
future-oriented strategy adopted by migrants resulted in the re-projection of the West 
further afield. They concluded that the UK was not a real representation of the West 
and expressed a desire to migrate to places like Germany, the US, and Spain which 
were seen as its closer approximations. Finally, the few who chose to return to Bulgaria 
did so out of the conviction that Bulgaria too could offer the opportunities for success 
and normality they were after. Thus, they sometimes granted the country with the 
status of an ‘almost West’ while at other times they kept the option of further westwards 
mobility open. 
I have shown that despite everything they went through, my informants refused to 
abandon their imaginations, hopes and dreams of life in the West. Instead, they 
sustained and reproduced the ‘imaginary West’ in their future aspirations. In this sense, 
the West took on the nature of a telos – something never realised and always deferred 
into the future (Hartman 2007). As such, the West was not subjected to criticism or 
discontent; my informants did not attribute the hostility, discrimination, and exclusion 
they met as its inherent characteristics, but explained them with the fact that the UK 
presented a distorted and flawed version of the West. I have argued that this persistent 
and stubborn pursuit of the Western telos reflects the adoption and reproduction of the 
309 
 
social ideology of modern capitalism. The reaction of migrants to the dire social reality 
they endured appears to be resulting from an inner tendency towards fantasy 
identifications compensating states of lack, deficiency, and meaninglessness (Zizek 
1997). However, I refrained from interpreting this attachment to ideological fantasies 
as a naïve form of self-deception and as succumbing to the illusionary projections of 
capitalist ideology (Zizek 2008). I have argued, instead, that their unwillingness to 
abandon the ‘imaginary West’ and sustain the hopes and dreams associated with it 
stemmed from their drive for purposeful existence and progressive improvement. 
Bulgarian migrants chose to hold on to the promise of the ‘impossible West’ because 
enduring their present was impossible without knowing that something better lay 
ahead. In the words of one informant, ‘insisting on imagining and aspiring to realise 
one’s dreams against all odds is the only way for people to carry on with their lives’. 
What this means is that individuals who realise the ideological nature of their dreams 
and their distance from reality often have no other choice but to follow and retell them 
as ‘truthful’. In such a way, by consciously contributing to their own deception, 
Bulgarian migrants engage in practices that fail to challenge the logics of the capitalist 
system but serve to reproduce the latter.  
The sustenance and reproduction of the ‘imaginary West’ in people’s individual 
lifewords indicates the reasons for the importance of this particular imaginary as a 
driver of Bulgarian migration to the UK. The conscious self-deception through which 
the imaginary works, or what Sloterdjik calls ‘enlightened false consciousness’, takes 
place not only on an individual but also on a societal level. By introducing Mahler’s 
concept (1995) of the ‘cycle of deception’ In Chapter Six I have explained the 
mechanism through which the ‘imaginary West’ continued to be reproduced in 
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individual but also public consciousness even if its illusionary nature was fairly obvious. 
I have explained how my informants became part of the cycle of deception already in 
Bulgaria by talking to and observing the consumption practices of current and return 
migrants, reading online discussion forums, and collecting impressions from social 
networks and media (Facebook, Viber, etc.). Public discourse on and media 
representations of the supremacy of western countries’ standard of living and social 
organisation also played a role in constructing an overly positive and idealised vision 
of the West. The negative depictions and the critical voices that tried to question the 
veracity of such accounts were dismissed by my informants as either inaccurate or 
intentionally misleading. I have observed how, in the UK many newcomers felt duped 
by the overblown stories of friends and family, this, however did not stop them from 
consciously embellishing their own reality and conspicuously demonstrating their 
‘success’ when communicating with those back home. Those willing to share their 
hardship and disappointment were taken aback by their families’ lack of compassion 
and suspicion. This lack of interest in, or active denial of, more realistic accounts that 
could potentially unravel the fragile edifice on which the myth of the West was built, 
emanated from the above-discussed individual urge for hope and purpose but 
nevertheless perpetuated a cycle of deception. It was in this way, I have argued, that 
the imaginary West was reproduced as a driver of migration from Bulgaria to the UK – 
luring new cohorts of aspiring migrants each year to try their luck in a country that they 
knew would welcome them with hostility and prejudice.  
The fact that my informants did not manage to realise their visions of Western living is 
not to say that all Bulgarian stories in the UK were negative. Indeed, I met few, mostly 
long-term migrants who had managed to establish their own businesses, re-unite with 
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their families and who were living satisfying and fulfilling lives. They all arrived before 
or straight after 2007 when there was a higher demand for migrant labour and the 
competition for jobs was not that fierce. These success stories were result of years of 
hard labour, migrant ‘knowhow’, and accumulated social networks but also hardship 
and privations. Initially, my informants hoped to replicate the migrant trajectory of ‘old’ 
Bulgarian migrants, but soon they realised that their efforts went against negatively 
changing socio-economic circumstances. In any case, my fieldwork period was too 
short to verify whether informants managed to eventually realise their dreams or not.   
 
Re-visiting migration, imaginary and class 
This thesis makes several contributions to the theoretical debates outlined in Chapter 
Two. Firstly, in my efforts to go beyond the economic reductionism prevailing in the 
field of migration studies I have explained migration as a process engendered by a 
diversity of subjective motivations and wider structural factors. In doing so, I have 
emphasised the important role of individual imaginations in driving and sustaining 
migration. By introducing the notion of the ‘imaginary West’ I have captured the 
imagination that propelled my informants’ movements as an individual everyday 
practice, on one hand, and as shaped by wider cultural constructs, on the other. Thus, 
in opposition to Appadurai (1996) who sees the pursuit of imaginations and dreams 
through migration as an expression of individual empowerment and emancipation I 
have demonstrated how these journeys can lead to disappointment and further 
entrenchment of the precarity and marginalisation that people try to escape from. 
Understanding how individuals’ imaginaries of particular geographical locations and 
the life they have to offer inspire and sustain physical mobility re-casts migration as a 
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cultural process. The emphasis that my thesis has put on migration as a deeper 
statement of one’s ‘personality […] values and attachments’ (Fielding 1992: 210) 
presents a balanced account of the interplay between a diversity of both non-economic 
and economic, as well as, structural and subjective factors which entangle in the 
enactment and reproduction of migration. I have revealed the wide variety of dreams 
contained in the imaginary West – ranging from expectations for experiencing 
existentially meaningful and purposeful lives to engaging in the consumption of luxury 
items and covering monthly utility and food bills.  
Secondly, the thesis makes a timely empirical and theoretical contribution to research 
on east European migration to the western world and the UK in particular. So far 
academic interest has been predominantly focused on the so-called ‘first wave’ of east 
European migrants (Polish in particular) with very little efforts to address the 
experiences of Bulgarians who, despite their lower numbers, have been migrating to 
the UK since 1989. One of the reasons behind this neglect is the homogenisation of 
the experiences of different migrant groups from the region under the category of east 
European migrations. Moreover, existing studies are often informed by a policy agenda 
and geared towards a general description of trends and dynamics in an effort to identify 
possibilities for steering and regulating migration movements. My study presents an 
alternative to such research agendas – as migrants are not treated as ‘flows’ in need 
of regulation but as individuals trying to deal with the challenges of life in the 
contemporary capitalist economy. My contribution lies in my efforts to shift the focus 
towards migrants’ actual experiences. I give them the central role of subjects able and 
deserving to speak for themselves in order to show how their experienced reality is 
affected by structural, economic and political barriers. In particular, I reveal the 
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discrimination, institutional violence and exploitation that persist despite the granting 
of full working rights to Bulgarians in 2014. Such dynamics of exclusion remain 
obscured in portrayals of migration in popular discourses where Bulgarian (and 
Romanian) migrants are unreflectively assumed to be integrated into the UK labour 
market. 
Thirdly, this thesis presents a critique of the research on Bulgarian and east European 
migration that draws on normatively charged and politically handy dichotomies 
between ‘economic’ labour migrations and ‘highly-skilled’ ‘transnational’ mobilities (for 
examples see Chavdarova 2006, Ditchev 2008, Stoilkova 2005, Liakova 2008). 
Although my informants endorsed and drew on these distinctions when presenting their 
migration stories, I have demonstrated how many of the differences between these two 
groups - often taken for granted - are in fact concealing fundamental factors of 
inequality and precarity. I have argued that both categories of migrants demonstrate 
diversity of migration motivations. For example, I show how ‘labour’ migration is not 
solely, if at all, led by economic incentives but a desire for agency, meaning and 
recognition, whereas the mobilities of the ‘highly-skilled’, with the exception of the 
quests for professional realisation, are also attempts of achieving economic stability. 
More importantly, my thesis demonstrates that very often migration leads to the blurring 
of class boundaries and status equalisation as post-migration structural limitations 
exert equal pressure on newcomers despite their different levels of education and 
despite previously held social positions.  
Furthermore, by basing my analysis on individuals’ ways of defining and delineating 
their group belonging and identity this thesis contributes to discussions on postsocialist 
class and to literature that engages with the role of class in migration processes. 
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Research of postsocialist societies has been correctly criticised for its class blindness 
(Morris 2017). The adoption of an anti-communist ideology and neoliberal rhetoric on 
individual responsibility has reduced scholarly treatment of class to social stratification 
and professional status differences (Boyadjieva and Kabakchieva 2015). My research 
seeks to redress this bias by focusing on the lived experiences of class and discussing 
the construction of class identifications and the meanings they hold for individuals in 
their everyday realities. By applying a Bourdieusian class analysis I also demonstrate 
how class identities do not solely depend on economic but also on the possession of 
diversity of other capitals (social, cultural, symbolic).  
Class dimensions have been largely neglected in contemporary migration studies 
particularly when it comes to their effects on the process of migration (Van Hear 2014). 
My thesis contributes to filling this gap by exploring how the different forms of capitals 
(economic, social, cultural, symbolic) accumulated by migrants affect decision-making, 
expectations, and imaginations of post-migration realities, as well as migrants’ post-
migration experiences and chances for reaching their goals and aspirations. I have 
also demonstrated how individuals’ pre-and post-migration narratives on the reasons 
behind, meanings and experiences of migration have been constructed very much in 
line with their subjective class identities and externally-imposed classifications.  
Fourthly, this study provides a contribution to anthropological scholarship on 
postsocialist transformations that so far has paid little attention to the significance that 
imaginings of the West in eastern Europe hold in influencing individuals’ practices, 
worldviews, and self-perceptions. 
Lastly, I demonstrate how the analysis of international system of migrant labour and 
core-periphery dynamics can benefit from the integration of hegemonic cultural 
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imaginaries or ideological constructs to explain the triggering and perpetuation of 
migration movements.  
 
Epilogue: a new West? 
One warm summer evening in August I sat down with Lora and Emil in their tiny kitchen 
in north London. Back then, the two were in the midst of their scramble for documents. 
In an ardent diatribe Lora foresaw what neither of us could have imagined that pleasant 
summer evening, that which a couple of years later has become an increasingly 
realistic scenario:  
I sometimes think that the visa system that we had before, you know how 
Bulgarians could only work with a visa in the UK, was much better. [Me: Come 
on, do you seriously mean this?] Well, see, in the UK the message is ‘come, 
you have the right to work’. People fool themselves and believe they can really 
come and work. When they realise that in practice it is not so straightforward, it 
is already too late – they have quit their jobs and sunk into debt. The visa system 
is just much more honest and fair. If they [the British] don’t want to be in the EU, 
they better get out. Then they will bring back the visa system and maybe it will 
be better, at least people would know what to expect.  
Lora’s vision was not shared by most of the Bulgarians I met in the UK and those 
whose lives I continue to follow after the Brexit referendum of June 2016. They did not 
expect their rights and entitlements to be severely restricted but they worried that 
sustaining a satisfactory quality of life in the UK would become even more problematic 
and would eventually require them to reconsider their migration plans and strategies. 
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For those who regularly remitted money or hoped to raise some capital to invest back 
home, and for the many for whom circular migration was the only available strategy, 
the plummeting of the British pound was a harsh shock. Many shared the impression 
that as the country was preparing for a hard Brexit the prices of essential goods and 
services have increased by up to 20 per cent. They had the feeling that there were 
more job opportunities available but they didn’t take this as a good sign, firstly because 
for them this meant that more and more people were leaving the UK and secondly 
because the minimal wages these jobs offered were not enough to compensate the 
increased cost of living. Another post-referendum observation of my informants 
referred to the fact that people with anti-immigrant sentiments have been further 
empowered to express these in a more explicit way.  
The effects of the pro-leave vote and the prospective change in migrant’s legal status 
promise to increase my informants’ vulnerability. Many feared that a forthcoming Brexit 
would make their stay in the UK impossible or will lead to a loss of their hard-earned 
achievements. More and more people are contacting me nowadays to say they have 
started to reconsider their migration plans. Although a return back to Bulgaria still 
doesn’t appear to be a sensible option they are increasingly considering potential 
futures in other migration destinations – Germany and France being the most 
appealing. What this comes to show is that as further disillusionment with life in the UK 
threatens to dethrone the country from the status of an ultimate West, this idealised 
‘elsewhere’ is quickly re-projected further afield. This demonstrates that in people’s 
perceptions, the West does not have fixed geographical coordinates but can shift 
depending on the circumstances. When the realities of life in a given place do not 
match up with the imagined ideal and disillusionment prevails, people refuse to let go 
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of this ideal but again aim to locate it and attain it in a new geographical destination. 
This utopian place, state, and condition is immune to criticism because it is the source 
of meaning and the ultimate end making people persist in their life struggles. Because 
physical mobility remains the most direct, if painful, path to the West, the concept of 
the ‘imaginary West’ is of key importance for understanding the reasons and the 
mechanisms of migration from peripheral to core regions in contemporary capitalism.  
Academic discussions of east European migration, especially in the context of Brexit, 
have tried to emphasise the economic, cultural, and demographic benefits that 
migrants bring to local society.184  Such efforts, however well-intended, still feed into 
an instrumentalist policy perspective that tries to resolve the ‘migrant problem’ by 
pointing out the measurable added value of immigration for the local economy. In this 
light, migration scholars should make an effort to shift the debate away from the preva-
lent macroeconomic and biopolitical framing and focus on the lived realities of 
migration and migrants’ own narratives. Thus, scholarship could make a more genuine 
effort to understand and demonstrate the effects of migration on migrants themselves 
and the price they pay for following the promises of a better life. This will also allow a 
grasp of the structural factors influencing migration and the global dynamics underlying 
it, such as inequality across and within countries, entrenched peripheralisation, and 
underdevelopment of regions like eastern Europe.  
 
  
                                            
184 See for example a recent workshop titled EU Referendum 2016, UCL, School of Slavonic and East 
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